Contents
1. Intro
2. The Buddha and His Teachings
3. Early Buddhism and The Historical Context of Nagarjuna
4. Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamakakarika
5. The Philosophy of Madhyamika
6. Conclusion
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Notes: The most readable version of this thesis is the nicely-formatted PDF (created by Christopher Richardson in 2001). The 1994 original was written in the TEX publishing code, which did not allow for easy conversion to html. Some characters are missing. While I stripped 99% of the internal TEX formatting codes, some still remain, and the footnotes are in the body of the text. This thesis was, in print, 175 pages. In 2002 Gilles Therrien added formatting that was not included in the original. Emphases (underlining) are Therrien's.
Preface
Any research into a school of thought whose texts are in a foreign language
encounters certain difficulties in deciding which words to translate and
which ones to leave in the original. It is all the more of an issue when
the texts in question are from a language ancient and quite unlike our own.
Most of the texts on which this thesis are based were written in two languages:
the earliest texts of Buddhism were written in a simplified form of Sanskrit
called Pali, and most Indian texts of Madhyamika were written in either classical
or "hybrid" Sanskrit. Terms in these two languages are often different but
recognizable, e.g. "dhamma" in Pali and "dharma" in Sanskrit. For the sake
of coherency, all such terms are given in their Sanskrit form, even when
that may entail changing a term when presenting a quote from Pali. Since this
thesis is not intended to be a specialized research document for a select
audience, terms have been translated whenever possible, even when the subtleties
of the Sanskrit term are lost in translation. In a research paper as limited
as this, those subtleties are often almost irrelevant. For example, it is
sufficient to translate "dharma" as either "Law" or "elements" without delving
into its multiplicity of meanings in Sanskrit. Only four terms have been
left consistently untranslated. "Karma" and "nirvana" are now to be found
in any English dictionary, and so their translation or italicization is unnecessary.
Similarly, "Buddha," while literally a Sanskrit term meaning "awakened,"
is left untranslated and unitalicized due to its titular nature and its familiarity.
Another appellation of Siddhartha Gautama, Tathagata, is the only unfamiliar
term consistently used in the original. This has been done because translations
of the term do not do justice to its mystic import and esotericism.
Finally, two processing errors must be explained. The occasional
appearance of an extra space in hyphenated words, such as "self- nature,"
is due to an unavoidable conflict between two processing programs used in
formatting this document. The extra spaces are not due to poor typing or
incomplete proofreading. Second, the reversed opening quotation marks were
not fixable.
"Misery only doth exist, none miserable,
No doer is there; naught save the deed is found.
Nirvana is, but not the man who seeks it.
The Path exists, but not the traveler on it."
- -The Visuddhimagga
Chapter 1
Introduction
The study of Buddhism has in recent years become quite a vogue in
the West. Post-Enlightenment Europe found Buddhism to offer an attractive
alternative to the authoritarianism implicit in Christianity's doctrine
of revelation and in its priestly structure. Buddhism seemed to offer
a "natural" religion, one based on common sense and teaching truths accessible
to anyone, yet without surrendering mysticism.
Note: Cf. Peter Harvey, An Introduction to Buddhism (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990), 300
Buddhism also seemed curious to the Western mind because, like so many
Oriental philosophies, it was neither really a philosophy nor a religion,
but something with elements of both. As such, it posed unique solutions
to the problems of Western thought, as well as whole new types of problems
of its own.
The form of Buddhism that has most captured the attention of the
West, especially America, is Japan's Zen.
Zen represents a religion that is in many ways a diametrical opposite to
America's Protestant Christianity. Its unorthodox means of transmission,
complete rejection of ritual, doctrine of the spiritual nature of all beings,
and emphasis on direct, personal perception of the Truth have proven fascinating
to the American mind. Unfortunately, this is often all that is known of Buddhism.
It is not uncommon to encounter the belief that Zen represents the culmination
of or even the entirety of Buddhism. This is far from true. In fact,
it could be defended that the history of Buddhism has witnessed more
internal philosophical diversity than almost any other religion, with the possible exception of Hinduism. Even more egregious, the non-doctrinal
nature of Zen has allowed Westerners to conflate Buddhism with a number
of other systems of thought, be they "Eco- spirituality" or watery "New-Ageism,"
declaring them all to be compatible. That Buddhism has dogma and is a widely
variegated, autonomous religion not always reconcilable with modern philosophies
and movements is often not seen.
The uniqueness of much of Buddhism lies in the
way it seeks "Ultimate Truth" and the manner of Ultimate Truth it finds.
Truth, for Buddhism, is relative.
There is no single, unchanging, absolute ground of being like there
is in most of the world's thought. To make a broad generalization
of Occidental philosophy, the entire Abrahamic tradition, stretching from
the pre-Israelites to the Bahá'í religion, sees the universe as in some
way contingent on a transcendent, absolute level of Being. Even the most
mystical or skeptical of the early Western schools of thought accepted
an ultimate essence of reality. For Pythagoras it was numbers, for Heraclitus
it was a reification of process itself, for Plotinus it was Mind, and
for the Jewish Qabala it was a super-attenuated form of divine light.
Even the most skeptical of philosophers, such as Zenoo or Pyrrho, did not
deny an ultimate ground of being. Rather, they just said that it was inconceivable.
The Oriental religions, too, agree that there is an ultimate essence in
things. The Taoists insist that it is utterly ineffable, Advaita Vedanta
declares it to be beyond existence itself, and the Materialists deny that
it is of the nature of spirit. Nonetheless, all agree that there is an
"Ultimate."
Note: This generalization is not meant to suggest that the philosophies
listed agree in any way on the nature of the Ultimate. More, there were
trends of thought within some of these philosophies that come very close
to the Buddha's theory of the Ultimate; the Rg-veda X.129, for example, states
that in the beginning "there was neither existence nor non- existence, …neither
death nor immortality," and the Tao te Ching chapter II says that "being
and non-being create each other." Nonetheless, the general trend within
all of these schools of thought was to seek and find some form of "Absolute."
In contrast with all of these is Buddhism.
The Buddha did not teach that there is an Ultimate, nor did he deny it.
He did not declare the Ultimate to be ineffable because mystical and
inherently beyond the scope of thought, nor did he embrace agnosticism
and say that we just can never know its nature. The
Buddha simply would not talk about it. When a concept was discussed
in relation to a metaphysical thing, he would declare this concept to be neither
wrong, nor right, nor both, nor neither. It just should not be discussed.
- This approach has no parallels.
- It is not a form of skepticism, for the Buddha was very clear in enunciating doctrines that his followers
must accept on at least a conventional level.
- It is not agnosticism, for the
Buddha did not just say that we cannot know about the nature of Ultimate
reality, but rather he said that it truly is "not this, not that, not
both, and not neither."
- It is not pessimism, for the
Buddha taught that all unpleasantries can be overcome and that there
is a definite goal to be striven for.
- Finally, it is not mere mysticism, for the Buddha stressed the importance of directing one's consciousness
to concrete affairs.
This unique non-affirming non-negating
approach of the Buddha is implicit in all schools of Buddhism.
It is the most explicit in three: the Perfection
of Wisdom school of the first centuries BE., the
Madhyamika and Yogacara
movement of the first millenium C.E., and Zen and its predecessor,
Ch'an, of the modern era. All of these teach
the non-dual, non-conceptual, non-existential nature of reality and the
applicability of mentation to the pragmatic sphere only. Any
one of these three would have been desirable subjects for study.
The one school I chose to research and explain
here is Madhyamika. This school has been chosen partly
because early Buddhism has been little studied in the West. Madhyamika
has, of late, begun to attract much scholarly attention, but it is still
a little-recognized word and an even less- understood philosophy. The Perfection
of Wisdom school was, for my purposes, too early to be the focus of study
here. It was superseded by and amalgamated into the Madhyamika-Yogacara movement,
and so a discussion of the latter will explain much of the former. Yogacara
would also have been a fascinating object of study, but I feel that the
Yogacara school introduced concepts into Buddhism which were somewhat foreign
to the tradition. This is not a criticism, but what I desired to study was
Buddhism as expressed by the Buddha. Madhyamika seems to be the better of
the two in representing this.
Note: Cf. Gadjin M. Nagao, "Yogacara, a Reappraisal" in Madhyamika
and Yogacara (New York: State University of New York Press, 1991), 219-225,
where Yogacara is represented as adding to the tradition of Buddhism
and completing the move from the original Theravada to the innovative
Mahayana.
Whether Madhyamika represents the original essence of the Buddha's teaching
is a matter of speculation that can never be fully resolved. However, many
if not most scholars of Madhyamika are of the opinion that it is perhaps
the truest philosophical systematization of the Buddha's ontology.
Cf., for example, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy,
volume I (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1929), 643, or T.R.V. Murti,
The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.,
1960), 55
Perhaps my main reason for selecting Madhyamika was the same as that
felt by Europeans over a hundred years ago when they first "discovered"
Buddhism: it represents a fascinating approach to philosophy and a general
worldview the likes of which are not to be found in the history of Western
thought.
Finally, Zen, too, would
have been a compelling research topic, and, unlike Yogacara, it does
not seem to conflict with or add to the philosophy of the Buddha as preserved
in the earliest writings. There is, however, one difficulty in approaching
Zen from an academic perspective. Both Zen and Madhyamika
agree that concepts have no final applicability, but they differ in their
internalization of this fact. If one asks a Zen master what the
nature of reality is, one is likely either to be hit or to be told "this
flax weighs three pounds."
Note: Cf. the anecdotes told of Zen teaching methods in Paul
Reps, ed., Zen Flesh, Zen Bones (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books
(no impress date))
This may be an appropriate way of expressing the school's philosophy
of the nature of reality, but it does little good to one who needs to write
about that philosophy. A proponent of the Madhyamika
school may, in essence, give the same answer as the Zen master. He or
she will, though, at least be kind enough to explain the answer in words
and sentences, making this school more amenable to the scholarly approach.
Notes on the Methodology of this Thesis
The goal of this thesis is to present
the philosophy of Madhyamika in as clear and concise a manner as possible. Given both the length and time constraints of this research project
and the limited degree of education I have thus far enjoyed, it was necessary
to investigate this topic with a tight focus. I
have chosen to use only Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamakakarika, "Verses on the Fundamentals of the Middle [Way]," as the lens through
which to view Madhyamika. This treatise is the premier work both of
Nagarjuna and of the school as a whole. It includes all of the main themes
of the school, it serves as the model for the school's method of argumentation,
and it is the focus of the subsequent history of the school. Following Nagarjuna,
Madhyamika commentaries addressed, not just "what did the Buddha mean?",
but also "what did Nagarjuna mean?"
In following this procedure of discussing only the Mulamadhyamakakarika,
I often faced the tantalizing temptation to draw quotes from other of
Nagarjuna's works. There are instances where a concept in this treatise
may be spelled out gradually over the course of five or so verses, while
the same concept in another text may be expressed succinctly and pithily.
Unfortunately, these cannot be quoted in such a context as this. Once another
text of Nagarjuna's is used, it is only a short step to back up Nagarjuna
by quoting aryadeva, and then only another short step
to explain Nagarjuna by recourse to Candrakirti. Since
this would ultimately result in a distortion of the treatise, I have deemed
it best neither to quote nor discuss any other works.
The other methodological issue I had to consider is whether to use any
concepts or tools from Occidental philosophy in this analysis of Madhyamika.
There are numerous parallels between Madhyamika and various schools of
thought in the Western tradition. These parallels include concepts, intentions,
methods, and results. Once again, though, I chose
to examine the Mulamadhyamakakarika on its own and within the tradition
of Buddhism only. It must be admitted that much understanding of
the work may have been lost by such a limitation. Notwithstanding, there
are two definite advantages of bringing to bear no Western philosophy here.
First, and most simply, I had neither room, nor time, nor sufficient education.
Even had I those luxuries, though, I doubt that I would have utilized them.
Interpreting Nagarjuna using Occidental tools may seriously misrepresent
him. For example, a major criticism of T.R.V. Murti's analysis of Madhyamika
is exactly this; in contrasting Nagarjuna with Kant, even favorably, Murti
may have seen Nagarjuna through distorting lenses. The approach of this research
project is thus to try to arrive at an understanding of Madhyamika by examining
only the central work of its central figure with as few contrasts and comparisons
as possible.
A final note of the methodology of this project regards which things
were selected for examination, and in what depth. What has been chosen
was to explain the philosophy as well as possible to the lay, not the scholarly,
reader. An extra chapter, "The Buddha and His Teachings,"
has been included that would not have been necessary had the intended
audience been a specialized one. This has resulted in extra length
of the thesis, but I deemed it well worth while. The philosophy of the Buddha
is not just foreign and difficult for a modern Western audience, but was
found to be abstruse even by the Buddha's ancient and Eastern one. Providing
plenty of background can only help in understanding this topic.
The depth of this study proved to be a trickier issue. On the one hand,
each chapter of the Mulamadhyamakakarika could be summarized in a mere
five sentences. On the other hand, fifty pages or more would not be sufficient
to explain fully any chapter, and entire books could be devoted to some
of them. Likewise for the three subjects highlighted as foundational for
the school, i.e. self-nature, dependent arising, and emptiness — -each could
have been explained in one page or one hundred. The depth I have chosen is
thus completely arbitrary, guided only by considerations of what could investigated
in one year and in less than two hundred pages total.
Chapter 2
The Buddha and His Teachings
The Life of the Buddha
Siddhartha Gautama, the sage of the Sakya clan, founded a religion
that is in many ways the most anomalous of those surviving in the world
today. He claimed access to no divine wisdom, no unique intuition, no worldly
or spiritual authority, and no super-human status of any kind. The philosophy
he taught subverts common-sense notions about what the nature of the world
is and uproots the very beliefs that people tend to cherish the most: the
existence of God, the reality of the self, the promise of an afterlife,
and the availability of happiness. In their place he taught reliance on personal
understanding and the pragmatic uselessness of mere belief.
Note: Walpola Sri Rahula, What the Buddha Taught (New York: Grove
Press, 1959), 3, 8-10
He taught that all phenomena are impermanent
and nothing can be counted on to endure; that there is
no soul to be found at any time, in any thing, anywhere;
and that the fundamental quality of life, even when it seems pleasant,
is radically unsatisfactory.
And yet, the religion that has grown out of Gautama's teachings has
become a major world religion known for its equanimity, its compassion,
and, even, its joy.
Gautama was born in northeastern India in what is modern day Nepal in either
566 or 448 BE. and died eighty years later.
Note: For a full discussion of the Buddha's dates, see Etienne
Lamotte, History of Indian Buddhism, trans. Sara Webb-Boin (Louvain-La-Neuve:
Institut Orientaliste, 1988), 13-14
Gautama's father Suddhodana was a minor king, the head of the Sakyas. Legend
holds that Gautama was so remarkable as a child that soothsayers predicted
that he would one day become either a universal monarch or an "awakened
one," a "Buddha."
Note: The following biography of the Buddha is culled from a variety
of sources. The scriptural accounts of his life vary, and so this often-imaginative
biography is not to be taken as authoritative.
Suddhodana wanted his son to be the next head of the clan, and so
did everything in his power to keep him attached to the world and oblivious
of things spiritual. Gautama was provided with fine clothing, expensive
perfumes, courtyard gardens and lily pools, and all worldly delights, and
was attended by female musicians in three palaces, one for each season.
Strict orders were given that he was not to be exposed to any uglinesses
or unpleasantries. He married a neighboring princess, Yasodhara, at age
sixteen, and they had a son, Rahula, when he was twenty-nine.
Legend relates that one day, shortly after the birth of Rahula, Gautama
requested to see the city that he had never before seen. Unable to dissuade
him, his father had runners clear the streets of all unpleasant sights
and then allowed Gautama to be taken out in a chariot. Serendipitously, or,
as some legends hold, at the will of the far-seeing God, the young prince
was exposed to four shocking sights which the runners had
missed.
- First, Gautama saw a decrepit man, gray-haired, broken-toothed, and bent with age, by the side of the
road. Since he had seen few humans other than his family and his 40,000
dancing girls, he asked his charioteer in astonishment what sort of creature
the man was. That is what happens when people get
old, explained the driver.
- The next day, the prince asked to go out again. Though his father
doubled his efforts to clear the streets of all unpleasant sights,
a sick person was missed. On seeing the person lying by
the side of the road, racked with disease, Gautama again turned to his
charioteer in surprise. That is illness, he
was told.
- The following day he embarked on another tour on which he was
exposed to the sight of a human corpse, and thus learned of the fact of death.
Legend or not, this story portrays an important element of the Buddha's
later teachings: while the facts of age, sickness,
and death are known to us, it is still easy to forget them, and a direct
confrontation with their reality is often a novel and disturbing insight.
Unless one is aware of suffering, one will never seek to improve one's
condition, a fact of which the Buddha was to make much use.
- The prince made one more excursion into the city the next day,
and, again, he was exposed to something he had never before seen — -
a saffron- robed renunciant with a shaven head, a begging bowl, and,
most importantly, a tranquil and serene demeanor. That night,
after returning to his palace, he realized that all of his previous pleasures
were now but hollow delights. He waited until Yasodhara and Rahula were asleep,
took one last look at his son lying in his wife's arms, kissed them both,
and left. Such an exit was seen by some of the later writings as setting
a precedent for the renunciant monastic disciplines the Buddha later organized,
and the seeming callousness of it is mitigated by the claim that he had
to leave his family for the future benefit of all beings, that is, so that
he could attain his enlightenment and then teach it to others.
It is also pointed out that he was clearly not abandoning his family,
for his son later became one of his greatest disciples. However, the sense
of solitude, spiritual desperation, and determination portrayed by this
episode is not lessened.
It was with such a sense of determination that Gautama embarked on
the next stage of his life. He had seen the
suffering from which he had been sheltered for so long,
and then he had seen proof in the form of the
renunciant that such suffering can be conquered.
He now set himself the goal of learning how to conquer it. He saw
that his many years of living in opulence had not taught him the way to
enlightenment, so he now tried the opposite path.
For six years he practiced renunciation and asceticism. He first
practiced raja yoga in an attempt to conquer suffering through meditation
and the control of consciousness. Gautama soon surpassed his teachers by
attaining states of elevated awareness higher than the ones of which they
were capable, but did not feel that he had reached his goal yet.
He left his yoga teachers and joined a group of ascetics to practice rigorous
physical austerities. His strong sense of determination led him
to practice self-mortifications so severe that he nearly died.
By the time he could barely stand up and all of his hair had fallen
out, Gautama realized that asceticism was not going
to bring him to his goal, either. He recollected that he had once
spontaneously experienced a certain meditative state that could provide a
path to awakening, and decided to give it one last try. He took food, left
the group of ascetics, and sat under a tree, determined to gain enlightenment
or die. As he began to meditate, the legendary demon tempter, Mara, assailed
him first with visions of beautiful women and then with violent storms in
an attempt to prevent Gautama's immanent enlightenment. Gautama ignored Mara
and entered deeper into meditation. He passed through
state after state of consciousness until he achieved the enlightenment he
had so long sought, nirvana. He was now a "Buddha," an "awakened"
one. Reflecting on what he had found, he saw himself as presented with a
difficult choice, which is sometimes portrayed as being Mara's final assault.
He could either selfishly enter parinirvana, the state of "nonreturning"
liberation, or he could postpone the final, ultimate freedom and return to
the world to teach. The latter option seemed pointless, for the awakening
that he had experienced was so profound, so subtle, and so "beyond the sphere
of reason" that he feared it would be pointless to try to teach it to anyone
else. The deciding factor was the Buddha's enlightened insight into the
oneness of all beings, which led him to sympathize with the suffering of
others. He felt compassion and realized that he must return, even if for the
sake of only one person's understanding. Thus began the ministry of the Buddha.
The biographies in the canonical texts, the sutras, give only sparse
information of the Buddha's life following his nirvana. A likely explanation
for the greater emphasis on his earlier life than on his later is that the
core teaching of the Buddha is the "path" to follow, the process one must
go through to realize nirvana for oneself. Thus, the
Buddha's personal search for awakening is more important than what he did
after he had found his goal. The general picture conveyed by the
few details available is that he spent the rest of his life wandering around
the Ganges basin area on foot, with few possessions, teaching his ever-growing
group of disciples. Much of his teaching method would have been seen as
subversive by the society around him. He taught in the local languages and
dialects, spurning the Sanskrit which by this time was already associated
exclusively with the educated, elite priestly caste of Hinduism.
Note: Michael Coulson, Sanskrit (Chicago: NTC Publishing Group,
1992), xvii
He taught with no distinction, associating with all classes and castes
of men and women.
He also shunned both the isolation of the forest and the community
of the cities, preferring to reside and teach in the outskirts of the urban
areas. After wandering and teaching for forty-five years, the Buddha prepared
for his death. He asked his followers if they had any last questions. When
no one spoke, he told them "All conditioned things
are impermanent. Work out your salvation with diligence!" and entered
parinirvana, the final liberation.
Note: Maha-Parnibbana-Sutta in T.W. Rhys- Davids, trans., Buddhist
Suttas (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1969), VI.10
The Thought of the Buddha
The philosophical system that the Buddha taught is remarkably clear
and simple. It would, however, be very easy for a presentation of his thought
to degenerate into hundreds of pages of confusion and nonsense, and it could
be argued that much of the history and doctrinal development of Buddhism
has been just such an endeavor of obfuscation. His teaching is simple in
that it can be summed up in two words: the keyword
of his philosophy is "impermanence" (anitya) and the keyword of his
religion is the "path".
Note: The question of whether or not Buddhism is a religion will
not be considered here. For purposes of this discussion, "philosophy"
will be taken to mean the intellectual explanation of reality, and "religion"
will be taken to mean the quest for salvation. Further discussion of this
question can be found in Regington Rajapakse, "Buddhism as Religion and
Philosophy," Religion 16 (January, 1986): 51-56
All elements of the Buddha's teachings fall out from these two concepts.
The purpose of the Buddha's teachings is to bring people to their own enlightenment
by means of the "Noble Eightfold Path," the prescriptions for living the
"noble" and beneficent life. Thus, while his philosophy is the subject of
this thesis, a brief presentation of his soteriological teachings will be
apposite here. The key to the moral life is following
the "middle way" between extremes. The Buddha had attained enlightenment
by renouncing the two extremes of worldliness and world-renunciation. Neither
his twenty-nine years of living in luxury nor his six years of living in
self-denial had led him to his goal; it was only after he abandoned such
extremes that his search came to an end. The first sermon the Buddha delivered
after his enlightenment opened with an admonition to give up both the seeking
after pleasure and the practice of asceticism. The correct way to lead a
proper life, he taught his first audience, is "the middle path, …a path
which opens the eye, and bestows understanding, which leads to peace of mind,"
and eventually to nirvana.
Note: Dhamma-Cakka- Ppavattana-Sutta 3 in Rhys-Davids
The significance of following the middle way is greater than merely
the renouncing of the two extremes of hedonism and asceticism: the middle
way is the principle which infuses the entire corpus of moral teachings
of Buddhism.
Note: Whether or not, and in what way, such "middle-ism" also defines
Buddhist philosophy will be discussed in chapters four and five.
Buddhism is primarily a path, not a philosophy. As has been aptly
stated, Buddhists often insist "If you wish to understand
the Buddha's doctrine, you must practice it!"
Note: Geoffrey Parrinder, ed., World Religions (New York: Facts
on File Publications, 1983), 271 (italics in original)
The Buddha likened the human situation to a man who has just been shot
with a poisoned arrow by an unknown assailant. If the man refuses to have
the arrow removed until he finds out who shot him, what caste the assailant
is from, what color his skin is, how tall he is, what kind of bow he used,
and what types of feathers were on the arrow, that man will die. The important
thing for the man to do is to remove the arrow. The arrow in the side of
humanity is afflicted existence, duhkha. The poison on the arrow is the cause
of duhkha, which cause is craving. The way to remove the arrow of duhkha
and the poison of craving is by following the Buddha's path and teachings,
the Dharma.
Note: The complete parable can be found in Henry Clarke Warren,
ed. and trans., Buddhism in Translations (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1987),
117-122
Duhkha cannot be satisfactorily
translated into English. It conveys the sense of the words "evil," "unsatisfactoriness,"
"unpleasantness," "imperfection," and "disease." The most felicitous single
translation is "suffering." Even if not exact, this is the term encountered
most commonly in translations. The fact of suffering constitutes the first
of the Buddha's four "Noble Truths." All things that are temporary and
conditioned are suffering, duhkha. Encounters with unpleasant things are,
of course, suffering, but even pleasant things are suffering because of the
fact that, being conditioned, they are subject to ending.
Note: It may be important to introduce here
the concept of conditionality, for it is a concept that
will surface again and again in the following thesis. Briefly,
a thing is conditioned if it arose depending on a cause, such
as a sprout arises depending on the existence of the seed, or if it exists
depending on a ground of support, as fire exists depending on the fuel it
is burning. A thing is also called "conditioned"
if it depends on something else for its differentiation and definition, as "shortness" only exists in relation to "longness." Only something
which is uncaused and has an autonomous identity can be unconditioned.
The cause of suffering is the second Noble
Truth. Suffering is occasioned by desire, be it the thirst
for pleasure or the craving for existence itself. This desire, having impermanent
things as its object, will always be frustrated because it can never be
satisfactorily fulfilled. The third Noble Truth is that it
is possible to put an end to such desire and thus rid oneself of suffering.
Ridding oneself of suffering occurs when one realizes the nonreality of existence
in a peculiar state known as nirvana, or freedom. Thus far, the Buddha presented
an analysis of the human experience which states that all existence is inherently
unpleasant due to its impermanency, that the reason we find impermanent phenomena
to be unpleasant is because we entertain desires and cravings which cannot
be satisfied by ephemeral things, and that the key to finding satisfaction
is to put an end to such desires.
The fourth and final Noble Truth is that there is a method
available to us by which we can appease desires and thus attain nirvana.
This way is presented as the Eightfold Path. The path is a systematized
guide for living which will enable one to curtail attachment to transitory
things and to train oneself in proper modes of thought and behavior to eventually
achieve liberation. The eight limbs of the path prescribe behavior which
is "samyak." "Samyak" will here be translated as "right," but it also carries
the overtones of "complete" and "perfect."
Note: cf. Sir Monier Monier-Williams, ed., A Sanskrit-English Dictionary
(Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1993), 1181
A fuller understanding of "samyak" can be had by keeping in mind the
importance of "middle-ism" as described above. Renouncing all behavioral
extremes leads to a comportment that could best be described as "moderate;"
observing moderation in all actions and thoughts and desires will lead,
not just to proper behavior, but also to the very enlightenment which is
the goal of Buddhism.
The Eightfold Path opens with two guidelines for perfecting wisdom,
namely right (samyak) views and right thought. Personal
apprehension of the Buddha's teaching, his Dharma (henceforth translated
as "Law"), is an essential aspect of accepting the Law and proceeding on
the path. This understanding must be translated into right thought, the
attitudes of the individual towards the rest of the world.
Right thoughts are selflessness, compassion, and non- violence. This
is followed by three guidelines for morality, namely right speech,
right conduct, and right livelihood. The moral life is not required
merely for reasons of compassion for others; appeasing the desires that
cause one to suffer will be accomplished in large part by leading a life
free from egocentricity, greed, and selfish goals. The final three steps
on the path, right effort, right mindfulness, and right concentration, detail the spiritual ascesis without which the attainment of nirvana
would be impossible. Right effort and mindfulness prescribe the importance
of being focused on the goal of liberation, and avoiding all things which
would be karmically unwholesome. Right concentration, samadhi, is that drive
of pointed meditation which allows for liberation, the final abandonment
of all desires and the attainment of alert equanimity and bliss.
The philosophy of the Buddha rests on one
simple observation: all things are impermanent (anitya).
Impermanence is the first of three fundamental marks of existent things,
and from it follow the other two: suffering, and "soul-less-ness." Transitorinessis
the fundamental property of all existent things, for all things come into
being, persist for a time, and then pass out of being again. Without such
impermanence, no change would be possible, and thus neither would liberation
be possible. That is, it is the susceptibility of all things to change that
allows one the option of controlling one's life and following the Eightfold
Path. The Buddha's emphasis on the reality of impermanence should not be
seen as a doctrinal dogma as much as a simple perception. Not only is continual
flux perceptible to all who have insight, but, moreover, a balance in reality
requires that any thing which comes into existence must also, some day,
go out of existence.
Note: The use of the problematic term "reality'' must be explained.
That signified by "reality" is usually taken to be the real, i.e. that which
exists. Here, it will occasionally be used to refer to the cosmos as a
whole, to the entirety of nature, yet without expressly signifying "existence.''
For lack of a better term, the reader is asked to accept that "reality,"
used here, is not necessarily meant to imply existence as such, and the
meaning of the term will vary according to context.
The significance of impermanence is beautifully expressed by the parable
of the conversion to Buddhism of the two friends Sariputta and Moggallana.
Seeking enlightenment and having found it nowhere, they made the pact that
they would split up and whoever should first realize nirvana would come
and teach the other. Sariputta went his way, and encountered a saintly monk,
placid of disposition and perfect of deportment. What is your secret, brother?
asked Sariputta. Whom do you follow, and what is the truth you have found?
The monk replied that he was but a novice and a new-comer to the doctrine
that he had found, and so could not expound the doctrine or describe its
teacher. He could, however, offer to Sariputta this tidbit of the teaching:
all things that arise will cease, said the monk. On hearing this, Sariputta
suddenly understood, clearly and distinctly, the noble doctrine, and became
enlightened. He returned to his friend Moggallana who, upon seeing Sariputta
from afar, immediately perceived that a profound change had come over his
friend. What is the truth you have found? asked Moggallana. I don't know
the doctrine or its teacher, replied Sariputta, but I can tell you this:
all things that arise will cease. On hearing this, Moggallana,
too, became enlightened.
A refusal to accept transitoriness is the cause
of suffering, as briefly discussed above. A perception
of such impermanence and of suffering, its corollary, is the key to liberation.
Humans tend to desire, and desires do not exist in a vacuum — -they are always
desires for something, and if the object of the desire is subject to flux,
then the desire will, sooner or later, be frustrated. The third mark of
existence is also a direct corollary of impermanence:
there is no permanent, abiding, unchanging soul, atman,
to be found in any existent thing. This is perhaps the most revolutionary
of all elements of the Buddha's philosophy, for his time period was one of
great emphasis on the reality of the soul in the dominant zeitgeist of India,
Hinduism.
The period of the writing of the principal Upanisads had only recently
ended, and the orthodox schools of Indian thought were abuzz with theories
of the individual soul and its relation to Brahman, the universal soul.
By denying the reality of atman, the Buddha was subverting one of the most
cherished of all concepts in Indian religion. However, the doctrine of soullessness,
anatman, was an inescapable conclusion of the perception of flux; if all
existent things are subject to change, then there can be no unchanging essence
that exists. And if one tries to escape that conclusion by positing a soul
"beyond" the realm of existence, then one arrives at the same answer: the
soul does not exist. It is meaningless to posit something that is beyond
existence, for it would be in no way real.
The three marks of existence — -impermanence,
suffering, and soullessness — -define the nature and quality of reality
as taught by the Buddha. Inquiring into the ultimate cause and
purpose of existence and its ontological nature is fruitless. It is not
that the answers to such metaphysical questions are beyond human understanding,
nor that the answers sought are conceptually inexpressible; it is simply
that they are irrelevant. If you do not remove the arrow now, said the
Buddha, you will die. One must leave metaphysics alone, for the only thing
of importance is to follow the path.
Note: A usage note is required here. The term "metaphysical" will
be encountered often in this thesis, and so a clarification of its meaning
is crucial. Metaphysics must not be understood as pertaining to the study
of the supernatural, the mystical, or the New Age movement; this is a
very recent use of the word. Metaphysics is the branch of rational philosophy
that examines the nature of reality, especially the relationships between
mind and matter and substance and attribute. This includes the connotational
meaning of a priori speculation upon questions that are unverifiable by
observation, analysis, or experimentation.
Notwithstanding, the Buddha was in no way misologistic. That he did
not scorn the use of reason and philosophy is demonstrated by the fact
that the first two limbs of the Eightfold Path are right views and right
thought. He offered a positive metaphysics by presenting a complete teaching
of causation known as the theory of pratitya-samutpada,
"interdependent origination," or "dependent arising."
As a teaching of the nature of all existent
things, dependent arising is a comprehensive philosophy which explains
the origin of perception, the essence of the individual, the workings of
karma, and the nature of previous, present, and future lives. Dependent
arising is an extremely lucid and rational explanation of the nature of
all existent things, but not one that is easy to understand without a great
deal of reflection. The following explication of dependent arising is thus
not intended to be an explanation as much as a brief introduction. (No
more than an introduction is necessary here, because the theory will be
discussed extensively in chapter five.) Dependent
arising, simply, is the principle that all existent things are conditioned
and relative by virtue of having come into existence as interrelated phenomena.
When this arises, that arises; when this ceases, that ceases, explained
the Buddha. Impermanence and its corresponding dictum of soullessness preclude
the possibility of there being permanently-enduring or independent and self-subsisting
phenomena.
The "chain" of dependent arising consists of "links" of mutually interacting
causes and effects. The root of the chain is ignorance, avidya,
on which basis the second link, preferences and dispositions, comes to be. On the basis of these preferences arises the third link,
volitional will and consciousness. This consciousness
gives birth to the fourth link, the psychophysical individual. The individual then experiences sensory stimulation which creates in
him or her desires to have certain sensations and to avoid others, which
is a process of the next three more links. On the basis of
these desires one develops cravings, link nine, and grasps
onto perceived existence itself, link ten. This grasping and clinging to
existence is the cause of all suffering, for it leads to the eleventh link,
birth and rebirth, which is followed by the final link
of old age, disease, and death. The key to enlightenment,
or cessation of afflicted existence, is the reversal of the process by
which afflicted existence has arisen. One must
appease, or let go of, cravings. In order to do this one must seek wisdom,
which wisdom will undercut ignorance, the initial cause of the chain.
Although presented as a linear chain, dependent arising should be understood
as a circle, for all of the links of the chain influence all of the other
links. It is tempting to look at the ultimate cause of the chain, ignorance,
and ask what caused it to come into being, and thus embark upon infinite
regress. There are two reasons that this would not be appropriate, one philosophical
and the other pragmatic. First, it would not be proper to seek a cause for
ignorance avidya), for ignorance is not a positively existing entity. Rather,
it is a lack. One does not inquire into the cause of darkness, for darkness
is nothing but the lack of light. Second, the "cause" of ignorance is utterly
irrelevant for the Buddha's teaching. Ignorance is a deadly poisoned arrow
which must be removed; where the arrow came from is not important.
It is often said that the Buddha was neither a prophet nor simply a
teacher, but was a spiritual doctor. His presentation of the
four Noble Truths paralleled the practice of medical doctors in his day which
was to 1) diagnose a disease, 2) identify its cause, 3) determine whether
it is curable, and 4) outline a course of treatment to cure it.
This was exactly the Buddha's method. All humans are afflicted with
the disease of suffering; this disease is caused by ignorance and the cravings
which can follow ignorance; this disease is not an unregenerate condition
but can be cured; the cure is to follow the Eightfold Path of moderation
and understanding, which will lead to enlightenment and freedom.
The Buddha's teachings may thus far appear simple and straightforward.
This may be true, but for one condition. All unenlightened humans, according
to the Buddha, are immersed in the mud of ignorance, and are thus incapable
of seeing clearly. "Men who are overcome by passions and surrounded by a
mass of darkness cannot see this truth," he once thought to himself.
Note: Source not named: quoted in Rahula, 52
However, there were also times when he reassured his disciples that
his philosophy was inherently difficult to grasp. Speaking to his disciple
Vaccha, he said "Profound, O Vaccha, is this doctrine, recondite, and difficult
of comprehension, …and it is a hard doctrine for you to learn."
Note: Majjhima-Nikaya, quoted in Warren, 126
Whether the difficulty of comprehending the Buddha's teachings is due
only to the obscuring passions of humans or whether it is indeed inherently
abstruse, the subsequent history of Buddhism demonstrates that the Buddha's
teachings were anything but unambiguous to his disciples and later Buddhist
thinkers. The varieties of interpretation of the Buddha's thought that have
been propounded in the last two-and-a-half millenia bear ample witness to
this. It is this diversity of interpretation that was to engender the Madhyamika
school six hundred years after the Buddha's death.
Chapter 3
Early Buddhism and The Historical Context of Nagarjuna
The Person of Nagarjuna
Legend reports that, in the second or third century C.E., a young Brahmin
named Nagarjuna mastered the Vedas and all of the existing Hindu sciences,
including magic, while still a young boy. When he was a teenager he used
his magical abilities to render himself and two of his friends invisible
so that they might slip unnoticed into the royal harem of the local king's
palace. They took advantage of the situation and then made their escape.
On attempting to leave, however, his friends neglected to make themselves
sufficiently invisible and were caught and executed. Nagarjuna escaped, but
this experience caused him to reevaluate the desires which had caused him
to come so close to peril.
Inspired by this episode, Nagarjuna entered a Buddhist monastery. In a
mere ninety days he studied and mastered the whole of the Pali canon, the
early writings of Buddhism. He left the monastery in search of more advanced
teachings of the Buddha that he felt sure must exist. One day he was expounding
upon the doctrine of the Buddha to a group of listeners and noticed that,
following the lecture, two members of the audience disappeared into the
ground. He followed them to what proved to be their
home, the kingdom of the Nagas, a land inhabited by beneficent, half-divine,
serpent- like beings. Here the Nagas presented Nagarjuna with occult teachings
and with several volumes of sutras, canonical scriptures. These writings
were the Prajnaparamitas, the "Perfection of Wisdom" sutras.
The Buddha had delivered these sacred teachings centuries before but
had decided that they were too profound for his contemporaries. He arranged
to have them hidden for safekeeping in the nether world until humankind had
acquired the necessary sophistication and spiritual development to allow them
to appreciate these teachings of "perfect wisdom." Now that the world was
ready, Nagarjuna was permitted to spread the Buddha''s final teachings.
Note: One of the most complete Buddhist accounts of Nagarjuna's
life is to be found in the eighteenth-century Tibetan text "Presentation
of Tenets" by Jang-gya. cf. Donald S. Lopez, Jr., A Study of Svatantrika
(Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 1987), 245- 252. A comprehensive account
by a modern scholar can be found in K. Venkata Ramana, Nagarjuna's Philosophy
(Rutland, Vermont: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1966), 25-70
This colorful legend, like most, is told with many minor variations.
Unfortunately, there is not much known about Nagarjuna besides these legends.
It is certain that he was an actual historical person remarkable for his
brilliant and energizing philosophical spirit.
Note: Heinrich Zimmer, Philosophies of India (New York: Meridian
Books, 1957), 520
His influence was so great that he was regarded as more than merely an
important philosopher. The teachings of the Buddha were seen as the "first
``turning of the wheel,''" the setting in motion of the dispensation of
universal law, Dharma. The teachings of Nagarjuna came to be regarded by
the majority of Buddhism as the "second turning of the wheel," i.e. the renewal
of and expansion of the Buddha's original doctrine. Throughout northern India
he is still spoken of as a veritable manifestation of the Buddha, and his
teachings are revered equally with "the sutras from the Buddha's own mouth."
Note: ibid., 520 Aside from such fanciful reverence of Nagarjuna,
this much is certain: he is generally agreed to be, by his admirers and
detractors alike, the acutest thinker in Buddhist
history.
Note: Mervyn Sprung, trans., Lucid Exposition of the Middle Way:
The Essential Chapters of the Prasannapada of Candrakirti (Boulder: Prajna
Press, 1979), 1 His commentaries on Buddhist philosophy had such a great
effect on the world of Buddhism that a schism which had been brewing for
some time, that of the new "Greater School" of Mahayana diverging from the
"Older School" of the Theravada, now became crystallized and irrevocable.
Note: cf. D.T. Suzuki, Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism (New York:
Schocken Books, 1967), 60
Nagarjuna's alleged "authorship" and elucidation of the Prajnaparamita
writings seems to have provided the Mahayana with a claim to unique mystical
insight which allowed this school to divorce itself from what it considered
to be the "lesser" teachings of the Theravada.
Some of Nagarjuna's contemporaries found his thought to be so unique
and worthy that they regarded him as the founder of an entirely new school
of wisdom, the Madhyamika. New
"Madhyamika" texts sprung up, many of which aimed to be nothing more than
interpretations of Nagarjuna's writings. This new school was so compelling
and vibrant that it, too, witnessed schisms into sub-schools.
Some scholars have interpreted the philosophy of
Nagarjuna as an innovation, a revolution in Buddhism. Others see Nagarjuna's
philosophy as being little more than a clarification and restatement of
the Buddha's doctrines. To investigate the thought of Nagarjuna and
to address these claims, a brief summary of Buddhist intellectual history
from the time of the Buddha to the time of
Candrakirti, Nagarjuna's most famous commentator, is apposite. When Nagarjuna completed his study of the original Pali canon and
went in search of more teachings of the Buddha, it appears that he was
confronted with a multitude of contending schools of philosophy.
The debates which both preceded and were contemporary with Nagarjuna
surely influenced his thought and a summary of them will help in achieving
an understanding of the Madhyamika school.
Some Early Controversies
A central point of the Buddha's thought is that all is in flux; nothing
which exists can remain unchanged. A natural implication of this is that
the Law, the Buddha's teaching itself, would also suffer corruption and
change. The original scriptures announced various prophesies regarding
this change. Some predicted that the Law would remain pure for only 500
years, others that it would endure for a thousand.
Following this period of pure understanding, mere scholarship would replace
spiritual achievement.
Note: Edward Conze, Buddhism: Its Essence and Development (New York:
Harper and Row, 1975), 114-6
The simple fact of the Buddha's historical life becoming a more and more
distant memory is only part of the story. It appears that the very methods
of the Buddha's teaching began to lose their efficacy, for the early writings
contain accounts of large numbers of people, sometimes thousands at a time,
achieving sudden enlightenment merely by hearing the Law.
Note: cf., for example, Warren 302, where a sutra reports that "the
conversion of eighty-four thousand living beings took place."
Gradually fewer and fewer cases of conversion were reported, until the
conviction spread that the time of sainthood was over. One sutra conveys
this sentiment clearly by describing the death of the last saint at the
hands of one of the scholars.
Setting aside the fact that, according to the Buddha, flux is inevitable,
there are three obvious reasons why the Law witnessed change and reinterpretation.
One reason is simple geography.
The teachings of the Buddha were born in northern India and from there
rapidly spread east and west, eventually becoming diffused across the whole
of southern and eastern Asia. Following the death of its founder, such
broad decentralization of the message and the concomitant divergence of
interpretations was inevitable. A second factor which precipitated change
was the fact of applying the Law to daily life and all of its concerns.
No matter how complete the Buddha's teachings, inevitably some question
would arise which he had not addressed. These were usually precise disagreements
over proper comportment of the monk, such as when to eat food and whether
to accept money as a gift.
Note: Michael H. Kohn, trans., The Shambhala Dictionary of Buddhism
and Zen (Boston: Shambhala, 1991), 37
A third and perhaps principal source of contention and change was the
somewhat agnostic stance of the Law itself. The Buddha did not leave the
community with a single source of authority following his death, telling
the monks to seek and follow the Law for themselves. This likely left the
monks with a sense of freedom to interpret the Law as they wished.
Note: David J. Kalupahana, A History of Buddhist Philosophy (Honolulu:
University of Hawaii Press, 1992), 125
He also had consistently refused to give conclusive answers to many types
of metaphysical questions, as the parable of the arrow shows. However,
as the Buddha fully knew, the human tendency to enquire into such intangibilities
is practically ineradicable. People were wont to philosophize on even those
very subjects about which the Buddha forbade speculation. This inevitably
led to differing opinions about the nature of reality. Even some modern
scholars have been misled by the Buddha's apparent agnosticism, calling
it a "vagueness" in the Buddha's teachings, a vagueness which caused "a
great divergence of views" to arise.
Note: M. Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy (London: George
Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1967), 196
Buddhism remained relatively free of internal controversy for the first
two centuries after the Buddha's death. Minor disagreements over points
of doctrine persisted, but were not a major cause for concern. Then, during
the reign of King Asoka, 272-236 BE., another disagreement, this one regarding
the nature of the saint, arose and threatened the unity of the Order. King
Asoka, a nominal Buddhist whose influence in Buddhist history was enormous,
wished to restore peace to the Order. While the precise history of the
debate is uncertain, a few elements of it are widely accepted as being
authentic and, more important to the topic at hand, had a direct bearing
on Nagarjuna's work.
Note: A more comprehensive discussion of the dates and the background
of Asoka can be found in Hermann Kulke and Deitmar Rothermund, A History
of India (London: Routledge, 1990), 64-70
Asoka invited a respected monk, Moggaliputtatissa, to convene a synod
of monks to discuss and settle disagreements. Moggaliputtatissa compiled
the proceedings of this council in a text that, despite being written two
and a half centuries after the Buddha, was so influential that it quickly
was accorded canonical status.
Note: Kalupahana 1992, 126
Although two hundred and eighteen specific topics of monastic discipline
and philosophy were debated, the key philosophical issues boil down to
three: "Personalism," "Realism," and "Transcendentalism."
Note: This division, which is perhaps somewhat simplified and artificial,
will be encountered repeatedly in this thesis. It can also be quite confusing,
and, hence, it should be summarized and more technically clarified here.
- The Personalists were the Vatsiputriya, nicknamed
the Pudgalavada after "pudgala" = "person;"
- The Realists were the Vaibhasika and Sautrantika
sects of the Sarvastivada, the latter nicknamed after their belief that
"all," "sarva" exists (on the Sautrantika, see also page 124f.);
- The Transcendentalists were the Lokattaravada sect
of the Mahasanghika, so nicknamed due to their belief in the " lokuttarra,"
the "supramundane."
This factional history, though technically confusing and incompletely
documented, has extensive import, for it was a precursor to the bifurcation
into the "Greater" and "Lesser Schools" of Buddhism.
Broadly speaking, the Mahasanghika led to the formation of Mahayana, while
their opponents, the Sthaviravada, became the Hinayana, or Theravada.
These three will be summarized here and treated more fully later.
Broadly speaking, Indian philosophy has witnessed two opposing traditions
regarding the ultimate nature of reality. One tradition, which is represented
by practically the whole of Hinduism, asserts the existence of an immanent
and transcendent "soul," the atman. The atman is the soul both of the
human individual and of the universal God. It is the ultimate ground of
being and is immutable and eternal. Buddhism, on the other hand, denies
this substratum. It presents a doctrine of
anatman, "soullessness." The Buddha taught that there
is no abiding self, but rather just five ever-changing aggregates (skandhas)
of elements: physical substance, sense-contacts, perceptions, psychological
tendencies, and consciousness. The individual person is an aggregate of
these five categories, and each category is in itself an aggregate of composite
elements (dharmas and dhatus). For example, the category of physical substance
is an aggregate of earth, air, water, and fire, and the category of psychological
tendencies is an aggregate of habits, likes, dislikes, greed, willfulness,
etc. The idea of a "person" is just a convenient
way to refer to these five categories and aggregates of elements. It is
a mistake to believe that there is an underlying and unchanging self in
this dynamic agglomeration of fluctuating elements. However, a small
group of monks insisted that, nonetheless, the individual self must be in
some way real. If there is no self more real than and transcending the aggregates
of elements, they argued, still at the very least it should not be wrong
to say that the self is no less real than the aggregates. They claimed that
there is a subtle self which is neither identical with nor different from
the agglomeration of elements.
Although Moggaliputtatissa and all other Buddhist schools rejected this
"Personalist" argument, the notion proved to be tenacious and long-lived.
As late as the seventh century C.E. a full one-quarter of Indian monks
claimed adherence to the Personalist school,
and Nagarjuna as well as numerous later writers, both Madhyamika
and otherwise, felt compelled to address this misbelief.
Note: Nagarjuna, David J. Kalupahana, trans., Nagarjuna: The Philosophy
of the Middle Way: the Mulamadhyamakakarika of Nagarjuna (New York: State
University of New York Press, 1986), XVI.2 and XXIV.29-30
The "heresy" of Personalism presumably arose because some
Buddhists were unwilling to abandon completely the belief in the soul,
and so claimed that the aggregate of elements did not fully preclude the
possibility of a self. The controversy of "Realism" also
arose from the doctrine of the aggregates, but for an exactly opposite
reason. The Realists asserted that, if there is no metaphysical soul behind
the aggregates, then the aggregates themselves must be real. If the soul
is not an ultimate entity, then the individual atomistic elements (dharmas)
of which the world is composed must be ultimately real. These elements
are reified, they taught, and each has its unique and individual atomic
"self-nature," svabhava. Only thus could the Buddha's teaching that all
aggregates are in perpetual flux be reconciled with the fact that objects
are observed to have individual and continuous identities.
Furthermore, these atomistic elements are themselves eternal and unchanging;
while their form and the objects of which they are a part may change, their
self- nature, svabhava, remains real and constant. Hence the label "Realism."
The Realists were quite vocal against the concept of Personalism and insisted
that the Buddha's doctrine of anatman allowed no room for any type of belief
in self-hood. However, their assertion that the atoms comprising the world
have individual self-natures was seen by other Buddhists as being an unjustified
realism or as just another form of Personalism. Criticism of their concept
of self-nature became one of the key issues of the Madhyamikas.
The third false doctrine which Moggaliputtatissa reports being discussed
was Transcendentalism. The Buddha had left the community
of his followers with no single source of authority following his death,
telling them instead to "be lamps unto [them]selves." "The truths and rules
of the order which I have set forth and laid down for you all, let them,
after I am gone, be the Teacher to you."
Note: Maha-parinibbana Suttanta II.33 and VI.1, in Rhys Davids
Despite these words which the Buddha delivered from his deathbed, many
disciples came to believe that the Buddha had totally transcended the world,
not just ceased to exist. Mahayana Buddhists came to believe that, although
the physical Buddha was dead, his intelligence and his teachings remained
in a form called the "Dharma Body."
Note: Paul Williams, Mahayana Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations
(London: Routledge, 1989), 176
Although it was claimed that this transcendent form did not really exist
(for that would contradict the Buddha's doctrines), still the Dharma Body
is an expression of the ultimate reality, the true nature of things.
The Dharma Body came to be known by diverse terms, such as "Buddha- nature,"
"Thusness," or "Suchness of Existents," and its nature has been interpreted
in many ways. Moggaliputtatissa refuted this belief in a transcendent nature
of the Buddha by demonstrating that it is incompatible with the Buddha's
historicity.
Note: Kalupahana 1992, 141-3
Nagarjuna dealt little with the theories of Transcendentalism, but it
became an important topic for later Madhyamikas.
Note: cf. Williams, 175-179
Abhidharma and the Perfection of Wisdom Writings
Between the third century BE. and the third century C.E. a group of
writings whose purpose was the systematization of certain elements of the
Buddhist philosophy took shape. This was the Abhidharma, "Further Teachings."
This collection of writings purported to be, not a new set of teachings,
but merely a codification of the old. As such, it was accorded a canonical
status and, along with the sutras, the Buddha's discourses, and the Vinaya,
the monastic rules, comprises the official three-tiered Pali canon. There
was little controversy over the sutras and the Vinaya; although there is some
variation in the latter between schools, the two are almost universally accepted
in Buddhism. The Abhidharma, however, elicited a
certain amount of conflict in subsequent Buddhist thought.
The purpose for compiling the Abhidharma was to distill the essentials
of the Buddha's teachings on philosophy and psychology from the discourses
and attempt to avoid the inexactitudes and ambiguities occasionally found
in these scriptures. This codification was achieved
by stating everything in exact language and thereby providing a detailed
enumeration of the elements of reality (dharmas), the basic causal processes
observed to operate between the elements (pratyayas), the exact constituents
of the human personality and consciousness (skandhas and ayatanas) and,
finally, to draw out the relations and correspondences between all of these
factors.
The endless lists and classifications found in the Abhidharma, which
one modern commentator has characterized as "ten valleys of dry bones,"
Note: Nyanatiloka Mahathera quoted in Kalupahana 1992, 147
might seem to be of little interest to all but the most devout Buddhist.
There are, however, two reasons why the Abhidharma directly relate
to the study of later Buddhist philosophy: the Abhidharma
provided an exhaustive analysis of the base constituents of reality, and
it uncovered much of the implications of dependent arising, the process
by which these elements come into being and are perceived.
What the Abhidharma achieved was also twofold:
- its analysis of the elements coherently
and comprehensively described reality without any recourse to a theory
of self-hood or ultimate reality,
- and it refined the doctrine of dependent
arising by showing how the basic patterns of causation condition each
other in a web of complex ways.
Notwithstanding, the Realist school managed to find in the Abhidharma
classifications support for their view that the elements do have a self-nature,
svabhava, a view which had definite repercussions on the doctrine of dependent
arising.
Note: Kalupahana 1986, 22
The Abhidharma literature was avowedly part of the "Older School," Theravada.
Its sole purpose was to systematize the teachings found in the Pali scriptures,
and it made no use of the innovative interpretations and doctrines that
were becoming an important aspect of the "Greater School," Mahayana.
The Abhidharma was, however, being written during approximately the same
time as the Prajnaparamita writings. These "Perfection of Wisdom
(Prajnaparamita)" writings mark the inception of and the core teachings
of the Mahayana,
Note: based on distinctions made by Edward Conze. cf. Conze 1975,
121-125
a school which defined itself in large part as being the "new" Buddhism
no longer bound by the limitations of the old. The Abhidharma provided
the starting point for the Perfection of Wisdom school, both as historical
influencer and by being the focal point of criticism. Further, the Abhidharma
thinkers did their job so well that subsequent thinkers, such as those
of the Prajnaparamita, had no choice but to adopt a different tack in interpretating
and expounding the Buddha's teachings. That is,
the general approach of the Abhidharma thinkers was to take the agenda
of analysis and systematization to its furthest extreme. "Rarely
in the history of human thought has analysis been pushed so far," said
the scholar of Buddhism Etienne Lamotte.
The result of this is that the Perfection of Wisdom writings, representing
a reaction to this influence, are quite unlike those of the Abhidharmas
in style, thought, and intent.
The Perfection of Wisdom
scriptures are a collection of voluminous writings
from ca. 100 BE. to 100 C.E. which emphasize the ultimate incomprehensibility
of the world. They utilized paradox and even
nonsense to demonstrate that true wisdom is intuitive and cannot be conveyed
by concepts or in intellectual terms.
The writers of the Prajnaparamitas regarded the
Abhidharma of the Older School of Buddhism, with its dry emphasis on the
proper path towards and means of achieving enlightenment, the rules of
the Order, and the niggling debates over fine points of ethics, as being
on the wrong track.
This approach stifled the essence of the Buddha's
teaching, which essence is that all doctrines are empty of reality and
are but mental creations. According to the Prajnaparamitas, true wisdom
consists, not in cataloguing doctrines, but in intuitively understanding
that the true nature of the universe is this emptiness, sunyata.
The Perfection of Wisdom writings were in many
ways a reaction to certain trends found in Abhidharma thought, particularly
that of Realism. The Realist school, though refuted by Moggaliputtatissa,
remained a potent force in philosophical discussion for some time. A primary
Prajnaparamita criticism of this realist trend was that it did not go
far enough in understanding the Buddha's doctrine of anatman.
The Realists accepted that there is no substantial
soul abiding in the person, but just a series of fluctuating elements whose
agglomeration gives the appearance of a self- identity. However, as explained
above, the Realists took this analysis of elements too far. To explain
reality without invoking atman, the Realists defined the elements as being
point entities having absolutely small spatial and temporal extension. To
reconcile this infinitesimal atomism with the fact that the individual elements
still interrelate and that continuity is experienced, the Realists had to
posit a form of self-nature.
Note: Kalupahana 1986, 22
The Prajnaparamitas saw this explanation as falling short of the mark.
The predominant themes of the Perfection of Wisdom teachings do not
differ either from the teachings of the Buddha as recorded in the discourses
or from the explanations of reality given in the Abhidharma.
That is, the essence of reality does not allow for real change or decay,
origination or extinction, identity or differentiation, unity or plurality,
existence or non-existence. All of the above are imagined only by the
ignorant. The criticism lies in the fact
that some Buddhist schools were not satisfied with this description of
reality and felt the need to add the notion of svabhava, self-nature. This is not necessary, the Prajnaparamitas taught, for the Buddha's
theory of dependent arising is alone sufficient to explain all perceptions
of the world and its elements as well as fully explain the ways in which
these elements exist and interrelate.
The authors of these texts most likely had no intention of producing innovative
theories and saw themselves as just explaining the teachings of the Buddha
in a deeper and more profound way, relying more on insight than on intellect.
Nonetheless, the Perfection of Wisdom writings
are often defined as marking a clear transition from old to new, Theravada
to Mahayana. The emphasis on emptiness as a characteristic
of reality "revolutionized" Buddhism "in all aspects," writes modern commentator
T.R.V. Murti.
While the intention of these writings was not to produce innovations in
philosophy but just to teach with a different emphasis,
their method of philosophizing was decidedly original.
The Prajnaparamita adopted a dialectic that was only implied in the original
discourses, that of seeking the middle between all extremes, and utilized
this dialectic to a much fuller extent. This rejection of extremes
led to the assertion that all dualities are empty of reality. Notions
whose basis is one half of a duality, such as existence and nonexistence
or atman and anatman, can be used to speak of common, everyday truths, but
their applicability fails when referring to ultimate truths. The ultimate
reality is devoid of all dualities and thus is wholly impervious to conceptual
thinking. It can only be accessed in non-dual intuition, prajna.
There are thus two levels of truth
: the everyday, relative truth and the higher, absolute truth. One should
not be confused, the Prajnaparamita taught, by the Buddha's use of words
like "person" or verbs like "exist," for he used these words only pragmatically,
as a necessity for discussing commonly perceived things. He in no way intended
for such relative concepts to be reified or applied to the absolute sphere.
Note: Peter Della Santina, Madhyamaka Schools in India (Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass, 1986), 12-13
The Perfection of Wisdom writings set the tone for what would become
the majority of Buddhism, the Mahayana. Its anti- dogmatic rejection of
extremes, mystical mood, use of paradox, and emphasis on intuitive wisdom
are still famous in the form of Prajnaparamita that has come down to us
today, Zen.
Note: cf. David J. Kalupahana, "Reflections on the Relation between
Early Buddhism and Zen," in Buddhist Philosophy: A Historical Analysis
(Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press, 1976), 163-176, or Kalupahana
1992, 228-236
This collection of works was also found quite compelling by Nagarjuna
and the subsequent Madhyamika school.
The Main Figures of Madhyamika
It was to the exposition of the philosophy of the Perfection of Wisdom
scriptures that Nagarjuna, "one
of the subtlest metaphysicians the human race has yet produced,"
devoted himself. Although it is almost certain that Nagarjuna did not
write or discover them, as legend claimed, he may have been influential in
the formation of some of them, and he certainly is to be credited with systematizing
them and offering the most coherent and authoritative interpretations of
them.
Note: Richard H. Robinson, Early Madhyamika in India and China (Madison,
Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), 61-65
Furthermore, many scholars, both ancient and modern, regard Nagarjuna's
Madhyamika as the proper systematization of the voluminous and often unorganized
Prajnaparamita writings. His philosophy, though, is not to be seen as a
mere commentary on these sutras. He offers slightly revised interpretations
of their key concepts, i.e. dependent arising, emptiness, and self-nature,
and he draws out more fully the implications of the two truths.
His basic philosophical method is to take the Buddha's exhortation to
follow the "middle way" and apply this "middle-ism" to all sets of dualities.
Hence the appellation for this school: "madhyama" simply means "middlemost."
Note: Monier- Williams, 782
The Madhyamika method does not
deal with dualities by attempting to arrive at a compromise between the
two sides or by formulating a position that lies between the two. Rather,
it attempts to supersede the sphere of conceptual thinking and its attendant
dualistic modes.
As Nagarjuna's philosophy is the primary subject of this investigation,
no more than the briefest summary of his school will be presented here.
Conceptual thinking operates using
dualities, especially that of subject versus object, perceiver versus the
external world. However, Nagarjuna taught, it is this very process of intellection
and our grasping onto its products, i.e. concepts, which prevents us from
realizing enlightenment. One must "appease" the tendency to conceptualize,
and it is this appeasement which will allow one to see through the illusions
of dualities and grasp the " true nature" of things, the
tathata.
This true nature is formless and beyond conceptual
distinctions. It is devoid of self-nature, and so is described as being
"empty," sunya. The fact of dependent arising, i.e. the fact that all existing
things come into and go out of being only in dependence with other existing
things and that no thing can exist "on its own," as it were, also demonstrates
the fundamental "emptiness" (sunyata) of all things. If one wished
to speak in absolute terms and seek the ultimate ground of being of the universe,
one could say no more than that the universe is characterized by ultimate
emptiness. This is not a pessimistic denial of existence, though,
but rather just a description of the way things are. One who sees the true
nature of things simply perceives that they are empty of self- nature. This
realization, far from being nihilistic, is actually the very means by which
liberation is achieved.
Nagarjuna is credited with a great number of writings. Even excluding
those which are possibly or definitely not his, we are still left with a
large body of work. Nagarjuna wrote theoretical scholastic treatises, collections
of verses on moral conduct, teachings on Madhyamika practice and the Buddhist
path, and a collection of hymns.
Note: cf. Chr. Lindtner, Nagarjuniana: Studies in the Writings and
Philosophy of Nagarjuna (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1987), 10-8, for a
list of writings attributed to Nagarjuna and a discussion of their relative
authenticity.
This range of works demonstrates that his concern was not just scholastics
and theory but also monastic discipline and, as attested by his hymns,
religious veneration. The range of his thought, its acuity, and his genuine
devotional attitude to the Buddha inspired a number of subsequent commentaries
and independent works. The Madhyamika tradition enjoyed a vibrant history
in its native India until at least the eighth century C.E. The philosophy
was around this time imported to Tibet, where the Tibetan king declared
it to be his country's authoritative form of Buddhism.
Despite encountering various historical vicissitudes,
it remains the foundation for Tibetan Buddhism even today.
It must be admitted that this latter point is uncertain. Herbert Guenther
writes that "Reports coming from Tibet are uncertain… With the annexation
of Tibet by China, a chapter in the history of Buddhism… came to a close.
(Encyclopedia of Religion, 1987 ed., s.v. "Buddhism: Tibetan Schools.")
Notwithstanding the uncertainty of the situation in Tibet, though,
the exiled Buddhist community outside of Tibet is definitely keeping
the Madhyamika tradition alive.
Cf. C.W. Huntington, Jr., The Emptiness of Emptiness: An Introduction
to Early Indian Madhyamika (Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press, 1989),
9
Aryadeva
was the chief disciple and successor of Nagarjuna, and it is to him
that the Madhyamika system owes much of its popularity and stability. Nagarjuna
directed his dialectic primarily against the Abhidharma philosophy,
but, by the time of aryadeva, there was need to consolidate the Madhyamika
system against non-Buddhist systems as well.
Aryadeva can be credited, along with Nagarjuna, with founding and systematizing
the school of Madhyamika.
- The school began to encounter internal controversy approximately
three centuries later. A monk named
Buddhapalita produced a commentary on Nagarjuna's
major work, the Mulamadhyamakakarika (henceforth abbreviated as
karika). In his commentary, Buddhapalita refuted the
positions of his opponents using the tactic of "reductio ad absurdum,"
a logical method whereby a position is shown to result in unresolvable
absurdities. The true
Madhyamika can have no position of his or her own, Buddhapalita wrote,
and thus has no need to construct syllogisms and defend arguments. His
or her sole endeavor is to demonstrate that no philosophical position whatsoever
is ultimately acceptable; upon scrutiny of a theory and its consequences,
the theory inevitably dissolves into nonsense. This section of Madhyamika
is known as the Prasangika, after
prasanga, "[logical] consequences."
- Buddhapalita's near contemporary,
Bhavaviveka, also wrote a commentary on Nagarjuna's
Mulamadhyamakakarika, in which he
disagreed with the Prasangika refusal to adopt a philosophical position.
He argued that one must advance a theory that is independent, svatantra, to
provide a proper counter-argument to the opponent's position and thus establish
the Madhyamika position. Buddhapalita used logic only to demonstrate
the untenability of an opposing theory, and then abandoned the logic. In
contrast, Bhavaviveka felt that the Madhyamika did have a certain justification
for using and defending logical argumentation. This school became known as
the Svatantrika, the
"Independents."
Note: The names Prasangika and Svatantrika are not found in any
Sanskrit texts, and were probably coined by later Tibetan scholars. Cf.
The Encyclopedia of Religion, 1987 ed., s.v. "Madhyamika," by Kajiyama
Yuichi
The main difference between the two schools was
that they disagreed on the proper way to interpret Nagarjuna's karika.
As such, it may seem that the dispute is trifling. This may
be true — -it may be the case that the only real difference between the
two is the character of the arguments which they employed in order to convince
their opponents of the truth of the Madhyamika, a philosophy which they
mutually shared. However, the significance of their different approaches
may go deeper than that. The issue which divides the two schools may be
the result of their very interpretations of reality and the degree to which
they accepted Nagarjuna's wholesale denial of self-nature.
Note: Santina, xvii-xviii
The last figure in the history of Madhyamika who will be discussed
here is Candrakirti, who lived in the first half of the seventh century.
He was the chief and most famous exponent of the Prasangika school.
His commentary on Nagarjuna's karika, the Prasannapada, is
of the utmost importance to us today because in this work is the only copy
of the karika which has survived in the original Sanskrit, and, moreover,
the Prasannapada is the only commentary on the karika which has itself
survived in Sanskrit. This fortuity aside, his influence
on the Madhyamika school is second only to that of Nagarjuna. His
contribution to Madhyamika literature is immense and erudite.
He reaffirmed the reductio ad absurdum approach of Buddhapalita, and,
largely through Candrakirti's efforts, the
Prasangika school became the norm of the
Madhyamika.
The form of Madhyamika which he championed was still studied in the monastic
schools of Tibet and Mongolia as late as this century, where it was considered
to represent the true philosophical basis of Buddhism.
Note: Theodore Stcherbatsky, The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana
(London: Mouton & Co, 1965), 67. (It is no longer studied in the Tibetan
monasteries, because they have been destroyed. Cf. Guenther.)
Chapter 4
Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamakakarika
Structure of the Karika
A study of Nagarjuna's philosophy encounters many initial obstacles.
Not only can his thought itself seemingly be impenetrable, but also the
mythical stature he has acquired obscures much understanding of him.
One modern scholar of Nagarjuna has admitted that the veneration of Nagarjuna
"at times reached such ridiculous heights that his name was sanctified
and stamped everywhere with reckless abandon."
Note: Kenneth Inada, quoted in Kalupahana 1986, 3
One result of this is that often it cannot be determined precisely which
works attributed to him are authentically his. Of the more than one hundred
texts bearing Nagarjuna's name, only thirteen are almost certainly his.
Note: Lindtner, 9-11
There are two reasons that it is difficult to determine which of
these many works are his: One, his influence was extensive and his name
venerated. It was not uncommon in Indian tradition for an adherent of a
school to attribute a work to the school's original founder, as a means of
paying respect. This certainly happened within Madhyamika. Two, there was
likely more than one author actually named Nagarjuna, and there may have
even been many.
Note: A. K. Warder, Indian Buddhism (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,
1980), 375
Of these thirteen works that were authentically
written by the Nagarjuna in question, one stands out as being his chief
work: the Mulamadhyamakakarika, "Verses on the Fundamentals of the Middle
[Way]."
Note: Nagao writes that the name of this work was likely
given to it by the Sino-Japanese tradition. This tradition found one verse
of the treatise, XXIV.18, to be paramount; this verse concluded with the
term madhyama pratipat, "Middle Path," and the treatise was named after it.
(Nagao 1991, 190)
This work stands supreme primarily because of its inherent merit,
both in terms of philosophical acuity and innovativeness. It is also one
of the few works that are indubitably his. The treatise also deserves to
be regarded as unique because it was historically pivotal; it inspired a number
of subsequent commentaries by other acclaimed thinkers and galvanized Buddhism
into developing a wholly new school of thought based on this work, the Madhyamika,
the "Middle Way" school. Finally, the Indian, Chinese,
and Tibetan traditions are all unanimous in considering the karika as Nagarjuna's
magnum opus.
Note: Lindtner, 10
The karika consists of 450 sententious
verses.
Note: (448 verses plus 2 in the dedication)
These verses have been preserved in the form of
twenty- seven short chapters, each dealing with one topic. (For
sake of clarity, it was necessary to differentiate between Nagarjuna's
chapters and the chapters of this thesis. To solve this, Nagarjuna's chapters
will henceforth be referred to as " sections
," and the word "chapter" shall be taken to refer to chapters of this
thesis.) The entire karika, minus commentary,
would only run to thirty or forty pages. The chapter (section) structure
in which the text is preserved is possibly a later formalization, most likely
by Candrakirti. This is evidenced by the fact that the section titles provided
by Candrakirti are often misleading as to the actual contents of the section,
and also because copies of the karika preserved in Chinese and Tibetan
occasionally contain very different section headings.
Note: Sprung, xv
The verses are written in a precise metered form which was
the staple of classical Sanskrit composition.
Note: Coulson, 250
Each verse consists of two lines of exactly sixteen syllables
each which, while not rhyming, are very poetic and rhythmic when read aloud
or chanted. Part of the reason for this writing style was to facilitate memorization.
Books were often preserved in writing by this period in time, but the chief
means of transmission was still oral. However, this is not the only import
of the karika's poetic structure. Nagarjuna was not merely a reflective philosopher.
He was a monk, and the purpose of monasticism was to facilitate meditation
and traveling the path to enlightenment. This work, like his hymns, was surely
intended to be an aid in meditation. One could memorize the karika and meditate
on it by contemplating one verse at a time.
The verses were not intended to be prosaic explanations of a philosophical
position, but rather were meant to illuminate, in a terse and often aphoristic
manner, certain precise aspects of the Buddha's teachings about the nature
of reality and the proper path. Although the meaning of the verses is usually
clear, there are many that defy interpretation. Like the famous Zen koans,
some verses seemingly make no attempt to explain a philosophical theory but
instead aim to provoke an immediate transcendence of conceptual limitations.
Methodology of this Examination of the Karika
There is no easy and obvious way to approach the karika. Most modern
interpreters have opted to approach it by analyzing in isolation the
broader topics with which it deals, such as anatman or dependent arising,
and pulling quotes and examples from all sections of this work and from
other works to explain each topic. Other scholars have chosen to select
merely one subject of Madhyamika to address, such as emptiness, or one
methodological consideration, such as the use of dialectic. Such approaches
seem unsatisfactory for the present examination of Madhyamika because
only the karika and its themes are the focus here, not the spectrum of
Madhyamika as a whole. Attempts have also been made to categorize the sections
of the karika into larger groupings of several chapters each and indicate
the broad themes which Nagarjuna supposedly had in mind with each section.
Note: cf. Kalupahana 1986, 27-31
This approach, too, can be misleading and has no definitive
validity; ultimately it may reveal little more than the interpretive bias
of the interpreter. The most fruitful approach in the present context will
be first to present in summary form the scope and thought of the karika
itself and only afterwards to discuss its broader philosophical meaning
and possible intent.
There are two admitted drawbacks of this approach, i.e.
examining the karika and the karika alone. One, it will not be possible
to present "the thought of Nagarjuna" as a whole. Other of his works show
different sides to his thought and character and provide fruit for differing
interpretations of his place in the broad spectrum of Buddhist thought. For
example, the karika makes almost no mention of any of the themes which came
to be emblematic of the "Greater School" of Mahayana,
Note: The only exception is
one mention of the Bodhisattva-career in XXIV.32.
However, even this mention does not demonstrate Nagarjuna
to be an advocate of Mahayana. and so it could be objected that an examination
of the karika only would attribute too much "Older School"-ness to him.
A second drawback is that presentations of his concepts could often be made
clearer by recourse to other of his or his follower's works. It will be
responded that these two drawbacks are not debilitating, and may not even
be handicaps. An exposition of solely the karika can be defended because
this work is truly the cornerstone of the entire subsequent Madhyamika school
in all of its variety. The karika is the vitalizing influence of Madhyamika
and all the main themes of the school are to be found in it. As mentioned
above, the Buddhist tradition is unanimous in considering it to be the keystone
of Madhyamika and perhaps even the single most influential work in all
of Buddhism after the original sutras.
What would perhaps be most desirable would be to skip
a section-by-section analysis of the karika and jump straight to a discussion
of its broader themes and significances. An attempt to do this was the initial
intent of this thesis. What quickly became apparent, though, was how great
the amount of background knowledge necessary to make sense of this work
and how little of this knowledge could be presupposed on the part of the
reader. Take, for example, this wonderfully cryptic verse: "The arising of
arising is exclusively the arising of primary arising. Again, the primary
arising produces the arising of arising."
Note: karika VII.4.
(All quotations from the
karika, unless otherwise noted, are from the translation of David J. Kalupahana
in Kalupahana, 1986.) Lest the reader be kept in suspense, this
verse is explained in context below, page 57. The obscurity of such a statement
is not the fault of the translation; the above is perhaps the clearest translation
of this verse available. It is not to be assumed that the meaning of a
verse like this automatically becomes pellucid if one has a background in
Buddhist philosophy, but it does illustrate the difficulties one faces in
attempting to comprehend and communicate Nagarjuna's thought.
It was thus deemed necessary to summarize the basic themes of each of
the twenty-seven sections, one by one, and briefly introduce the reader
to the concepts contained therein. Only after this has been done can broader
observations be made and the philosophical significances extracted.
Certain translations of Madhyamika thought have presented only selections
from the original works, sometimes calling them the essential selections.
Note: e.g. Sprung 1979
The implication of this pointed out by David Kalupahana,
translator of and commentator on the Mulamadhyamakakarika, is that the remaining
sections are inessential.
Note: Kalupahana 1986, 27
This thesis will not adopt that approach. While
the following exposition of the karika may appear lengthy, the reader must
be assured that prolixity has been scrupulously avoided and only the few
most essential themes of each section have been mentioned.
Nagarjuna was both a Buddhist monk and an apologist
for Buddhism. It is the Buddha's philosophy, and this philosophy only,
that engaged his thought and veneration, as evidenced by frequent references
to "the Buddha(s)" and "the fully enlightened one."
One thought informs the whole karika: the Buddha taught that there
is no substantial essence underlying and supporting the manifest world.
Note: The reader's attention is
called to the etymology of the word "substantial:" the Latin roots are
sub = "under" + stare = "to stand."
A "substance" is that which stands under something
and provides the ground of being for it. The abiding soul and/or an absolute
God posited by some schools of thought is, by definition, not dependent upon
any element of the world for its existence, and the Buddha's philosophy holds
that anything that is not dependent cannot be real. It would either transcend
or precede existence, and thus could not exist.
Notwithstanding, the mass of humanity perceives and believes in the real existence
of the world, all the elements contained therein, and the characteristics
of and relations between these elements. Nagarjuna devotes the majority of
his sections to an analysis of these aspects of the putative world, such as
cause-and-effect, the senses, action, and time. Following this, he examines
the Buddha's teachings themselves, focusing on the nature of the enlightened
being, the Noble Path, enlightenment itself, and dependent arising.
A Presentation of the Treatise
Section one — Causation, and some Initial Problems
Nagarjuna devotes his first section, "Examination
of Conditions (pratyayas)," to the subject of causation.
A discussion of causation had to precede his examination of the elements
of reality (dharmas), for it is a thing's origin that determines its ontological
status. Discussion of causal theories held a paramount place in Indian philosophy,
because it was felt that a system's theory of causality reveals the method
of the entire system.
Note: Murti 1960, 166
The Buddha's explanation
of the causal process is dependent arising: "if this arises, that arises.
If this ceases, that ceases."
It is unlike any of
the non-Buddhist theories of causation which fall in one of four categories
:
- self- causation,
- other-causation,
- a combination of the two,
- or no causation.
- The first, self- causation, is exemplified by
the Vedic tradition of asserting the reality of the immutable Universal
Soul, atman. Briefly, this declares all effects to be inherent in their
cause, which cause is in every case some form of the eternal atman.
Note: cf. David J. Kalupahana, Causality: The Central Philosophy
of Buddhism (Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press, 1975), 6-15
A problem with self- causation is that the effect must be inherent in
the cause. If so, then nothing new has occurred or come to be.
- Other- or external- causation declares all change
to be produced by some form of a deus ex machina, such as God, fate, or
a deterministic self- nature.
A problem with other-causation is that if cause and effect are different
then the relation is lost, and, for example, fire could be produced from
water.
- A third type of causal theory advocated by some schools is basically
a combination of the self- and other-causation. The problem
with this is that both of the above two problems are compounded.
- The final option is that neither self- nor other-causation operates,
which position is in effect an indeterminism that denies all causation. If anything were to emerge ever, anywhere, then everything could
emerge at all times, everywhere.
The philosophy of Nagarjuna almost defies interpretation. By the
second verse of the first section, one is already hard-pressed to explain
exactly what Nagarjuna is saying. Following an introductory dedication
to the Buddha,
Note: discussed below, pages 115-118
he opens the karika with, in the first verse
, what would appear to be an unqualified rejection
of all the possible theories of causation.
"No existents whatsoever are evident anywhere
that are arisen from themselves, from another, from both, or from a non-cause,"
he declares.
Note: karika I.1 This can be, and has been, interpreted to be
a pure denial of causation. In the next verse
, though, he lists the four conditions (pratyayas) that function causally:
"There are only four conditions
( pratyayas), namely,
- primary condition,
- objectively supporting condition,
- immediately contiguous condition,
- and dominant condition."
The word he uses here for "condition," pratyaya, was often found in
the early Buddhist texts as a synonym of " cause."
Note: Kalupahana 1975, 54
A condition, in this context, is a foundation on the basis of which
a thing can come to be: "[There] are conditions (pratyayas),
because, depending on them, [things] arise," defines Nagarjuna.
A condition
(pratyaya) seems to be a cause which is necessary but not sufficient.
It is that which cooperates in causing a thing to arise, but is not the
sole cause of its arising. The difficulty of interpreting Nagarjuna's statements
lies in the fact that, even if a condition is only a part of the cause, it
is still a cause. He has thus, in the first two verses,
denied the tenability of the four non-Buddhist theories of causation, only
to follow it with an assertion that conditioned causal relations do exist.
Note: A comprehensive discussion of the
four conditions (pratyayas) Nagarjuna mentions in verse two is beyond the
scope of this examination.
There are a few very different ways to interpret Nagarjuna's
stance on causation.
Of the hundreds of commentaries on and studies of Nagarjuna's philosophy
since his death, the main hermeneutical approaches boil down to only a
very few, and these few come into play even at this early point in the
karika. A brief summary of the various hermeneutical
approaches is necessary here, at the outset, partly because
they offer differing ways to reconcile verse one (denial of causality)
and verse two (affirmation of causality), but also because they will be
seen to surface again and again in various guises throughout this presentation
of the karika.
- 1) One way to interpret the disparity between the two
verses is that Nagarjuna is being selective
about what type of causation he admits.
A "cause" in the sense of an active and determinate force that effects
change is rejected. What is admitted is only that, if certain conditions
(pratyayas) are present, a thing can arise dependent on them.
- 2) A second possible interpretation is that Nagarjuna
in verse one is only denying that a causally-arisen existent is evident;
the causal process could perhaps be claimed
to be either hidden or transcendent, and thus not accessible to human perception.
- 3) A third interpretation also rests on the word
"evident:" Nagarjuna could be claiming that,
while causal relations are perceived by an unenlightened person, they
are seen as illusory and unreal by the one who has realized nirvana.
- 4) Fourth, the crux of the argument could be
the concept of real existence. Verse one declares that no existents are
evident that have come to be through the workings of causation.
Perhaps things do arise from causes, but these things do not really
exist. Whereas the previous interpretation holds that the causal
processes are illusory, this position would state that it is the ontic
status of the elements themselves that is under attack.
- 5) A final exegesis is that mentioned earlier:
Nagarjuna
can perhaps be seen as rejecting causation in all its forms and manifestations.
Note: Kalupahana
solves this apparent contradiction between the first two verses simply
by stating that Nagarjuna was denying causation
but was neither denying nor confirming conditionality. This interpretation
is questionable and, even if it is valid, the problem is not wholly resolved.
It may seem hasty to present so many interpretations so soon. However,
as mentioned, an immediate discussion of them is warranted, for, while
here the various positions relate only to Nagarjuna's treatment of causation,
they can and have been applied to almost all of the topics he examines.
The five
interpretations as they relate to this context and their broader implications
can be summarized as follows:
- 1) Nagarjuna accepts causation, but selectively. He isolates
exactly which theory of causation he supports, clarifies this theory, and
rejects the rest.
- 2) Nagarjuna rejects the human ability to understand the process,
in this case the workings of cause-and-effect. The mysterious mechanics
of the universe are either too transcendent or too esoteric for human investigation
to access.
- 3) The whole process as well as its products are illusory. The individual mired in the sphere of relativities may believe that
the world has certain qualities, but these specious beliefs evaporate when
one attains enlightenment and sees the true nature of things.
- 4) The issue arises due to a mistaken understanding of existence. There are conditions (pratyayas) dependent upon which things come
to be, and one can speak of cause and effect relative to these things,
but they do not enjoy the status of having substantial existence. Having
no measure of independence, they cannot be said to be real.
- 5) Nagarjuna is rejecting everything for the sake of nonsense.
He denies causation only to follow it with an assertion of causation.
The point of this is to force his readers to abandon concepts altogether
and achieve an unmediated awareness of the absolute, and nonconceptual,
nature of the world.
These five opinions are not necessarily mutually
exclusive. It will be seen that most or all are accurate in certain
situations and that there may not be any one single exegesis that will
be accurate in all situations.
The following summary of the karika will first present
Nagarjuna's basic arguments on each topic and reserve commentary until
all elements have been examined. The above five interpretations can be kept
in mind to help understand his themes and what to make of them. It is hoped
that this will not prove too confusing at times; the reader is to be reassured
that generalized elucidation is forthcoming.
The majority of this first section seems
to be an examination of what type of relation holds between the effect
and the conditions pratyayas) which gave rise to it.
- The self-nature of the effect is not evident in the conditions
(pratyayas), he says in verse three
, so the relation between cause and effect
is not one of identity. The effect is not inherent and preexisting in the cause. If it were, then the self-nature of the effect would have to
exist before the effect itself came into manifestation. Yet this implies
eternalism and leads to a philosophical impasse like that the atman school
faced when forced to explain how change could occur if self- nature is eternal
and immutable.
- Neither, however, is the effect a new
creation that is wholly different
from the cause. If the effect
were not preexistent in the condition, then effects would not depend on
causes. This would allow for utter randomness — -anything could arise at any
time.
- It is thus not appropriate to see the effect as
arising either from conditions (pratyayas), which implies
eternalism,
- or from non-conditions (pratyayas),
which implies anarchy.
Nagarjuna also demonstrates that one cannot
view either conditions (pratyayas) or the effects arising from them as
existent.
The two options are that an effect either existed or did not exist
at the time it was brought into being, but neither position withstands scrutiny.
The reason is that neither of the two elements
of the equation, the "effect" and its "cause," can exist
independently. They come into being
only in dialectical relation to each other, and neither can be isolated
and examined separate from its dialectical component.
- If the effect is said already to exist at the time of its rising,
then what is the use of saying it had a cause? If it already existed,
then the concept of a cause becomes superfluous.
- However, neither can one say that the effect did not yet exist
at the time of its arising. If so, then what would be the function of
a cause? "Of what use is a [cause] of the existing [effect]?" asks Nagarjuna.
Note: karika I.6. (pratyaya translated by me as "cause." cf. Monier-Williams
673)
- Neither can one attempt to resolve the dilemma by positing
some agency that is either a combination of existence and nonexistence
or is a rejection of both.
- There is thus no way to attribute
any form of existence to an effect and still speak of its cause. " Since a thing that is existent or non-existent
or both existent and non-existent is not produced, how pertinent in that
context would a producing cause be? " Nagarjuna summarizes.
Note: karika I.7
Nagarjuna's clear presentation of the implications of cause-and-effect
demonstrates that the entire problem stems from an over-analysis of the
categories. There is only a problem if one attempts to separate cause and
effect and speak of each in isolation. While
the argument is clear and seemingly incontrovertible as he presents it,
the consequences of his conclusion are far- reaching. If cause and
effect arise only in mutual dependence, as the Buddha taught, then all talk
of real existence must be abandoned, a radical conclusion indeed.
Note: It may seem that
an inherent contradiction in Nagarjuna's philosophy is exposed by his language:
in the very act of denying the reality of either existence or non-existence
the verb "to be" is used. For example, verse XXV.10 reads "nirvana is
neither existence nor non- existence" (italics mine). This problem stems
from translation only. Unlike English, Sanskrit does not rely on the verb
"to be" to express relations. In this example, the original is "na bhavo
nabhavo nirvanam," which literally reads "Neither existence nor non- existence
nirvana." (Curiously, though Sprung pointed out this problem, he neglected
to answer it. Cf. Sprung 12)
Section two — The Relationship between Nominal and Verbal Subjects
Section one does
not exhaust Nagarjuna's explanations of causality, for he discusses it throughout
the entire work and examines it in greater depth especially in sections
four and twenty. His intent in opening the karika with a brief examination
of causality probably was to preclude any initial misunderstandings and
to refute the theories of causality which were both the dominant theories
in the non-Buddhist world and which also had become prevalent within Buddhist
philosophy.
His next subject,
"Examination of the Moved and the Not-Moved," is
an investigation of the process
, rather than the elements, of dependent arising.
The Buddha's doctrine of dependent arising shifted the ontological
emphasis from one of static "being" to one of dynamic "becoming."
It is the use of verbs rather than nouns that can express reality and
its intrinsic fluctuant nature.
Nagarjuna discusses the notions of change by examining one concrete
example: motion and rest.
He breaks down the verb into its three components of
- the verb in the abstract,
- its subject,
- and its sphere of activity, in this case motion, the mover,
and the space within which motion occurs.
The concept of "movement" is dissected and
scrutinized to demonstrate that the three categories of the verb,
its subject, and its sphere are all untenable.
There is indisputably a perception of action, but this perception
cannot be explained in a way that withstands logical inspection.
First, a span of time
is necessary for activity to take place. Activity, of any kind, requires
a process of changing physical position or changing attributes.
This change requires a temporal extension, for an instantaneous
change would be tantamount to the complete disappearance of one thing and
the appearance in its place of a wholly new thing. Nagarjuna first points
out that to speak of motion in the present requires
isolating the present moment. Movement in the past or in the future
obviously does not constitute present moving; neither the "has moved"
nor the "will move" is presently moving.
When, though, did the motion of the presently-moving
object commence? Prior to its commencement it was the "will
move," but a "will move" is not moving. "How could there be a movement
in the not [yet] moved?" he asks.
Likewise, movement is not initiated in the "has moved," for the "has
moved," by definition, is not partaking of present movement. Further,
movement does not commence in the "presently moving," for this is already
moving — -an action cannot begin anew in a place where it is already present.
The exact commencement of motion can never be perceived, for, no matter
how infinitesimally small the atomistic division of time, there will always
be one point at which the object is not yet moving.
"When the commencement of movement is not being perceived in any way,
what is it that is discriminated as the moved, the present moving, or the
not [yet] moved?"
Note: karika
II.14
Thus movement can only be perceived in the present moment, and the activity's
necessary time span is lost. With the loss of temporal extension, the verbal
activity becomes unfathomable, and hence unreal.
Even assuming that one
could still speak of motion even when confined to a single present moment
only, one now has the problem of what moves. By definition,
only a mover can partake of movement. Likewise, separated from a mover,
there can be no such thing as movement in the abstract. The relation between
these two, the moverand the fact of its movement, is logically meaningless.
To say that a mover moves is redundant and superfluous. To say that a non-mover
moves is to state a contradiction. But these are the only two options,
for, "other than a mover and a non-mover, what third party moves?"
Note: karika
II.8
It may sound reasonable to say that it is a mover who partakes of movement.
But it is not appropriate to speak of a mover without movement for, if
it does not move, then by what is it a mover? Either option creates a disjunction
between the subject and its action that is unacceptable.
The subject of motion
is only half the story. One must further examine the lack of motion, or
rest. The problems encountered by the issue of rest are identical
as those faced by motion: a mover is not stationary, for this is a contradiction,
a non-mover is not stationary, for this is a needless tautology, and there
is no third party that is stationary. Further, a mover cannot come to rest,
for it would then cease to be a mover. If a mover were to become a "rester,"
then its identity would change and it would no longer be the same subject;
there would be the dissolution of the moving object and the instant creation
of the stationary object.
The obvious objection
to the above arguments is to say that they assume an untenable identity
of a mover and its movement. This identity should be replaced with a concept
of difference, the opposition could declare: the mover is not the same
as its movement, but merely possesses movement. If this were so, though,
then movement would exist in the abstract and be independent of the mover.
There would be motion but nothing moving. Another problem of isolating the
subject from its movement is that this subject is not perceived in any
way. This subject devoid of attributes, what Western philosophy calls the
"bare particular," would be a metaphysical creation produced purely by
the imagination, for it could never be experienced.
Nagarjuna closes this section with the summary statement that neither
motion, nor the mover, nor the space moved in is evident.
Note:
karika II.25
He has up to this
point not offered an explicit discussion of the spatial dimension
, but he states that the reality of space is to be negated in the same
way that motion and rest were.
The reader is at
this point likely to be left with the thought that Nagarjuna was a rampaging
nihilist. All concepts are being summarily denied for some obscure and
perverse purpose. Admittedly, this is a conclusion that has occasionally
been drawn by admirers and detractors alike, both ancient and modern. However,
while it is not yet clear what Nagarjuna's intent is, it is likely not one
so simple.
He appears to be negating, not the reality of subject and object and
their attributes, but rather just some way of thinking about them.
Regarding the topic of this section, he wrote "The view that movement
is identical with the mover is not proper. The view that the mover is different
from motionis also not proper."
Note:
karika II.18
It remains to
be seen, though, what view is proper.
Sections three through six — Factors of Personal Existence: Elements
and Passions
Nagarjuna moves from these foundational examinations to
an analysis of each of the specific categories delineated by the Abhidharma:
- the spheres of sense (ayatanas),
- the factors comprising the individual (skandhas),
- and the physical elements dharmas).
He begins with an examination of the sense
faculty of the eye, its function, and its object. He uses seeing
as a paradigm for all of the senses, because an examination of one sense
faculty is sufficient to explain the function of all of the senses.
Note: More
than this, the faculty of vision was paramount in Indian philosophy. Truths
were seen as being self- evident, so much so that the term for a system
of thought was darsana, "sight." The Buddha also emphasized the unique significance
of sight by telling his followers, not to "believe" him, but to "come and
see [for yourself]." Cf. Rahula, 8-9
The theory of
perception explained in section three of the
karika, ``Examination of the Faculty of the Eye,'' is
nothing more than a restatement of the Buddha's teaching of dependent
arising. On the one side are the six sense faculties, and on the
other are their six objective spheres. When these two come together, sensory
perception arises. (The mind is considered the sixth organ of sense. It
is not to be confused with consciousness, which infuses all six faculties,
not just the mental.) There was little controversy about the senses themselves,
Note:
Kalupahana 1992, 164
so what likely
inspired this section was a debate regarding the specific functioning of
the faculties. Hindu philosophy posited two distinct elements necessary
for seeing: the seeing of the object, and the abstract noun "seeing."
Note:
ibid., 164
This is analogous to the above-mentioned debate over motion, in which
there was a tendency to isolate and make abstract the process of "movement"
as separate from the actual instance of moving. There was also
a disagreement regarding the functioning of the senses within Buddhism.
The older Theravada tradition held that the sensory objects exist outside
of and independent of the act of perception. This may not necessarily
violate dependent arising, for the sensory object consists only of infinitesimal
and momentary atoms and the functioning of the faculty of perception is
required to impose order on the atoms and create a perception.
Note: Hiriyanna, 204
While
this theory may not be wrong per se, Nagarjuna was
still uncomfortable with the substantialism it implied. To clarify
exactly what dependent arising says about the function of perception,
he used an illustration: perceptions depend on their physical objective
sphere "just as the birth of a son is said to be dependent upon the mother
and the father."
Note: karika III.7
That is, perception is wholly dependent upon the object perceived for
its functioning. Perception as an independent process or entity cannot
exist in the abstract, separate from the object perceived.
The other
aspect of perception that he felt compelled to examine, after perception
and the perceived, was the subject perceiver. Again, the
immediately obvious alternative to the Buddha's teaching was the Hindu.
The Upanisads asserted an unchanging and eternal agent perceiver, and declared
that this eternal soul is the ultimate object of all perceptions. The truest
and most primal perception is that of the atman, the soul, being aware of
itself. This concept is surely what Nagarjuna had in mind in the second
verse of this section when he says that "seeing does not perceive itself,
its own form." There must be two separate elements for seeing to arise: the
seer and the seen. Yet on the other hand, seeing must in some way perceive
itself, for "how can that which does not see itself see others?"
Note: karika III.2
A
further confusion lies in the seer's relation to his or her seeing. Like
the mover and movement, "a seer does not exist either
separated or not separated from seeing."
Note: karika III.6
If the seer exists separate from the action of seeing, then there will
be some point at which the seer is not presently seeing, and thus is not
yet a "seer." If they are not separated, then there is no one engaging in
the activity of seeing, but rather one whose nature it is always to see.
This theory can perhaps be asserted metaphysically, but it is never experienced
in fact. The way to disentangle the paradox is by not positing either a
strict bifurcation between seer and seen, which would preclude their possibility
of interacting, or an identity between the two, which would obviate perception
as a faculty. The proper description of the relation between the two, i.e.
dependent arising, is yet to be explained.
Section four, ``Examination of the Aggregates,''
discusses the Buddha's insight into the transitoriness
of all phenomena. He saw that impermanency requires that there be no
permanent entities. Conversely, if there are permanent entities,
then these can never be phenomenal, and thus are pure abstractions that
are too metaphysical to have any relevance. The apparent permanence of
the noumenal individual was explained as a mere contiguity of phenomenal
elements. The Buddha analyzed these units of phenomena into two categories:
the aggregates of factors that constitute the apparent personality, the
skandhas, and the physical elements comprising these aggregates, the dhatus.
These two categories, along with the spheres of sense, comprised the base
constituents of reality as analyzed and classified by the Abhidharma. Having
discussed the senses, Nagarjuna now devotes two sections to an examination
of the remaining two categories.
Reacting to the schools that asserted a transcendent and immanent soul,
the Buddha analyzed the psychophysical personality into five aggregates
to show that there was no permanent soul in the individual and then to explain
what does comprise the individual. On the opposite end of the spectrum,
he reacted to the materialist theory that it is only matter which is eternal
by analyzing the physical elements themselves and exposing their transience.
There was no debate within Buddhism about the validity of these theories;
the skandhas and the dhatus were accepted by all. However, it appears
that there was a tendency to read more into these theories than the Buddha
intended.
- The "Realists" posited some form of a self-nature
that resided in the elements,
- and the "Personalists" asserted that there was some
form of a self-hood that transcended but was neither identical with nor
different from its component aggregates.
Nagarjuna chose to approach these heretical
theories in this section by demonstrating first that it is not possible
to think of the aggregates as real. The aggregates into which the
Buddha analyzed the individual were material form (the body), sense-contacts,
perceptions, psychological tendencies (the characteristics that most evidently
distinguish one personality from another), and consciousness. These could
be reified by positing a base foundation for each. For example, the foundation
for material form would be the elements of earth, air, fire, water, and
space, and the foundation of sense-contact, or feeling, would be pleasure,
pain, gladness, sadness, or indifference.
Note: Kalupahana 1992, 146
Such a reification, Nagarjuna argued, requires an untenable division
between the foundations of an aggregate and the aggregate itself.
Any attempt to relate an aggregate and its foundation dissolves into
nonsense in exactly the same way that a mover and its movement cannot be
related. Consider, for example, feeling and one of its constituents,
pleasure. Are they two different things? If so, then they will exist independently,
and will lose their dialectic identity. The various perceptions and sensations
will not be a foundational constituent for the human category of feeling
if feeling is not contingent upon them, and vice versa. Then are they identical?
If so, the division between an aggregate and its foundation would become
meaningless, for they would then be one and the same. Feeling would be
both pleasure and pain always and at the same time. The only relation they
could have is one of complete dependence, which is exactly what the Buddha
taught. Neither the aggregates nor that which comprises them have any existence
on their own: in this example, pleasure does not exist until it is felt,
and feeling has no function until there is pleasure.
Note: It may be noted that the paradigm offered by the Buddha is
wholly antithetical to that of Platonism: the Platonic ``theory of Forms''
represents an epitome of the worldview Nagarjuna was rejecting.
It seems that Nagarjuna's only grievance about the theory of the aggregates
was the tendency to seek a substantial reality underlying each aggregate.
While the systematization of the categories produced by the Abhidharma
was not necessarily wrong, Nagarjuna wanted to ensure that no excessive
metaphysical theorizing resulted from it.
Section five, "Examination of the Physical
Elements," is along similar lines. The Buddha spoke of
the elements as each having a specific characteristic, e.g. the nature of
earth is hardness and the nature of water is fluidity.
However, cautions Nagarjuna, this distinction between an element and
its characteristic cannot be pressed too far. If the characterized,
e.g. earth, exists separately from its characteristic, e.g. hardness, then
one is left with two independent and meaningless abstractions: a piece of
earth that is not yet associated with hardness, and a piece of hardness that
exists only in the potential. "An existent that is without characteristics
is nowhere evident," he said. Furthermore, "in the absence of the [existent],
there is no occurrence of the characteristic."
Note: karika V.2 and V.4, respectively
The relation of elements and their qualities, if scrutinized closely
enough in this manner, produces a rather startling conclusion:
"There is neither an existent nor a non- existent, neither the characterized
nor the characteristic," nor even any of the elements comprising physical
existence!
Note: karika V.7
A statement such as this obviously is subject to many and diverse interpretations,
such as the five summarized above.
Note: The reader is reminded that the word ``is'' in ``there is
neither an existent nor a non-existent'' is problematic in English translation
only. The original reads na bhavo nabhavo, literally ``neither existent
nor non-existent.''
Nagarjuna devotes section six to an ``Examination
of Lust and the Lustful One.'' The word used here for
``lust,'' raga, can mean any general feeling of passion or strong interest.
Note: Monier-Williams, 872
(To express their broad meanings, lust and its opposite, hate, will
often be translated here as ``passionate attraction and aversion.'')
His purpose here is to show that, like movement and the one who moves,
lust and the one who is lustful are interdependent and cannot be ontologically
distinguished. There is no such thing as a subject who is a tabula
rasa, who is not presently lustful but who either was or will be, for then
in what abstract realm could the unmanifest lust possibly exist? Further,
neither can lust and the lustful one be one and the same, for then there
would be no such thing as the noun "lust" — -there would only be one entity,
the lustful one, and speaking of two different things would be a superfluity.
There are two possible significances of this section. The one favored
by translator David Kalupahana is that Nagarjuna was here addressing one
of the issues that the Buddha said was chiefly to blame in committing the
individual to bondage. Greed, hatred, and lust are all instances of the
thirst tanha) that binds the individual to the cycle of unpleasant birth-and-
death, especially the misguided greed and lust for continued existence.
Note: Rahula, 29
Freedom, nirvana, was defined as the absence of lust, and therefore,
Kalupahana seems to say, Nagarjuna demonstrated the independent unreality
of lust to facilitate escaping from it and realizing nirvana.
Note: Kalupahana 1986, 40-41 and 153-4
A slightly different significance is hinted at by the placement of
this section. It immediately follows an examination of the components of
reality and the individual, i.e. the physical elements (dhatus) and the
constituent aggregates of the psychophysical individual (skandhas). Nagarjuna
has already examined two of the five aggregates, perception in section
three and material form in section four. The fourth constituent aggregate
of the individual is samskara, mental formations and dispositions. These
dispositions include any volitional activity or habitual tendency, good
and bad, that creates karma and thus binds one to the cycle of birth-and-death.
Dispositions include confidence and conceit, wisdom and ignorance, lust
and hatred.
Note: Rahula, 22
Since Nagarjuna examines one of these dispositions, lust, shortly
after a discussion of the aggregates as a whole, it is likely that he
is using lust as a paradigmatic example of all the dispositions.
His intention then would be to demonstrate in yet another way that
there is to be found no transcendent Self separate from its psychophysical
constituents.
That Nagarjuna intended this section
to be more comprehensive than an examination of lust only is indicated by
this section's concluding verse: "Thus, with or without
the lustful one, there is no establishment of lust. Like lust, there is
no establishment of anything with or without [accompaniments]."
Note: karika VI.10
(italics mine)
That is, all dispositional
constituents of the individual are ultimately dependent. Any real existence
of them is illusory, whether the individual exists or not.
Section seven — Cohesion of Disparate Elements (Samskrta)
The basic elements necessary for the manifestation of the physical
world, i.e. causal conditions (pratyayas), verbs, the factors of the
perceiving individual, and the physical elements have now been briefly
examined. It is now possible to examine the way the elements combine to
make phenomena. Nagarjuna proceeds to do this in
section seven, "The Examination of Composite Things."
Note: The word used here, samskrta, is usually translated as "
conditioned." To avoid confusion with "conditions (pratyayas),"
pratyaya, it will be clearer to translate samskrta as "
composite." (cf. Monier-Williams, 1120)
The Buddha described all composite elements,
i.e. all phenomena, as partaking of three characteristics: arising, enduring,
and ceasing. Things come to be, remain for a time, and then go
away. Nagarjuna accepts these three processes of
existence, but cautions against hypostatizing any of them. If a
thing were defined by either real arising, real enduring, or real ceasing,
then there would be the oddity of the origination of a thing which has no
duration or cessation, of something that endures but has no origination or
decay, or of a thing that dies but which was never born.
Note: Murti 1960, 192
The obvious way out of the dilemma is to say that a thing merely can
be described in terms of one of the three processes, rather than partaking
of the nature of one of the three. This response may, at first, seem to
be the proper one. For example, a phenomenon can be said to arise, but that
does not mean that it partakes of a separate and real thing called "arising."
If arising, enduring, and ceasing were real, then they would be discrete
entities and thus "not adequate to function as characteristics of the composite
[thing]."
Note: karika VII.2
The reason for this is that if they were real and discrete entities,
then a phenomenon could obviously not partake of all three at the same
time, which would mean that it would be arising at the same time that it
was ceasing. Neither could it partake of one after the other, for this would
imply that at the time of arising a thing was permanent, i.e. non-arisen,
and then becomes temporary between the moments of arising and ceasing, and
then suddenly shifts from a state of enduring to the process of decaying.
One could never find the precise moment when, for example, endurance gives
way to cessation. Infinite regress becomes unavoidable. Each of the three
processes would itself have to arise, endure, even if only but for an instant,
and then cease. "If arising were to produce this present arising, which arising
would again produce that arising of that arising?" Nagarjuna wryly asks.
Note: karika VII.18.
(This is the context of the "wonderfully cryptic" verse quoted on
page 40, i.e. "The arising of arising is exclusively the arising of primary
arising…" A further elucidation of this, though, would not be proper here.
Cf. karika VII.4)
The ineluctable conclusion of a close examination of the three processes
is that not one of them exists as real, and so the above response, though
seemingly acceptable, also breaks down. "As an illusion, a dream, a [mythical
city], so have arising, endurance, and destruction been exemplified." And,
further, "with the non-establishment of arising, duration, and destruction,
the composite [thing] does not exist."
Note: karika VII.33-34
That is, if the three phases of the process
are negated, then the processed thing itself must be illusory. Therefore,
even the notion that a thing can be described in terms of one of the three
processes must fail, even if the processes themselves are not reified.
Sections eight through eleven — The Ontological Status of the Individual
Having discussed the elements both singly and in combination, Nagarjuna
briefly looks at the agent which appears to underlie or precede these
phenomena. He does this with the next four sections
, in which he first examines
- the nature of the agent and its action,
- then the preexistent self,
- then the relation between the self's existence and its temporal
states,
- and finally the prior and posterior extremes of the self's
existence.
There are two primary ways that philosophers
have tended to approach the subject of the self:
- one empirical,
- the other speculative.
The empirical approach is famously expressed
by the Cartesian dictum "I think, therefore I am."
Nagarjuna analyzes this approach with the example of
"I act, therefore I am" in section eight, ``Examination of Action and
Actor.'' It could be said that the agent actor must exist,
for it is apparent that activity exists. In section two Nagarjuna removed
the substantial basis for activity and change, but it is not denied that
both are still perceived by the ignorant and the enlightened alike. The crux
is what is the proper way to regard, or believe in, this activity and change.
It is not possible to say that there is a really existent agent who performs
a really existent action. Real existence implies immutability, for if the
entity's essence changed then it would no longer be the same entity. However,
this immutability would require an impassable dichotomy between the ground
of being and the sphere of activity. Neither is it possible to say that the
agent who acts is in some abstract way "non-existent." If this were so,
then change and activity would be effected without having been existentially
caused. Despite the above problems, Nagarjuna does not deny the occurrence
of activity.
A flat
denial of activity would undercut the entire foundation of the Buddha's
teachings on morality and, by extension, the Noble Path leading to enlightenment
would be lost.
Note: karika VIII.5
The proper relation between agent and action
is once again nothing more than dependent arising, for neither of the two
can have either a real or an unreal status. "We do not perceive any other
way of establishing [them]," he concludes.
Note: karika VIII.12
The speculative approach to establishing the reality
of the agent is logical induction. Nagarjuna examines and refutes this
approach in the next section, "Examination
of the Prior [Entity]." If there
is the fact of perception, then there is the entity of a perceiver, this
approach would hold.
"Therefore,
it is determined that, prior to [perceptions], such an existent is," asserts
the opponent.
Note: karika IX.1-2
This could be expressed by slightly rephrasing the Cartesian dictum
to
"How could I think
were there not a thinker?" The immediate problem with this is that
such a "prior subject" could be nothing more than a speculative abstraction.
If the subject
is said to exist prior to perception, then "by what means is it made known?"
Note: karika IX.3
There is no way to be aware of or even to posit the existence of a
subject prior to and thus intrinsically devoid of its characteristic functioning.
Further, if such a prior entity were posited, then perceptions would exist
independent of the perceiver, which is absurd. The analysis of perception
undertaken above in section three of the karika focused on the impossibility
of independence specifically of perceiver and perceiving.
This section, though, is slightly different in scope — -it analyzes
the impossibility of the subject's existence independent of any of its
experiences by virtue of existing prior to them.
The consequence of this is broad. "Someone prior to, simultaneous with,
or posterior to [perception] is not evident," and therefore neither are
the experiences themselves evident. The upshot is that "thoughts of existence
and non-existence are also renounced."
Note: karika IX.11-12
Section ten is, prima facie, an examination
of one dualism: fire and the fuel which it burns. Actually,
though, Nagarjuna was using this example to discuss from yet another angle
the issue of the essence and temporal manifestation of the self. One school
of Personalism asserted that there is a person who is neither identical
with nor different from its constituent aggregates, skandhas. Adherents
of this school used the metaphor of fire and fuel to explain their position.
Fire is not identical to its fuel, for then that which is burned would
be the same as the process of burning. Nor is fire different from fuel,
for then they could not be explained in the same terms; for example, that
which is burning would not be hot.
Note: Lamotte, 608
Notwithstanding the fact that the individual cannot be explained ontologically,
the Personalists
held, it was still necessary to assert its reality, for otherwise karma
could not appertain and rebirth would not occur.
Note: Kohn, 243
It was this doctrine which Nagarjuna criticized
through his analysis of fire and fuel.
Nagarjuna agrees that fire and fuel cannot be identical, for then there
would be only one entity, and he agrees that they cannot be separate,
for then there could be heat and flame but nothing burning. While the
Personalists were maintaining that fire and fuel were neither identical
nor different, they were still admitting the reality of both. Their agenda
would then have been to deconstruct the ontological independence of the
two for the sake of arriving at a higher synthesis midway between the two
halves of the dualism.
Note: Kalupahana 1986, 197
It is difficult to explain what Nagarjuna's position is in this section,
for he seems to say two different things. One verse especially makes it
unclear what exactly Nagarjuna's stance on the identity/difference was. "If
fire is different from fuel it would reach the fuel, just as a woman would
reach for a man and a man for a woman," he says.
Note: karika X.6
He follows this with a statement that fire and fuel could reach for
each other in the same way as do the man and the woman "only if fire and
fuel were to exist mutually separated."
Note: karika X.7
On the one hand, he denied difference in the first verse of this section
by pointing out that if they are different then each would exist on its
own, an absurd conclusion. On the other, the fact that woman and man interact
is empirically validated and indisputable. One interpretation of this disparity
is based on the fact that there are numerous instances in the Mulamadhyamakakarika
in which Nagarjuna quotes an opponent's position and refutes it in the
next verse. Some commentators have interpreted the first verse of these
two as the opponent's wrong view, followed by Nagarjuna's assertion of the
correct view.
Note: Cf. the translation of the karika verses X.8-9 in Frederick
Streng, Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning (Nashville: Abingdon Press,
1967). (It has been claimed that this translation is not by Streng, as
claimed, but by J. A. B. van Buitenen. Cf. Kees W. Bolle, review of A History
of Buddhist Philosophy, by David J. Kalupahana, in Journal of Oriental Studies
(1994, page number unknown). However, since it is Streng's name only listed
in Emptiness and cross-references are to Streng, this translation will be
referred to here as his.)
This interpretation would have Nagarjuna say that, while fire and fuel
are not the same, they are not really different, either. Man and woman,
though, are non-dependent and hence different.
Another interpretation does not disagree with the above, but lends it
a slightly different character. One could interpret both verses as Nagarjuna's,
from which it would follow that he is recognizing there to be different
types of complementary relationships. While on the one hand fire and fuel
are mutually dependent for their very definition, on the other the human
genders are observed to be complementary but separate. This would declare
there to exist dualisms the individual elements of which are dependently
arisen, not contingent on the other half of the pair, but merely contingent
upon internal factors. The perception and conceptual differentiation of each
half of the duality would of course be dependent on the other half — -one
could not define "woman" without defining "man" — -but the ontic status of
the entity would not be dependent on the other half. While it is not certain
which of the above two interpretations is the better, an example Nagarjuna
used in section six, i.e. that of lust and the lustful one, may provide a
clue. There, he made it clear that, though lust and the lustful one are differentiable,
neither can exist without the other. Not only are their identities mutually
contingent, but further they cannot be found in separate temporal or spatial
locations. Likewise, fire and fuel are ultimately inseparable. Man and woman,
though, are obviously separate. If nothing else, the two genders can be seen
to exist when in separate spatial locations, when not "reaching for" each
other. Nagarjuna is thus demonstrating that complementary relationships can
take different forms, which relationships allow varying degrees of independence
of each half of the pair.
Section eleven, "Examination of the Prior
and Posterior Extremities," is devoted
to an address of one last element of the belief in the soul, namely the
eternalism it implies. The Buddha spurned discussions of etiology
and teleology both because the only important things to worry about are
those in the present, and also because ultimate beginnings and ends can only
be speculative. Nagarjuna here examines the meaning and relevance of the
latter, the ultimate prior and posterior ends. The Buddha clearly stated
that the ultimate ends of the universe are not evident and hence inconceivable.
Note: Kalupahana 1986, 206
Furthermore, it is not even appropriate to speak of the ultimate ends
of an individual life-span, for they cannot be "real." If birth were real,
then three undesirable options would arise. If birth preceded the entity
of death, then there would be a birth without old age and death, and all
arisen things would be immortal. If death is inherent in birth, then something
will be dying at the same moment it is being born. Finally, if it is flatly
stated that birth and death are separate, then no born things will die and
the things that die will never have been born.
The only correct way to view birth-and-death is that, if something
is born, then it will die. This is not merely a slightly different way
to phrase the relationship between the two, but rather a whole different
way of viewing the nature of birth and death: they do not exist on their
own, and therefore one can in no way speak of origins or ends. Of effect
and cause, characterized and characteristic, "of the entire life process
as well as of all existents, the prior [and posterior] ends [are] not evident."
Note: karika XI.7-8.
(The addendum "[and posterior]" is mine. It was left out of the sentence
most likely only to preserve the meter, so its inclusion is justified.)
Sections twelve and thirteen — Suffering and its Cause
Nagarjuna has now analyzed almost all of the elements into which
the Abhidharma subdivided reality. Only one percept has not yet been
mentioned. This is
duhkha, the all-encompassing universal suffering. The
Buddha spoke of "three marks of existence": impermanence, soullessness,
and suffering. Impermanence and soullessness are descriptions of the ontological
status of phenomena, and suffering is the consequence of these for the individual.
The next two sections of the karika discuss, first, the nature
and origin of suffering itself and second, the dispositions which
cause all phenomena to be experienced as suffering.
Buddhism does not see duhkha as just a regrettable fact of life that
must be accepted. This would be simple pessimism. Since Buddhism is preeminently
a soteriology, the fact of suffering is exploited to spur the unhappy
individual on to the proper goal of nirvana.
Note: Santina, 31-33
The Buddha was very clear that one must have a proper understanding
of suffering and its origin if one is to utilize this understanding and
ultimately escape from suffering. Nagarjuna examined all the possibilities
of the cause of suffering, namely self-causation, other-causation, both,
or neither, and found that none were tenable. The result of considering suffering
to be self-caused would be that one person acts in a way that causes suffering,
and then this same person experiences the suffering. This would mean that
the same person existed in at least two separate moments, which would
lead to the belief in eternalism. If suffering is considered to be caused
by another, then there would not be a firm connection between an act and
its consequences. This could lead to a denial of moral responsibility. A
further objection to both of the above is that any distinction between the
agent and the suffering caused by the agent's act would allow for there to
be a person existing separate from suffering. Who is this person who can
exist unsullied by duhkha? asks Nagarjuna.
Note: karika XII.4,6
Finally, if caused by both, then the above difficulties are just compounded,
and if caused by neither, then it would be deterministic and nirvana forever
unattainable. When a disciple asked the Buddha if suffering is self-caused
or is caused by another, the Buddha did not answer "yes" or "no" to either
question. He merely remarked, in answer to each, "one should not put it
that way."
Note: Kalupahana 1986, 45
To preclude the false and harmful beliefs mentioned
above, the fact of suffering was neither explained nor explained away.
The only important thing is its eradication, which is indirectly the subject
of the next section.
Nagarjuna examined briefly in section six the nature of passions like
lust and hatred, or passionate attraction and aversion, and demonstrated
that they are dependent upon the one who grasps. This proves that the constraining
passions are ultimately illusory and can have no real claim on the one
who understands them. An understanding of this dependence paves the way
for the possibility of freeing oneself from the passions and discovering
nirvana. He examines the nature of dispositions once again in section thirteen,
"Examination of Dispositions," but with a different emphasis. Whereas in
the earlier section he focused on the dependence of the dispositions on the
subject, here he explains in greater detail why the dispositions can have
no independent reality.
Note: The importance of this section is hinted at by the difficulty
the Buddhist tradition has had in naming it. Most interpreters have entitled
it "Samskara-pariksa," the analysis of "Dispositions" (Kalupahana) or
"Conditioned Elements" (Streng), even though the term samskara appears
in the chapter only once. The Tibetan texts gave it the title "Tattva-pariksa,"
analysis of "Truth," though the term tattva does not appear in the chapter
once. Sprung's title of "The Absence of Being in Things" may be the most
accurate, for the terms "sunya" or "sunyata" appear in half the verses.
However, since this debate is too involved for the context at hand, Kalupahana's
translation is accepted here.
This section, at eight verses in length, is one of the shortest in the
karika. However, it is one of the most important examinations of the entire
treatise. The dispositions have a unique place in the Buddha's
ontology, for they hold a very influential place in his two formulations
of reality, i.e. dependent arising and the aggregates of personal existence
skandhas). As the second link in the chain of dependent arising, dispositions
are that which, conditioned by ignorance, bring the world into existence.
In the five categories comprising the individual, dispositions both shape
the personality and condition rebirth.
In placing this discussion immediately after the one of suffering, Nagarjuna
apparently had in mind the Buddha's "three marks of existence," impermanence,
suffering, and soullessness. The Buddha's exact wording here is important.
He did not indiscriminately ascribe these marks to all aspects of existence.
Specifically, he said "All conditioned things are
impermanent. All conditioned things are suffering. All phenomena are soulless."
Note: Kalupahana 1986, 218
An implication of this is, not that conditioned things are not soulless,
but that not all phenomena are suffering.
Note: Neither may this be interpreted to mean that phenomenal things
are permanent. Admittedly, this is confusing. Likely the Buddha just used
the formulation that "all phenomena are soulless" to be more comprehensive — -
had he said "all conditioned things are soulless," one would not be prevented
from erroneously seeking a soul residing outside of the conditioned things.
cf. Rahula, 57-58.
If the Buddha were to have said that all phenomena
are suffering, he would have been promoting an unreserved pessimism, for
there is no escaping phenomena while alive. By saying that all conditioned
things are suffering, he was showing a way to escape from suffering while
in this life. A person may be a part of the phenomenal world but not regard
it in a way that creates suffering, i.e. not seek reality in conditioned
things. One needs only an understanding of this unreal nature of things, which
will allow one to give up the grasping thirst for existence and the passions
inspired by experience. This, in turn, will pacify the dispositions, and
most suffering will be avoided.
Note: Etymology provides an intriguing coincidence: the root of
the English word "passion" is the Latin pati, "to suffer."
The cause of all of this self-entrapment is a lack of proper understanding.
"The dispositions depend on ignorance," the Buddha said, and "the entire
mass of suffering thus comes into existence."
Note: Ramana, 111
The key that Nagarjuna holds
to all of this is that he can clarify the nature of the passions and dispositions,
which will help to dispel the ignorance which causes duhkha.
The aggregate of dispositions is of crucial importance, for it is this
aggregate which, more than any of the other four, flavors the character
of the whole bundle. In terms of the human individual, dispositions are most
directly responsible for giving shape and uniqueness to the personality.
The importance of this aggregate and the frequency of Nagarjuna's
reference to it warrants further elucidation of its nature. The first three
aggregates provide for the material world, sensations of it, and the resultant
cognizing of sensation called perception. For example, the first aggregate
may be an object, the second aggregate senses the light reflecting from
the object and reports the frequency of the light, and the third aggregate
identifies that frequency as "blue." The fourth aggregate is a mix of attitudes,
habits, emotions, passions, and thoughts which cause the person to react
to this perception, e.g. ``I like blue.''
This is also the place where, if one is not careful, such preferences
and attitudes can lead to grasping. These dispositions are what turn an
otherwise passive receiver of perceptions into a conceptualizing and acting
individual. These four all provide first an awareness of the external world
and then reactions to it. The fifth and final aggregate, consciousness,
is not a sort of higher result arising from the first four, for the internal
mental life is found in the fourth aggregate. Rather, consciousness is a
term for the all-pervading awareness which makes possible sensations, perceptions,
and dispositions.
A quote from the philosopher William James, while written in reference
to a different tradition, is nonetheless one of the clearest and most cogent
expressions of the function and importance of the dispositions this author
has yet found.
"Conceive yourself, if possible, suddenly stripped of all the emotion
with which your world now inspires you, and try to imagine it as it exists,
purely by itself, without your favorable or unfavorable, hopeful or apprehensive
comment. It will be almost impossible for you to realize such a condition
of negativity and deadness. No one portion of the universe would then
have any importance beyond another; and the whole collection of its things
and series of its events would be without significance, character, expression,
or perspective."
Note: William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (New
York: The Modern Library, 1929), 147 (italics in original)
The dispositions are thus vital if the person
is to act in and react to the world, and action and reaction are themselves
vital if one is to follow the Eightfold Path. On the other hand, the dispositions
can also be the chief cause of grasping and will bind one to the cycle
of suffering if one is not careful. It is dispositions which constitute
preferences, but it is these preferences which can easily become passionate
attractions and aversions. As Kalupahana puts it, "we are, therefore, in
a double-bind." We need the dispositions in order to live, but they can
also contribute most to our suffering.
Note: Kalupahana 1986, 48
The key is to use dispositional
preferences without being used by them. Nagarjuna's section here offers
explanations and guidance about how one is to do this.
To help to pacify, or break free from the clutch of the dispositions,
Nagarjuna introduces here his famous
concept of emptiness, sunyata.
Note: Emptiness was first mentioned at the end of his fourth section.
In that context, however, it was mentioned for a different reason and
may have even had a different meaning. Cf. pp. 148f.
First, he repeats his negation of the possibility of real change.
"Neither change of something in itself nor of something different is
proper. The youth does not age nor does an aged person age."
Note: karika XIII.5
An entity cannot both have a real identity
and experience a change. If, in the example, the person were
youthful, then he or she would partake of no agedness and thus could not
remain a youth and still age. If the person were aged, then it would be
ludicrous to say that he or she ages. This would be tantamount to saying,
for example, that a red thing turns red: real change would not have occurred.
The solution is to say that all existent things have no self-nature,
svabhava. Substances do not have attributes — -they are "empty."
Nagarjuna seems to feel that removing the possibility of holding false
beliefs is the best way to preclude dispositional grasping and the suffering
concomitant with it. If one understands that all things are empty, then
ignorance will be removed, the dispositions will lose their foundation,
and "the entire mass of suffering" will go out of existence.
Sections fourteen and fifteen — Identity/Difference: Self-nature
vs. Association of Distinct Elements
Nagarjuna has devoted the majority of the first thirteen sections
to examinations of each of the elements into which the Abhidharma classified
reality and some of the causal and dependence relations between these
elements.
The problems he has with most
of these elements boil down to the fact that they cannot be considered
in isolation. When any element is seen as being in some way independent,
logical paradoxes result. In section fifteen he addresses
the root cause of these problematic theories, which problem is the assertion
of self-nature, svabhava. Before tackling
this pivotal issue, though, there was one last point he wanted to clarify.
Nagarjuna has amply demonstrated that one cannot conceive of things
in isolation, because the identity which makes each a separate and distinguishable
"thing" depends wholly on its relation to other things. What
he has not addressed as fully as he would like is
the relation itself. This he does in
section fourteen, "Examination of Association."
If one asserts that phenomena consist of separate yet interacting elements,
then one is left with the problem of how these elements combine, or associate,
to produce the phenomena. There is no way for atomistic and fully independent
things to associate, for a truly independent thing is non-contingent,
incapable of being influenced, and thus not subject to association. Further,
if things are distinguishable, then their identity can be defined in isolation.
Yet the concept of difference requires dependence. "Different things
are dependent upon different things," Nagarjuna says.
Note: karika XIV.5
To say that things are different is to say that they are separate.
But, "without a second different thing, one different thing can not exist
as a different thing."
Note: karika XIV.7, trans. Streng (italics mine)
Since any attempt to differentiate elements or phenomena reduces to
absurdity, there can be no such thing as association of these elements.
"Neither the associating nor the associated nor even the agent of association
is evident."
Note: karika XIV.8
The English language affords an analogy here. The etymology of both
``distinguish'' and ``distinction'' is the Latin distinguere, ``to separate.''
As reality is ultimately whole, by whatever definition, separations have
only phenomenal validity. The consequence
of this is that there can be no way to declare a phenomenon to be composed
of separate but combined elements.
One of the aspects of the Buddha's teachings about which the Buddha
was most adamant is also one that proved to be the most unpalatable both
to subsequent Buddhists and to non-Buddhists alike. This is the assertion
that there is no real soul to be found in the universe. The Buddha was
very explicit regarding the doctrine of soullessness
:
"Whether Buddhas arise, O priests, or whether Buddhas do not arise,
it remains a fact and the fixed and necessary constitution of being, that
all its elements are lacking in an
ego (atman).
Note: Following Freud, there is a tendency to differentiate between
the "ego" and the "soul," the ego being the personality and the soul being
the animating principle. Relating these varying shades of meaning to the
Buddha's skandha-theory would be fascinating, but beyond the scope of this
paper. The terms "ego," "self," "soul," and "atman" will be used interchangeably
here.
(Whether ``self-nature'' is also a synonym is precisely the point Nagarjuna
discusses.) This fact a Buddha discovers and masters… and announces, teaches,
publishes, proclaims, discloses, minutely explains and makes clear, that
all the elements of being are lacking in an ego."
Note: Anguttara-nikaya- sutta, quoted in Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan
and Charles H. Moore, eds., A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1957), 274
Notwithstanding, the tendency to believe in the soul seems to have
been almost ineradicable, for it arose again and again in a variety of
forms.
The Theravada, for example,
saw every element as being a real entity with a self-nature,
svabhava.
Note: Lamotte, 602
While not exactly a form of atman, self-nature
was nonetheless not so very different. Even more radical, certain of the
Abhidharma commentaries explicitly defined an element in terms of its
self-nature, declaring that it is precisely this permanent factor which
gives an element its distinguishing identity.
Note: Warder, 323
Self-nature was the great bugaboo of metaphysical speculation, Nagarjuna
felt, for it was the assertion of self- nature that made incomprehensible
the relations between substance and attribute, subject and object, identity
and difference. Thus, the "Examination of Self-nature," though short, is
of supreme importance. While svabhava and atman are not exactly the same
thing, as theories they faced the same problems. Self-nature, for Nagarjuna,
had to be seen as a permanent and substantial identity for, if it were only
temporarily the identity of a thing, then it would not truly be that thing's
identity. However, this self-nature would have to be uncreated, neither
caused nor dependent upon causal conditions (pratyayas). "How could there
be a self- nature that is made?" he asks.
Note: karika XV.2
That is, if it were not uncreated then it would be artificial, and
an artificial substance is inconsistent with the very definition of substance.
Note: Kalupahana 1992, 165
If there is no self- nature,
then neither can there be its dialectical component, other-nature (parabhava),
Nagarjuna continues, and thus conceptions based on difference and relation
would be nullified.
Another significant corollary of svabhava is that it negates the very
possibility of existence itself. This can be illuminated
by etymology. Sva - bhava literally means "self - existence," and para -
bhava literally means "other - existence." Without sva - bhava and para
- bhava, Nagarjuna says, whence can there be existence itself, bhava? The
reason for this is that existence, bhava, "is established only when there
is svabhava or parabhava."
Note: karika XV.4
Further, "when the existent
is not established, the non-existent is also not established," for the
non-existent is nothing more than the change of the existent.
Note: karika XV. 5
The issue that Nagarjuna is addressing so doggedly is not simply metaphysical
eristics. The consequences for Buddhism are profound,
for "those who perceive self-nature as well as other- nature, existence
as well as non-existence, they do not perceive the truth embodied in the
Buddha's message."
Note: karika XV.6
The Buddha explicitly denied both extremes because, as a belief system,
each was injurious for the individual seeking a release from suffering.
To say that something exists or has self-nature "implies grasping after
eternalism." To say that
something does not exist now but once did, or exists now but will not always
exist, "implies the philosophy of
annihilationism." Therefore, "a discerning person should not rely
upon either existence or non-existence."
Note: karika XV.10-11
These two extremes are each deleterious to
the moral life: annihilationism because it undercuts responsibility, and
eternalism because a firm belief in the self leads to a preoccupation with
pleasure.
Note: Lamotte, 50
Sections sixteen and seventeen — Bondage and its Cause
The overarching purpose of Indian philosophy is the attainment of
freedom.
"Salvation" in Western thought tends to mean "the acquisition of holiness"
which is provided by God.
Note: Cf. Ninian Smart, The Philosophy of Religion (New York: Random
House, 1970), 104
Salvation is the deliverance from evil and the bestowal of eternal
life.
"Freedom"
for the Indian mind, however, is a little different. It is a release from
delusion and suffering which, while perhaps assisted through God's guidance,
is nonetheless wholly self-attained.
Note: T.R.V. Murti, "The Individual in Indian Religious Thought,"
in Charles A. Moore, ed., The Indian Mind (Honolulu: The University of
Hawaii Press, 1967), 328
That which caused the individual to be bound to the phenomenal world
is, ultimately, ignorance. The lack of spiritual understanding (jnana)
leads to volitional action, or karma, and the "fruits" of such action. These
two elements, the action and its result, constitute the law of universal
cause-and-effect. In order to attain liberation from the unpleasant cycle
of birth-and-death, the Buddha taught, one must disassociate oneself from
volitional action.
This is done, not by refraining from volitional action, which would
not be possible, but by refraining from believing that there is a real
self which does real acts. The insight that there is no self is the antidote
for ignorance. This understanding allows one to abandon the dispositions,
graspings, and passions which caused one to be bound to the karmic cycle
of birth- and-death in the first place. Nagarjuna now examines these
two interrelated concepts, bondage and its cause, karma.
All of the major Indian religious systems — - Hinduism, Buddhism, and
Jainism — -accepted the reality of karma and its corollary, rebirth.
Note: Charles A. Moore, "The Comprehensive Indian Mind," in ibid.,
13
All acts were necessarily followed by their fruits. If the fruit of
an act had not as yet become manifest by the time of the individual's death,
then that individual would be forced to return to existence in another
life, again and again, until the fruits of all actions had materialized.
Note: One must not be left with the impression that the systems
were in agreement on the nature and function of karmic volition.
There have been, quite literally, as many interpretations of karma
as there were schools of Indian philosophy. This is technically referred
to as transmigration.
The obvious difficulty that the Buddhist faced was in reconciling
the fact of bondage and its conjunct, transmigration, with the Buddha's
teaching that there is no self. This is the problem that is Nagarjuna's
major concern in section sixteen, ``Examination
of Bondage and Release.'' "It may be assumed that a person
transmigrates," he agrees. Yet, he has demonstrated in the previous sections
that there is no person-hood, no self, to be found in any of the elements
of existence. "Who then will transmigrate?"
Note: karika XVI.2
The dilemma is, once again, found to be caused by a "Personalist" misunderstanding
of the theory of the aggregates (skandhas). The dispositions, as the
primary embodiment of the forces of grasping and greedy passions, are
also the chief forces causing rebirth. The erroneous tendency was to posit
a substantial self-nature in these dispositions. The popular belief,
Nagarjuna explains, was that only a real entity with real soul can be
bound to phenomenal existence and transmigrate. This, however, is not
possible; as explained above, there can be no self- nature in the dispositions.
If there were an entity with a permanent nature, then it could not transmigrate.
Transmigration, Kalupahana points out, "implies moving from one position
to another, disappearing in one place and appearing in another."
Note: Kalupahana 1986, 54
The notion of permanence holds that an entity is always present, and
so there is no question of its ceasing and arising. Neither can an entity
without an enduring self-nature transmigrate, for, if the entity is truly
temporary, then it will completely cease, and no discussion of its continuance,
either from one moment to the next or from one life to the next, is appropriate.
This method of analysis, Nagarjuna says, applies not just to one factor
of the individual, but to the sentient being as a whole. It cannot transmigrate
whether it has or does not have a self-nature, and therefore it can experience
neither bondage nor release from bondage. If one
thinks in terms of self- nature, then the inevitable conclusion is that "a
sentient being, like [dispositions], is neither bound nor released.
"
Note: karika XVI.5
Nagarjuna does not explicitly state in this section what is the proper
way to view the individual, its state of bondage, and the nature of release.
It is to be understood, though, and it will become clearer later, that
the way out of the impasse is to forego thoughts of substantialism. The
Buddha's theory of the aggregates, as explained above, manages to explain
both what constitutes the belief in an individual and how that belief could
come to be without ever saying that there actually is a real individual.
Bondage and freedom are to be understood in the same way: the factors that
constitute the individual arise interdependently and continuity consists,
not in direct causation, but in causal influence.
This chain of arising is not broken by the event of a physical death. Death
is little more than the change of one of the aggregates, material form;
the chain of the other aggregates, and hence the appearance of self-hood,
continues unaffected as long as ignorant belief in the self remains.
A reading of section seventeen, "Examination
of the Fruit of Action," indicates
that the tendency of substantialist thinking extended to karma in the same
way that it did to the transmigrating self. If the self transmigrates, the
above argument held, then it must have a perduring essence. Likewise, if
the fruits of an act necessarily follow the act, then the act must itself,
in some way, also perdure. Even to say that the act disappears and only its
influence remains is still to say that there is something remaining, asserted
the opponent. Such a reification of karma ultimately contradicts anatman,
the Buddha's declaration that nothing has a substantial existence. Yet it
was of paramount importance to Buddhism to affirm that there is karma and
that its effects are inescapable, for a denial of this would destroy the
justification for morality. The Buddha's own morality stemmed from his insight
into anatman, soullessness, which by definition results in selflessness.
This selflessness awakened him to the plight of the suffering world, leading
him to teach "for the happiness of the many, out of compassion for the world."
Note: Rahula, 46
One who does not have this insight into soullessness may need an incentive
to act compassionately, an incentive which the doctrine of karma provides.
There was thus a need to affirm, in some way, the reality of karma.
The Buddha stressed the inescapability of karma by saying that its results
"do not perish even after hundreds of millions of aeons. Reaching the
harmony of conditions pratyayas) and the appropriate time, they produce
consequences for human beings."
Note: Kalupahana 1986, 250
Nagarjuna explained this with an analogy that is cryptic at best.
"Like an imperishable promissory note," he said, "so is debt as well as
action. It is fourfold in terms of realms and indeterminate in terms of
primal nature."
Note: karika XVII.14
The meaning of this seems to be that karma does not have a substantial
nature, just as borrowed money is not real. Karma does effect change, and
borrowed money can be used to buy things. However, borrowed money is not
really one's own, and at a certain time it and/or whatever was purchased
with it must be returned. Similarly, the fruits of an action must materialize,
following which both the act and its fruit disappear. Although the process
of karma is evident, the fact that an effect and its cause arise only in
mutual dependence means that neither is truly real. They are "indeterminate
in terms of primal nature." That karma is "fourfold in terms of realms"
means that all spheres of existence are ruled by its effects: "there is no
place on earth where a person can be released from his evil actions," said
the Buddha.
Note: Dhammapada, quoted in Kalupahana 1986, 54 (paraphrased)
Nagarjuna concludes the section by stressing once again that neither
the agent nor his or her act is real. An action cannot be created either
from conditions (pratyayas) or from non-conditions for the reasons discussed
in section one: if created from causes, then it would depend on those causes
and ultimately not be separate from them. If created by non-conditions
(pratyayas), then it would have appeared indeterminately and the universe
would be characterized by caprice. Since the action is thereby produced
neither by a causal agent nor by no agent, then the agent who would otherwise
be defined in terms of that action does not exist. And, "if both action
and agent are non-existent, where could there be the fruit born of action?
When there is no fruit, where can there be an experiencer?"
Note: karika XVII.30
It is necessary to uphold the moral path by affirming the process
of karma, but declaring there to be a permanent nature residing therein
is equally undesirable. Such a theory, Nagarjuna demonstrated, is logically
indefensible. Nagarjuna reconciles these difficulties by closing this section
with an analogy. Imagine that a person, through the use of magical powers,
creates a golem, an artificial human, and that this creature in turn creates
its own golem. "In the same way, an agent is like a created form and his
action is like his creation. It is like the created form created by another
who is created."
Note: karika XVII.31-32
Dependent on each other, and within the sphere of relative existence,
agents and their action are equally real and must be treated accordingly.
From the once-removed standpoint of the enlightened being, neither is real.
Bondage and karma are self-perpetuating, and the way to become free is
to relinquish the belief in the permanent soul and thereby uproot both.
Section eighteen — Self-hood and its Consequences
Nagarjuna apparently felt that he had not yet explained fully the
way in which belief in a permanent individual leads to bondage. (The reader
may feel the same.) He therefore addresses this issue more directly in section
eighteen, "Examination of Self." This section, though short and though
ostensibly an examination of this one particular topic, is actually one
of the densest and weightiest in the entire work. Nagarjuna here mentions
in passing certain issues of such far-reaching import that they elucidate
the entire scope and purpose of this thought. Specifically, after discussing
the connection between self-theories and bondage, he mentions the manner
in which the sphere of thought and its conceptualizing activity evoke the
entirety of reality, then he alludes to the nature of this reality (tathata)
and the characteristics of final truth. The significance of these issues
as relevant to the immediate topic of the section will be explained, but
a fuller discussion of their broad import will have to wait.
The untenability of the concept of a permanent soul, atman, has already
been addressed, but Nagarjuna now sums up once again and in a slightly
different way the reasons for rejecting this belief. The self is neither
identical with nor different from its constituent aggregates. If it were
identical, then it would, like they, partake of arising and ceasing and
thus not be permanent. If it were different from the aggregates, then it
could not have the same characteristics of them; e.g. it could not have the
potential for perception or the quality of consciousness. A consequence of
the insubstantiality of the self Nagarjuna has not previously mentioned is
the impossibility of it having possessions. "In the absence of the self,
how can there be something that belongs to the self?" Since the self can
have neither characteristics nor possessions, "one abstains from creating
the notions of "mine" and "I."
Note: karika XVIII.2
The import of this is that it is "grasping" based on this possessiveness
which binds one to repeated existence. Contact with the perceived world,
if it is believed to have a real existence, leads to a desire for pleasant
sensations and an aversion from unpleasant ones. Both are forms of grasping.
If, on the other hand, the world is believed to be founded on nonexistence,
then, the Buddha taught, yet another form of grasping results: one fears
the supposed nihility of nonexistence and clings even more strongly to the
cycle of repeated births. All of these forms of greedy clinging are rooted
in the belief that there is a permanent soul which can possess things: possession
leads to obsession. The teaching of soullessness counteracts these self-created
fetters, for, by definition, the theory of no-self negates self-ish-ness.
"When views pertaining to 'mine' and 'I'… have waned, then grasping comes
to cease. With the waning of that [grasping], there is waning of birth."
Note: karika XVIII.4
A variety of unwholesome actions and conceptions result from a firm
belief in the self, including grasping and repulsion, passionate attractions
and aversions, selfishness and pride, hedonism and excessive asceticism.
These are all referred to as defilements, and it is these which occasion
rebirth. When soullessness is realized, explains Nagarjuna, the defilements
wane and freedom is attained.
Having demonstrated the soteriological importance of abandoning belief
in the soul, Nagarjuna now rushes to forestall the antipodal error, namely
an emphasis on the lack of soul. To interpret the Buddha as teaching the
non- existence of the self is as bad as the tendency to reify self-ish-ness
in the first place, for nihilism and pessimism would result. Thus, while
"the Buddhas have made known the conception of self and taught the doctrine
of no-self," Nagarjuna says, "they have not spoken of something as the self
or as the non-self."
Note: karika XVIII.6
That is, Buddhism denies both atman and anatman, but it does not say
that there is some "thing" which can be described as either having or lacking
atman. The remaining verses of this section seem to be cautionary statements
the intent of which is to prevent one from clinging to anatman as a theory.
The teaching of soullessness is a dialectical device used to counteract
the tendency to believe in the soul, nothing more. If one were to assert that
the identity of the universe is anatman, then the Buddha would have to counteract
this by saying that that, too, is erroneous. The theory of no-soul is not
a real characteristic of existent things. It is no more than a way to obviate
the reifying theories, dispositions, and graspings which cause suffering
and lead to rebirth.
Nagarjuna follows this examination with four verses which deal with
the nature of truth, essentially declaring it to be undefinable.
Note: (karika XVIII.8-11)
These verses do not immediately seem to have any relevance to the issue
at hand, namely the nature of the self. Kalupahana interprets them in a
questionable way. "Up to this point [Nagarjuna] was discussing an embodied
self, a self associated with a psychophysical personality," says Kalupahana.
The verses that follow, therefore, "are intended to explain the Buddha's
view regarding the nature of a person when he attains [liberation]."
Note: Kalupahana 1986, 57
This interpretation is problematic. The word "self" is not used even
once in the entire second half of the section, and the only hint that Nagarjuna
could possibly be referring to the posthumous reality is that in one verse
he uses the word tathya, "such" or "thus." This is a word with many significations.
One of the uses of tathya is to refer to the nature of the individual who
has achieved nirvana, the Tathagata. He or she does not have the illusion
of partaking of any existential qualities and thus can only be referred
to as "thus." This is apparently what Kalupahana had in mind: it is the
use of tathya in this verse that leads him to interpret the entire second
half of the section as a discussion of posthumous reality.
Note: ibid., 58
These verses describe truth, of whatever kind, as encompassing four
possibilities: something is such (tathya), is not such, is both such and
not such, and is neither such and not such. "Such is the Buddha's admonition."
Note: karika XVIII.8
Nagarjuna follows this verse with two verses that describe truth as
having neither a single meaning or a variety of meanings, and a repeated
admonition that dependently-arisen things are neither identical nor different,
neither annihilated nor eternal.
Note: karika XVIII.9-11
An alternate and perhaps more defensible interpretation of the remainder
of this section is that Nagarjuna is emphasizing his initial point. The
self is neither real nor non-real and the Buddha's purpose in teaching anatman
was wholly and simply pragmatic. The doctrine of soullessness is not to
be understood as an independent and real truth, Nagarjuna is saying here,
for "everything is such, not such, both such and not such, and neither such
and not such."
Note: karika XVIII.8
Sections nineteen through twenty-one — Associative Composition of
and Occurrence of Phenomena in Time
Nagarjuna next offers a brief look at three qualities of the apparent
world. These three are time, the harmony existing between the elements
constituting a phenomenon, and the occurrence and dissolution of such composite
phenomena. His primary intention here is to demonstrate that, since the
composite factors are, as proven above, devoid of self-nature, so must the
things composed of them be devoid of real existence. Reductionism and atomism
cannot account for the real production of a real world, he says. A brief
aside is necessary to introduce and explain the background of this particular
debate.
The Buddha, as explained above, said that the world can be seen in one
way as being composed of elements (dharmas), spheres of sense and sense
objects (ayatanas), and the psychophysical aggregates (skandhas). The Abhidharma
refined these analyses by enumerating, classifying, and relating these
various constituent factors, all in the hope of achieving a world-description
that managed to be comprehensive without recourse to soul theories. All
physical and psychological phenomena were explained as being composed of
discrete and separate elements, the mutual arising and continuity of which
gives the illusion that there exist lasting identities, such as personhood.
A felicitous analogy is that of the motion picture. A film is composed of
static and separate photographs which individually have no capability of
conveying motion or change. However, when these photographs flash, one by
one, in contiguous succession, an illusion appears. The viewer sees a lasting
and unbroken continuity. A film thereby creates an illusion of an uninterrupted
process, the appearance of a real identity that is nowhere to be found in
the individual elements comprising the apparent process. Such, held the
Abhidharma theories, is the nature of reality. All things, events, and processes
consist of nothing more than discrete, irreducible atomistic elements. These
are referred to as "moments" ksana). The Buddha did not disagree with such
reductionism, for he taught it. However, he in no way said that these moments
are themselves real. Nagarjuna demonstrates in the next section, "Examination
of Time," that it is in such reification of atomism that problems arise.
Time must, to be perceived, be divided into past, present, and future. If
there were not this division, then one would have no referents by which to
perceive time. However, one cannot say that these three divisions exist as
such. For example, the present and the future depend on the past for their
determination. Yet, if they exist contingent upon the past, "then the present
and the future would be in the past time."
Note: karika XIX.1
If the thing called "present" and the thing called "future" did not
exist at the same time as the thing called "past," then they could not
relate to it. For example, the future could only come after some thing,
it cannot just be "after" in an abstract sense. If the past no longer exists,
though, then where is the thing the future is coming "after?" The things
would have to exist contemporaneously to relate, for there can be no relation
between two things if one of them does not yet exist or no longer exists.
It is obvious, however, that the present and the future do not exist in the
past, for this would oppose their very definitions. But, Nagarjuna continues,
"if the present and the future were not to exist [in the past], how could
the present and the future be contingent upon it?"
Note: karika XIX.2
Combining these two statements, one is left with the following argument:
1) The present and the future must exist in the past for their relation
and, thus, their reality to be upheld. 2) The present and the future do not
exist in the past. 3) Therefore, the present and the future do not exist.
4) Consequently, all of the divisions of temporality are illusory.
One may object that there is another way to view temporality that does
not depend on such irreducible momentariness. Time could be said to exist
as a concomitant of processes, not discrete events.
Note: Murti 1960, 201
This would obviate such an extreme slicing of temporality into separate
moments. However, time is not evident either as a static moment or as a
dynamic process. "A non-static time is not observed. A static time is not
observed."
Note: karika XIX.5
Ultimately, processes are no more real than their component parts,
but this is not what Nagarjuna chooses to emphasize here.
Note: It has been stated that Buddhism shifted the emphasis from
Being to Becoming, from the static moment to the dynamic process. (cf.
pp. 47 and 83)
This is true from a philosophical (samvrti) standpoint. From the standpoint
of ultimate truth (paramartha), though, both are concepts that have no
final validity. What he calls attention to here is that neither static nor
dynamic time is observed. Nagarjuna does not explain why neither is possible,
but there is one probable explanation. The act of perception is not instantaneous — -it,
too, is dependent upon temporality. The awareness of an object or event
is always separated, even if by the most infinitesimal amount, from the
perception of the thing, which perception is in turn separated from the
thing itself. This is so because, the Buddha taught, the perceiver and that
which he or she perceives do not form a unified gestalt. The Buddha's theory
of the five aggregates which comprise the person describes the process by
which awareness of the world takes place. There is a physical (or sensory
or conceptual) object, this object is sensed, this sensation is then classified
and made cognizable through the separate process of perception, this perception
is colored by dispositions, and finally consciousness forms a thought of
the object. The thing of which the perceiver is aware is thus always in the
immediate past. (If nothing else, it takes a span of time for light to travel
from the visible object to the eye.) Hence, time cannot be observed, but only
extrapolated.
The nature of temporality is the primary focus of this section, but
Nagarjuna mentions, in passing, the applicability of the logical method
used here to all concepts of relation. "Following the same method, …related
concepts such as the highest, the lowest, and the middle, and also identity,
etc. should be characterized."
Note: karika XIX.4
(The wording of "identity, etc." is necessary for preservation of
meter in the verse. What is meant is the distinguishing of identity, difference,
both, or neither.) The meaning here is that in all relations of quality
involving distinct elements, one cannot attribute the quality to any element
individually. For example, a person's "tallness" cannot be part of his or
her identity. He or she is only tall in relation to one who is shorter.
The tendency to distinguish the elements that constitute reality and
to define them in isolation led to another difficulty, namely the necessity
to posit another type of thing called "harmony." This Nagarjuna addresses
in section twenty, ``Examination of Harmony.'' The word translated here
as "harmony," samagri, also carries the meaning of totality, especially
as in the complete collection or assemblage of materials used together to
make an object.
Note: cf. Monier- Williams, 1204
An example is the visual perception of an object. In such a perception,
the physical object, the sensation and perception of it, and the eye all
come together to produce an awareness of visible form. The Buddha taught
that an event like this is based on the dependent arising of all the elements
which arise together and thereby produce visual perception. "Harmony" is
here a description for their mutual dependence. The Abhidharma reification
of the elements, however, required that one describe the coming together
of such discrete elements as a separate thing, a unique whole not found
in the parts. This view made harmony an attribute, not just a description;
the metaphysical description of elements as discrete requires that the harmony
between them become a separate entity itself.
Note: Kalupahana 1986, 61
The problem of causality then arises anew.
The four theories of causation are summarized again, this time in terms
of the atomistic "moments" described above. The theory that one moment
produces another moment which is subsequent and directly contiguous is
a form of self-causation. The theory that one moment produces another moment
which is subsequent but not directly contiguous is other-causation. The
theory that a moment is produced by neither a preceding contiguous nor non-contiguous
moment is neither-causation, or chaos. The three of these were discussed
and rejected in Nagarjuna's first section. The fourth theory is that a moment
is produced by a combination of self- and other- causation. In terms of
the present discussion, that combination is the "harmony" between causes
and causal conditions pratyayas). Nagarjuna, using the same methodological
approach he used in the previous discussion of causality, declares that
the effect is not to be found in this harmony any more than in the individual
causes and conditions (pratyayas) producing the harmony. If one asserts
that effects arise from such "harmonious" combinations of causes and conditions
(pratyayas), then the notion of harmony is just being substituted for the
effect-ive cause, which was refuted. The conclusion, too, is then identical:
"the effect is not made by the harmony, nor is it not made by a [sic] harmony."
Note: karika XX.24
The description of events as comprised of momentary units and things
as comprised of atomistic elements leads to a discrepancy with the Buddha's
theory of becoming, bhava, which Nagarjuna addresses in this next section,
"Examination of Occurrence and Dissolution."
Note: Bhava, "becoming," is not to be confused with bhava, "existence."
Cf. Monier-Williams, 748f. and 754.
If the elements are discrete, then, Nagarjuna shows, it is not possible
to explain how they can arise and cease in mutual dependence.
To review, the Buddha's original concept of dependent arising describes
reality as consisting of the same elements later classified by the Abhidharma,
but makes it clear that these elements do not exist independently; they
come into being only through a process of mutual contingence. This mutual
interdependence of phenomena shifted the emphasis from being to becoming.
That is, whereas the Hindu philosophies found the essence of the universe
in a substantial ("standing under") ground of "true being," the Buddha
recognized no substantial essence of the universe — -he saw all in terms
of process, flux. The characteristic of reality is neither Being nor non-Being,
but only Becoming. Change is evident, but there is not some thing that changes.
The process itself is the only thing that can be seen as having any degree
of certainty or reality.
Note: Hiriyanna, 142
This process of dependently arising phenomena is beginningless. If
it had a beginning, then there would be one thing which came first, which
thing would then be the originating cause of the entire subsequent chain.
It is not that the beginning is hidden in immemorial time, nor that it
is inaccessible due to having been set in motion by a transcendent power.
Rather, a beginning is simply inconceivable. Likewise, neither can there
be said to be an end to the process.
The tendency to find substantial identities in the elements led to a
slightly different interpretation of the Buddha's theory of dependent arising.
Whereas the Buddha had spoken of a "stream of becoming," i.e. a seamless
flow, the Realists now spoke of a "series of becoming," i.e. a relation
of independent serial entities.
Note: Kalupahana 1986, 62
Phenomena were seen as being comprised of these serial elements and
so, as described above, theories of association, or "harmony," had to
be formulated to account for apparent identities. Nagarjuna refutes these
notions of serial becoming first by focusing on the impossibility of such
associative harmonies to arise and cease. There can be no way to relate
the "occurrence," or arising, of a phenomenon with its "dissolution," or
cessation. "Dissolution does not exist either with or without occurrence.
Occurrence does not exist either with or without dissolution."
Note: karika XXI.1
If occurrence and dissolution existed together, then a thing would
be disappearing at the same time that it was appearing. If occurrence existed
without dissolution, then things would partake of a one-directional eternity — -they
would arise, but never cease. If dissolution existed without occurrence,
then there would be the death of a thing which was never born. Neither
can one attempt to avoid the dilemma by saying that dissolution is "potential"
in a thing which is arising, but is not yet "actual." This would ascribe
to a thing two contrary natures, that of occurrence and that of dissolution.
No hypothetical proportion of "potentiality" versus "actuality" of these
two natures in a thing, would, ultimately, disguise this internal disjunction.
Another possibility Nagarjuna mentions is the attempt to circumvent the
distinctions of occurrence and dissolution by describing gradual change.
That is, instead of saying that an existent thing suddenly disappears, one
can say that it just fades out of existence. But this will not work, either,
for there still must be one discrete moment before which a thing was still
fading and after which it is completely gone. "Dissolution of that which
is waning does not exist, nor is there dissolution of the not waning."
Note: karika XXI.7
A final objection Nagarjuna addresses is the empirical one. "It may
occur to you that both occurrence and dissolution are seen," he says.
That is, arguments regarding the logical tenability of arising and ceasing
are immaterial, for both are unanimously observed to exist. "However,"
he declares, "both occurrence and dissolution are seen only through confusion."
Note: karika XXI.11
The ignorant one may make such a claim, but the enlightened one knows
better.
Nagarjuna concludes this section with a paradox. He has just demonstrated
that arising and ceasing do not have real existence, and, therefore,
"the stream of becoming is not proper in the context of the three periods
of time." Nor can there be some other way of explaining the existential
flux, for "how can there be a stream of becoming that does not exist during
the three periods of time?"
Note: karika XXI.21
It seems that he is not accepting any theory of becoming. However,
as a devout Buddhist apologist, Nagarjuna certainly would not have denied
a single aspect of the Buddha's teachings. The only solution to this dilemma
is that he was not offering a blanket refutation of the stream of becoming,
but only a refutation of the stream as viewed in a certain way. He does
not explicitly state exactly which theory he is denying and which he will
accept, but the most likely explanation is that he is rejecting the substantialist
agenda. It is an error to posit an independent nature in the discrete elements
which comprise the serial flow. As dependently-arisen, no things are really
spatially or temporally distinct. If no substantial identity is posited
in the elements, then the issue of which produces which and when exactly
each is produced and dissolved ceases to be problematic.
All of the sections of the Mulamadhyamakakarika up to this point have
examined the specific elements, processes, and relations comprising reality.
These are all side issues, so to speak. The Path of Buddhism is little
concerned with what exact ontological status to grant to fire and fuel,
for example. However, misunderstandings about the nature of these factors
of reality can lead to problems of a more serious nature, and so all of
the factors had to be examined individually before larger issues could be
addressed. The remainder of the karika deals with precisely these larger
issues. Nagarjuna first discusses the nature of the one who has become
enlightened and realized nirvana, and then looks at the confusions and
afflictions which hinder the attainment of enlightenment. The Noble Eightfold
Path is examined next. The Path is the paramount teaching of the Buddha,
for it is this Path, and this path only, which can lead to an escape from
duhkha. A proper following of the Eightfold Path will lead to nirvana, the
subject of the next section. Nagarjuna then examines what is the most affirmative
teaching of Buddhism: the chain of dependent arising. This theory describes,
clearly and positively, the ontological origin and nature of reality as
well as the philosophical basis on which enlightenment can be achieved.
In the final section, in a last preventative effort, Nagarjuna describes
the specific errors leading to bondage and misunderstanding for the purpose
of forestalling these errors.
Section twenty-two — The Meaning and Ontological Status of the Enlightened
One
Siddhartha Gautama used a variety of epithets to refer to himself,
including Sakyamuni, "Sage of the Sakya Clan," Buddha, "The Awakened
One," and Tathagata, "The Thus-Gone One." The latter of these led to
a host of misunderstandings, for the term seemed to imply that there is
an agent, the "One," who "Goes" somewhere. That is, the enlightened person
often was believed to be reborn in a transcendent realm. One later Chinese
school of Buddhism went so far as to describe a "Pure Land," a concrete
heavenly paradise where beings of high spiritual attainment sojourn before
taking the final step towards complete nirvana.
Note: Kohn, 174.
To be fair, all attempts were made to explain that such spiritual
abodes were not really existent. Whether popular belief understood this,
though, is questionable. The original meaning of "Tathagata" is no longer
known for certain,
Note: For example, it is not wholly clear whether it is a compound
of tatha + gata, "Thus Gone," or tatha + agata, "Thus Come." Cf. Conze 1975,
36, and Nagao 1991, 205.
but that to which the Buddha was referring in using the term was clearly
explained. Nagarjuna clarifies it in section twenty-two, "Examination of
the Tathagata." Tathagata is merely a designation for that being who has
released graspings and dispositions, is thereby freed from karma and, following
the next death, will completely disappear and never experience another
birth. The defiling dispositions which created the illusion of person-hood
out of the aggregates have been "appeased," or released. The aggregates
still exist by dint of the inertia of previous karma, and so the enlightened
being still appears to exist. Since there are no longer graspings at work,
though, the apparent being will disappear when the last inertial karma has
been spent.
The Buddha made quite clear the fact that the Tathagata has not "gone
somewhere." In answer to his disciple Vaccha's persistent questions regarding
the nature of the Tathagata after death, the Buddha offered an analogy:
"What think you, Vaccha? Suppose a fire were to burn in front of you,
would you be aware that the fire was burning in front of you?"
"[Yes.]"
"…Vaccha, if the fire burning in front of you were to become
extinct, would you be aware that the fire in front of you had become extinct?"
"[Yes.]"
"But, Vaccha, if someone were to ask you, 'In what direction has that
fire gone, — -east, or west, or north, or south?' what would you say?"
"The question would not fit the case, Gautama."
Note: Majjhima- nikaya, quoted in Radhakrishnan and Moore, 290
The point is that a fire depends on certain elements for its existence,
such as wood, heat, and oxygen. When these elements are no longer present,
the fire does not leave, as such — -it just ceases to exist. Similarly, a
person is dependent on the aggregates, ignorance, and grasping. When ignorance
and grasping cease to be operative, and when the inertia of the last of
the aggregates, i.e. the body, is spent, then the person ceases to exist.
The person is "thus-gone," but there is no transcendent realm in which he
or she is reborn. That is, the person has "gone," but he or she has not gone
some where.
This teaching, while clear, was not easy to comprehend. The Buddha warned
his disciples numerous times that his message was "recondite, subtle,
and profound." It is therefore easy to see why Nagarjuna devoted a section
to this concept. Not only had it always been a difficult one to understand,
but, further, the recent Realist and Substantialist trends had precipitated
even more confusions. One tendency was to hold that the Tathagata was
composed of some substance not found in ordinary unenlightened humans.
This propensity to believe that the person's nature underwent some essential
transformation upon the achievement of enlightenment was evidenced even
in the Buddha's time. The theory was that the soul which is unenlightened
partakes of the quality of bondage, and, when this soul becomes free,
then its essence shifts to now partake of the quality of freedom.
Note: This notion was likely a product of the influence of Jainism,
which believed that the defiling karma is an actual substance that adheres
to the soul (jiva)
. Nagarjuna explains clearly that the nature of the Buddha is identical
to that of any other person, and it has neither the "quality" of bondage
nor the "quality" of freedom. There is no self to be found in either the
bound or the freed person; both are composed of nothing but the soulless
aggregates, and there is no real self which can be thus qualified. "The Tathagata
is neither the aggregates nor different from them. The aggregates are not
in him; nor is he in the aggregates. He is not possessed of the aggregates."
This definition of the Tathagata is no different than that of any and all
persons. Thus, "in such a context, who is a Tathagata?"
Note: karika XXII.1
The existence of a self in the Buddha is denied for the same reasons
that it is denied in any person. If the Buddha is independent of the aggregates,
then he will not evidence their characteristics, e.g. he will not have a
body, sensations, or consciousness. If the Buddha depends on the aggregates,
then "he does not exist in terms of self-nature." Further, if his essence
were to change upon enlightenment, then he would now have a different, or
"other- nature." But, if he does not exist in terms of self-nature, then
"how can he exist in terms of other-nature?"
Note: karika XXII.2
As all that exists is ruled by the process of dependent arising, one
cannot say that the Tathagata has an independent and transcendent existential
status. Even though the Buddha has ceased to grasp on to the aggregates,
"he should still depend upon them in the present. As such he will be dependent…
There exists no Tathagata independent of the aggregates."
Note: karika XXII.5-6
This is not to say that the Buddha has a self which exists even in
the present. Having abandoned grasping and soul-theorizing, it is only
the external appearance of him which exists. It is grasping which causes
the aggregates to continue coming together in life after life, grasping
for self-assertion, for sense-fulfillments, and for continued existence.
Since the Buddha has become enlightened by virtue of having released his
tendency to grasp, he no longer believes that there is a self comprising
him in the present, and so he knows that he will not exist after death,
either. It is only, Nagarjuna says, the misguided drive to attribute reality
to the objects of grasping, the grasping itself, and the one who grasps
that embroils the ignorant person in the tangle of existence-theorizing.
It is only this misguided person, "firmly insisting that a Tathagata 'exists'
or 'does not exist,'" who ascribes a present or posthumous existence to the
Buddha.
Note: karika XXII.13
That is, even though the Buddha no longer falsely believes that he
exists, it is still possible for those who do imagine reality to attribute
an existence to him. Nagarjuna explains that these people are seeing nothing
more than a figment of their imaginations. "Those who generate obsessions
with great regard to the Buddha…, all of them, impaired by obsessions,
do not perceive the Tathagata."
Note: karika XXII.15
Sections twenty-three and twenty-four — Error and Truth: the Perversions
and the Four Noble Truths
Nagarjuna has thus far examined all of the elements of existence
and negated substantialist understandings of all, and has discussed the
nature of the enlightened one who sees the true nature of things. Before
presenting the positive teachings of the Buddha's doctrine, Nagarjuna
found it necessary to devote section twenty-three, ``Examination of Perversions,''
to an explanation of the origins of confusions and misunderstandings.
The subject of this section, viparyasa, is best translated as "perversion."
The meaning of "perversion" here is not so much the common one of moral
or sexual debasement, but rather the etymological meaning of "turning through"
(per + vertere) and hence "error" or "delusion."
Note: cf. Monier-Williams, 974, in which the first meanings of viparyasa
given are "overturning" and "transposition."
The Buddha said that all conditioned things are characterized by three
"marks:" impermanence, soullessness, and suffering. These are not absolute
definitions of reality, but rather descriptions of the nature of reality
as perceived by the enlightened person. The epistemic ignorance of the
unenlightened person lies in his or her falsely knowing the world as permanent,
containing a soul, or non-suffering. Besides these three corruptions of
the three marks, the Buddha mentioned one other type of perversion, which
perversion is a value judgment independent of the three marks. This is the
human propensity to characterize things as wholesome or unwholesome, pleasant
or unpleasant. Since Nagarjuna has already examined the three marks in
previous sections, here he first takes up the latter perversion, the subjective
value judgments. The defilements such as passionate attraction and aversion
(lust and hatred), Nagarjuna says, "have thought as their source," and
it is on the basis of these defilements that value judgments such as pleasant
and unpleasant come to be.
Note: karika XXIII.1
All persons, whether Buddhas or unenlightened persons, continue to
perceive and have sensations, both pleasant and unpleasant. The difference
is that the sensations of the Buddhas are not filtered through defilements,
and so they do not believe that there is a real objective ground supporting
the subjective experiences of pleasant and unpleasant.
Nagarjuna spends the first half of this section demonstrating the unreality
of the foundations of perversions, thereby showing that it is possible
to overcome them. He first offers a rationale for abandoning belief in
one of the foundations of perversion, namely the defiling tendencies of
passions and grasping. Discriminatory judgments such as pleasant and unpleasant
are based on the defilements for, were there no passionate attraction and
aversion, there would be no need for one to judge things as pleasant or
unpleasant. All sensations would be accepted with equanimity and detached
acceptance. "The existence or non-existence of the self is not established
in any way," Nagarjuna reminds the reader, and "without that, how can the
existence or the non-existence of the defilements be established?"
Note: karikaXXIII.3
One may object that the defilements must exist, for they are experienced.
Nagarjuna counters this argument by explaining that the defilements exist
in the same way that the person does: both the defilements and the one defiled
may be experienced in ignorance, but neither is substantive — - neither
is to be found anywhere in the agglomeration of aggregates which comprise
the apparent person. Thus, as demonstrated in the examination of the self
in section eighteen, there is no reality in either the defilements or the
one defiled. Conversely, the defilements could be said to be dependent on
the perversions, for, were there no discrimination of pleasant or unpleasant,
there could be no reason for aversion or attraction. Yet this will not work
either, for "the perversions regarding the pleasant and the unpleasant are
not evident from the standpoint of self-nature." This being so, on what could
the defilements of passionate aversion and attraction be based?
Note: karika XXIII.6
Finally, one could cling to the belief in pleasant and unpleasant
based on the reality of the sensations giving rise to these categories.
Nagarjuna here delivers the coup de grace to the belief in the reality
of such discriminations. Visual form, sound, taste, touch, smell, and
concepts (i.e. mental sensations) are the "sixfold foundations" of defilements
and discriminatory judgments. But, as demonstrated above,
Note: cf. sections IV, "Examination of Aggregates" and XVIII, "Examination
of Self."
all six sensory foundations "are comparable to [a mythical city] and
resemble mirages and dreams. How can the pleasant and the unpleasant come
to be in people who are fabrications of illusion or who are comparable to
mirror images?"
Note: karika XXIII.8-9
That is, the pleasant, the unpleasant, and the one who discriminates
between them are all unreal. As such, Nagarjuna asks, whence the justification
for passionate feelings? In the same way that discriminating sensation
into pleasant and unpleasant gives rise to adverse graspings, so does it
hinder enlightenment to pervert the other marks of existence, i.e. confusing
the impermanent for the permanent, the soulless as having an ego, and the
suffering as non-suffering.
A Buddhist would have an obvious motivation in aggressively denying
the reality of the senses, the discrimination of sensations into pleasant
and unpleasant, and the passionate attractions and aversions which arise
on the basis of such discriminations. It is only when these tendencies
and perversions are understood as being groundless that they can be appeased
and the detachment of nirvana attained. If these unpropitious aspects of
existence were real, if they had self- nature, then they could never be
appeased, Nagarjuna says. Likewise, an emphasis on the unreality of the
one who discriminates facilitates release from perversions. "Perversions
do not occur to one who is already subject to perversion," nor do they "occur
to one who is not subjected to perversions," nor do they "occur to one who
is being subjected to perversions." The untenability of relating a subject
and its attribute in any of the three phases of time was explained in section
two in the examination of the moverand the moved. This being so, Nagarjuna
delivers the exhortation to "reflect on your own! To whom will the perversions
occur?"
Note: karika XXIII.17-18
The above tack aside, Nagarjuna had an additional reason for explaining
perversions and confusions here: his next three sections deal with "right
views," i.e. the Buddha's teachings of the Noble Truths, the nature of
nirvana, and the process of dependent arising. A person will be able to
comprehend these only if he or she first understands the false knowledge
and perversions which hinder such comprehension.
The Buddha expressed the core of his teaching in the four Noble Truths.
These are 1) suffering exists, 2) suffering has a cause, namely craving
and grasping, 3) suffering, having been caused, can be ended, and 4) the
Eightfold Path is the way to end it. These are all truths, but they do not
represent an objective and absolute Truth. Truths for the Buddha were pragmatic.
An Absolutist philosophy, such as Plato's theory of the Forms, defines a
concept's truth in terms of how well that concept corresponds to the transcendent
and independent standard, the Absolute Truth. A pragmatic philosophy, on
the other hand, does not recognize such an independent standard by which
relative truths can be measured. Pragmatism holds that knowledge exists only
as a tool to be used, and the test of a concept's truthfulness is its practical
consequences.
Note: Frank Thilly, A History of Philosophy (New York: Henry Holt
and Company, 1951), 602
That the Buddha's attitude towards truth is one of pragmatismcan be
seen in the fact that, were all four Noble Truths absolute, they would contradict.
For example, the first announces the fact of suffering, but the third declares
that suffering can be eradicated.
Note: Kalupahana 1992, 168
This is perhaps why the Buddha referred to them as "noble" (arya)
truths: their importance is in their value and worthiness, not in their
absolute validity. The implication of this is that they have a use and a
purpose. This schemata of truth is the subject of section twenty-four, "Examination
of the Noble Truths."
It is certain that Nagarjuna upheld the validity of the Buddha's Noble
Truths, for he stressed the value of the Buddha's teachings at every turn.
However, it would be easy, after reading the Mulamadhyamakakarika thus
far, to get the impression that Nagarjuna was denying all and asserting
nothing. Specifically, he has thus far declared all existent things, grasping,
the grasper, and even the Buddha himself to be devoid of self-nature and
"empty," sunya.
Note: karika XIII.3, XXII.10,14
respectively Such comprehensive negations would, it would seem, deny
the validity of all teachings, including the Buddha's, and sabotage the
Eightfold Path leading to nirvana. Nagarjuna presents this counter argument
in the first six verses this section. If all is empty, the opponent could
charge, all causation would be invalidated. This would lead to a denial
of the Noble Truths. There are four attainments, or fruits, corresponding
to the four truths, namely understanding the nature of suffering (duhkha),
relinquishing the passions which cause suffering, realizing the goal of
nirvana, and cultivating the proper Path towards the goal. But, the opponent
continues, if the Noble Truths are empty then likewise there could not
be these attainments, there would be none who achieve enlightenment and
break free from the cycle of birth-and- death, and finally, there would
not even be a Buddha. "Speaking in this manner about emptiness," the opponent
concludes, "you contradict the three jewels [of the Buddha, his teachings,
and the community of Buddhists], as well as the reality of the fruits, both
good and bad, and all such worldly conventions."
Note: karika XXIV.1-6
Nagarjuna's answer to this cogent objection is simple: "we say that
you do not comprehend the purpose of emptiness. As such, you are tormented
by emptiness and the meaning of emptiness."
Note: karika XXIV.7
The opponent's objections would hold true if Nagarjuna was saying
that all the elements of reality are empty of reality and validity. However,
what he has actually said is slightly different — -he said that the teaching
of emptiness, sunyata, has a purpose. It is not an absolute statement, but
a pragmatic one. To explain this, he introduces here the notion of two
levels of truth. "The teaching of the doctrine by the Buddhas is based upon
two truths: truth relating to worldly convention and truth in terms of
ultimate fruit."
Note: karika XXIV.8
The conventional truth, samvrti, is that which is used in the everyday
world. Even though all is a realm of mere appearance, one must still use
concepts to communicate with others and to function in the world. For example,
even though the enlightened one understands that there is no "mover"who
"moves," he or she still utilizes the conceptions of movement to discuss
going to the store. Likewise, even though the Buddha stressed the unreality
of the person and the complete lack of egoity in the world, he still, when
communicating, used terms like "myself" and "you." The other form of truth
is paramartha, which can be translated as "supreme truth" or "ultimate fruit."
As the term artha, "fruit" or "goal" implies, this level still does not represent
an ultimate, absolute Truth. It is a truth that does not rely on relative
meanings, but rather is provisional. Goal-oriented, the supreme truth is
conducive to attaining the fruits.
The four Noble Truths, i.e. the fact of suffering, its cause, its cure,
and the Eightfold Path leading to its removal are all expressed in terms
of conventional truth. Nirvana is the higher truth, the "greatest fruit,"
paramartha. These two levels of truth often contradict. For example, the
first limb of the Eightfold Path is "right views." One must subscribe to
the proper conceptual worldview to follow the Buddhist path. However, the
higher truth of paramartha denies that there is an ultimate "right view."
In the state of nirvana, all is seen to be empty, and nothing is right or
wrong, better or worse. What is crucial to point out is that samvrti and
paramartha are both called "truths." There is no line drawn here between
truth and falsehood, for that would give rise to absolutism — -something can
only be false if there is one single, independent standard against which
to measure it. Thus, instead of the true/false dichotomy integral to Absolutisms,
the Buddha spoke in terms of truth versus "confusion," i.e. using knowledge
pragmatically and beneficially versus being bound by it.
Note: Kalupahana 1986, 46
The use of conventional language and relative truths is necessary for
teaching. "Without relying upon convention, the ultimate fruit is not taught.
Without understanding the ultimate fruit, freedom is not attained."
Note: karika XXIV.10
The truths expressed by samvrti are necessary to point the way to
the ultimate goal. Language and concepts must be utilized. Once the goal
is in sight, these relative truths must be abandoned. It is at this stage
that one perceives all things to be devoid of soul and empty of reality,
and one realizes that the ultimate truth is itself not really a "truth."
What is vital is always to keep in mind which level of truth one is working
with. If one mistakenly applies the conception of emptiness to the relative
realm, for example, then one could see things as meaningless. This would
cause one to be left in a state of distress and lose faith in the Buddha
and his teaching. "A wrongly perceived emptiness ruins a person of meager
intelligence," warns Nagarjuna. "It is like a snake that is wrongly grasped."
Note: karika XXIV.11
If anyone "generates any obsessions or confusions with regard to emptiness,
the accompanying error is not ours," he disclaims. Such a confusion is
akin to that of a person who, mounting his horse, promptly forgets where
his horse is!
Note: karika XXIV.13,15
It is just such a mistaken attribution of ultimate truths to the relative
realm that led the hypothetical opponent above to conclude that Nagarjuna
was denying the validity of the Buddha's message. The opponent had simply
assumed that Nagarjuna's notion that all things are empty invalidates
all teachings, as well. Nagarjuna now turns the table on the opponent.
On the contrary, he says, it is the denial of emptiness and the assertion
of self- nature that negates the Noble Truths. He spends the remaining
two-thirds of the section demonstrating that theories of self-nature and
individual identity contradict all the Buddha's teachings and preclude
the very possibility of enlightenment. If existent things are not devoid
of a self-nature, then, for the reasons explained above, they must be eternal
and unchanging. If so, then they are both uncaused and incapable of cessation.
This will nullify the notions of an agent and his or her acts, which
will then render him or her incapable of appeasing the defiling dispositions
and escaping from the cycle of suffering. The Eightfold Path will then be
purposeless and its goal unattainable. Thus, Nagarjuna concludes, notions
of self- nature and a denial of emptiness will make the entirety of the
Buddha's teachings completely pointless.
A key to understanding the two truths is dependent arising. It is the
insight that all existent things have come to be only through a process
of mutual interaction and causation that provides the understanding of emptiness.
"We state that whatever is dependent arising, that is emptiness," says Nagarjuna.
Note: karika XXIV.18
All things that have come to be dependent on others are, by definition,
relative. That is, they only have identity in relation to other things,
as "tallness" has identity only in relation to "shortness." Since they are
arisen things they are not unreal. On the other hand, since they are relative
things they are not absolutely real. Neither are they both real and unreal,
for that would constitute an internal contradiction. However, neither can
they be said to be neither real nor unreal: as arisen, they are real, but
as dependent, they are unreal. The only remaining way to speak of arisen
things is by saying that they are in the middle between the extremes. All
discourse and conceptualization about dependently-arisen things is thus said
to be the "middle path." This is the key to the whole issue of truth and
reality covered in this section. "Whoever perceives dependent arising also
perceives suffering, its arising, its ceasing, and the path," says Nagarjuna
in closing.
Note: karika XXIV.40
That is, whoever perceives dependent arising understands the ontology
of existent things and perceives the Buddha's four Noble Truths.
Section twenty-five — The Ultimate Goal: Enlightenment
Having explained the Madhyamika stance on the reality of the Noble
Truths, Nagarjuna now can examine the goal of them and of the entire
Buddhist path, nirvana. There may be no single concept in Buddhism which
has elicited more confusion and debate than nirvana. Nirvana is often translated
as "freedom," but it actually means "extinction." A literal translation
of "nir - vana" is "blown out," as in the extinguishing of a fire. Nirvana
is not a state of transcendent eternal bliss, like that of some forms
of Yoga or of the Hindu Advaita Vedanta, nor sanctified salvation, like
that of the Christianity, nor final posthumous nonexistence, like that
of some Materialist philosophies. It is, simply, the cessation of those
factors which cause bondage, namely cravings, dispositions, and karma.
An example of the extinction of nirvana is afforded by the Buddha's
analogy of the fire given above. When the fire is extinguished, it does
not go anywhere, east, west, north, or south. It simply ceases to be. Similarly,
the one who has appeased, or eliminated, the snares binding one to the cycle
of birth-and-death can be said to have attained freedom, for he or she is
now free of the binding influences. But, this does not mean that the freed
one goes on to heavenly realm or a state of sanctified bliss. This person
does not disappear only to reappear elsewhere. The freed one simply is no
longer. It is not that the enlightened person ceases to exist, for he or she
never existed in the first place. It was only an illusion of real existence
that caused the one now free to have been bound to existence in the first
place, and it is an equally ignorant illusion of those viewing the freed one
to think that he or she exists now. That is, nothing goes out of existence;
it never existed in the first place.
Note: It has been mentioned repeatedly that a principal cause of
bondage is the process through which a person ignorantly perceives reality
in unreal things, feels passionate attractions or aversions to those perceived
things, and then grasps onto them. If it is unclear how it can be that
strong emotions can be aroused by a mere illusion, an analogy from mythology
may be illuminating: Ovid recounted the story of a young Greek sculptor
named Pygmalion and Galatea who, fearing and hating women, vowed to pour
all of his creative energy into his art alone. He carved one statue of a
woman, which he named Galatea, which proved to be so perfect and beautiful
that he fell in love with it. Venus took pity on his frustrated desires and
brought Galatea to life, and the two were married. This story suggests that
human passions do not discriminate between real and unreal objects.
In section twenty-five, "Examination of Nirvana," Nagarjuna eliminates
various misconceptions about this state of freedom. It is not a form of
existence, nor is it non-existence. It is not a "thing" which, like all things,
is dependent on all other things for its manifestation. Nor is it an independent
thing. The fact that nirvana is spoken of being "realized," "attained,"
or "achieved" is not to be understood as implying that freedom is a thing
which can be known or possessed. These verbs are just convenient ways samvrti)
of speaking about an inexpressible concept. Nagarjuna's concern, as a Buddhist,
was both to defend the Buddha's philosophy and to help his fellow Buddhists
escape the cycle of suffering. This exposition of nirvana, then, is to be
taken neither as a contribution to a philosophical debate nor as a theory
to be defended. It is a pragmatic concept which can be used as a tool for
escaping from suffering. To be useful as such, it must be understood in the
proper way. Hence this section, whose purpose is a clarification of the concept
and the improper understandings of it.
He opens the section with the opponent's objection that, if all is really
empty, then there is no arising of things and so there is nothing to
be extinguished (nir - vana). Nagarjuna replies, as before, that "if all
this is non- empty, there exists neither arising nor ceasing." If there
is svabhava, a self-nature in things, then it is that which will prevent
freedom.
Note: karika XXV.2
Having rejected self- nature by saying that all is empty, he is now
faced with a problem. If there are no things, then what is freedom, and
how can one speak of it or strive for it? The Buddha offered various definitions
of nirvana, one of which Nagarjuna now makes use of. "Unrelinquished,
not reached, unannihilated, non-eternal, non-ceased and non-arisen — -this
is called freedom."
Note: karika XXV.3
One substantialist notion of freedom was that the bound person partakes
of the quality of bondage. Freedom, then, would be the relinquishing of
this nature and the adoption of a new and wholly disparate mode of existence — -the
freed state. This does not apply. There is not a person who partakes of
qualities, and freedom is not a concrete goal that can be striven for. An
eternalist soteriology would hold that the state of freedom transcends temporality,
and the one who achieves freedom also becomes eternal. Nirvana is not such,
for it is non- eternal. Neither, however, is it a temporal state of salvation,
for it is "unannihilated." It cannot have any relation to temporality, which
is measured by arising and ceasing, for it is "non-ceased and non-arisen."
Freedom is thus not obtainable, not a transcendent reality, and not, like
the Vedanta atman, a preexisting immanent substratum.
Further, nirvana has absolutely no relation to the concepts of either
existence or non-existence. If it were a form of existence, then, like
all existent things, it would partake of birth and death, arising and ceasing.
It would be relative and thus conditioned, for there are no existent things
that are unconditioned. If conditioned, it could not be independent. These
would necessitate that nirvana, like all conditioned and dependent things,
be characterized by impermanence and suffering, which would make for a
poor enlightenment, indeed. Neither can freedom be said to be non-existence,
for, "wherein there is no existence, therein non-existence is not evident."
Note: karika XXV.7
The two are relative concepts. Moreover, if freedom were said to be
non-existence, it would, as one half of a dual conception, still not be
independent. Nagarjuna echoed the Buddha's clear assertion that nirvana
is neither transcendent existence nor posthumous annihilation. In discussing
the nature of the enlightened one in an earlier section, he clearly stated
that "the thought that the Buddha exists or does not exist after death
is not appropriate."
Note: karika XXII.14
Notwithstanding such difficulties, nirvana must be seen as non-contingent
and independent. If it were not, then it would not be free from the contingency
and dependence of the suffering world. The solution, the Buddha said,
is to relinquish the notions of becoming and being in all forms. Therefore,
"it is proper to assume that freedom is neither existence nor non-existence."
Note: karika XXV.10
(na bhavo nabhavo nirvanam) That is, if one completely ceases to think
in terms of being, then neither arising nor ceasing, origination nor annihilation
will be posited. There is another possible interpretation of the Buddha's
exhortation to relinquish notions of being. One could say that, instead
of seeing freedom as neither existence nor non-existence, one could see
it as both, as a transcendence of the two categories or, in Hegelian terms,
a synthesis of thesis and antithesis. This would declare freedom to be
some sort of mystical consciousness which is both existence and non-existence
by virtue of being a transcendence of the dualities. This will not work,
either, Nagarjuna now shows, for nirvana can contain no aspect of either
half of the duality. If it were both existence and non- existence, then, rather
than being independent, it would be dependent on both and thus doubly contingent.
Further, since existence and non-existence are mutually exclusive opposites,
"their simultaneous existence in one place is not possible, as in the case
of light and darkness."
Note: karika XXV.14
That which precipitated the debate was the Buddha's teaching that freedom
is attainable, and the following speculations of his followers about
what sort of existence the Buddha enjoyed after death, i.e. after his
full attainment of nirvana.
Note: There are two forms of nirvana: the one achieved during life
is a state of freedom but, since the freed one still has a karmically-bound
body, it is not complete nirvana.
Complete freedom, "total extinction" (parinirvana), only occurs at
death when the body, too, is extinguished. As Nagarjuna has just shown,
no theories of the Buddha's existential status seem to be possible. Thus,
"it is not assumed that the Blessed One [i.e. the Buddha] exists after
death. Neither is it assumed that he does not exist, or both, or neither."
Note: karika XXV.17
An immediate question following this statement is "then what happened
to him? He obviously existed at one point, and now he doesn't, so where
did he go?" Nagarjuna's answer is startling: "It is not assumed that even
a living Blessed One exists. Neither is it assumed that he does not exist,
or both, or neither."
Note: karika XXV.18
The answer, then, is that nothing happened to the Buddha. His existential
status did not change when he attained nirvana, for he could not even be
said to have existed before it.
If the Buddha's nature before his nirvana was the same as his nature
after enlightenment, then the only thing that changed was his subjective
understanding. His actual nature did not change. An even more startling
conclusion follows from this: if his nature did not change, then the world
of suffering, samsara, must not be different from the world experienced
by the freed person. This is exactly what Nagarjuna concludes. "The life-process
has no thing that distinguishes it from freedom. Freedom has no thing that
distinguishes it from the life- process."
Note: karika XXV.19
There is no transcendent reality, no unique state of freedom experienced
by the enlightened one. The worlds experienced by the one bound by suffering
and the one freed from suffering are not different worlds. Nirvana is nothing
more than a shift in understanding the world and a new way of reacting
to it. However, Nagarjuna is quick to say, this does not mean that the
cycle of life-and- death and freedom are the same. "Whatever is of the
extremity of freedom and the extremity of the life-process, between them
not even a subtle something is evident."
Note: karika XXV.20
If they were simply declared to be identical, then there would be neither
the experience of suffering nor the experience of release from it. Although
the cycle of birth-and-death and nirvana are not different, then, they are
nonetheless experienced differently and are not simply one and the same.
The cause of this whole sphere of confusions and misunderstandings about
the nature of freedom is the human tendency to speculate and theorize.
Were there not this tendency, then one would never perceive transitory
phenomena as enduring in the first place, which would prevent one from
developing passionate attractions and aversions regarding phenomena. Without
such passions, the dispositions, graspings and cravings would not develop,
and thus suffering would not come to be. Without these passions, one would
not create the concepts of eternal life, identity or difference, or infinity
of the universe, concepts which the Buddha repeatedly refused to discuss.
The notion of emptiness is an antidote to this chain which has its birth
in confused understanding and its result in suffering. For, "when all things
are empty, why [speculate on] the finite, the infinite, both the finite
and the infinite and neither the finite nor the infinite? Why speculate
on the identical, the different, the eternal, the non-eternal, both, or
neither?"
Note: karika XXV.22-23
When one completely and utterly ceases to grasp onto theories and
perceptions, speculation comes to an end, and dispositions are "blown
out." This is nirvana.
Section twenty-six — Dependent arising, the Buddha's Positive Ontology
Section twenty-six, "Examination of the
Twelve Causal Factors," is the penultimate examination of
the karika. It is a highly anomalous section. First, there is hardly a
single original statement in it, the entire section being no more than a
presentation of the twelve links of the chain of dependent arising as taught
by the Buddha. Second, there are none of the cryptic and negatory statements
so characteristic of the previous four hundred verses. This has led some
commentators to assume that it and the last section, "Examination of Views,"
are merely summations of Theravada, "Older School," doctrine. This opinion
holds that the first twenty-five sections were the exposition of Madhyamika
thought, and these last two Nagarjuna added as an appendix of sorts. Another
hypothesis proposed is that these last two sections are actually spurious.
Note: Kalupahana 1986, 77
Nagarjuna completed his treatise with the examination of nirvana,
this hypothesis holds, and the last sections were added by someone who
wished to make Nagarjuna appear to be a Theravadin.
There does not seem to be any justification for either of these views.
Regarding the last two sections as non-Madhyamika may help one uphold certain
theories about the nature of Madhyamika. The Prasangika school, for example,
asserts that Nagarjuna was denying all concepts and advancing none of
his own. Since section twenty-six decidedly presents a positive theory,
it would be convenient for the Prasangika orientation to regard it as spurious.
There is, however, no apparent reason to interpret this section in that
manner. If it is rejected because it is positive and thus seems anomalous,
then the dedicatory verses, as well, could be rejected, and then so could
any verse which was difficult to interpret. These last sections will therefore
be accepted as Nagarjuna's legitimate and intended conclusion to his treatise.
Nagarjuna presents the Buddha's twelve links in the chain of dependent
arising in the same order and manner in which the Buddha presented them.
The only innovation is that he inserts two verses from another sutra to
clarify one point and concludes the section with three verses which summarize
the way to reverse the cycle. The Buddha's chain of dependent arising was
already discussed in chapter two, and will be explained fully in chapter
five. This section is short, though, and the subject very important, so
it will not hurt to follow Nagarjuna's verses and present it again.
The causal chain begins with ignorance. The true nature of reality is
impermanence, soullessness, and suffering. One who does not perceive this
fact will believe that things are real, that there are enduring identities
and egos, and that it is possible to find satisfaction in these things.
One forms dispositions, such as attraction and aversion, on the basis of
such misbeliefs. One then initiates volitional action, e.g. approaching
that which one desires and avoiding that which is undesirable. Based on such
dispositions, consciousness infuses the new life-form. That is, consciousness
does not create the attractions and aversions, but rather they are primal
and give rise to consciousness. It may seem odd to say that consciousness
does not arise until this point, for most religious systems regard consciousness
as eternal, all-pervasive, and ultimate. Buddhism, however, holds it to
be dependently-arisen. Consciousness is but one of the five aggregates constituting
a person. Until there is an awareness of subject/object duality, there
can be nothing of which to be conscious. Therefore, consciousness neither
can arise nor is needed until there is an awareness of a subject interacting
with a separate world. The dispositionally- conditioned attractions and aversions
provide the earliest basis of and need for interaction. Following this infusion
of consciousness, "name and form," i.e. the psychophysical personality,
come to be. This is where the new life can be said to be a "person" proper.
The awareness of name-and-form both creates the individual identity and
also causes the awareness of the objective world. Before the rise of name-and-form,
it would be possible to see attractions and aversions as occurring and acting
as simple natural forces. Now, however, name-and-form cause awareness both
of internal subject and external object, both of "me" and "it." This awareness
conditions the six spheres of sense-faculty, i.e. the five physical sense-
faculties plus mental sensations, which are called thoughts. These sense-faculties
are not actual feelings, but just the potential means by which feeling can
occur. The duality of subject and object plus the potential for sensation
afforded by the sense-faculties gives rise to contact itself and the actual
feeling which ensues.
Nagarjuna here inserts a few lines from one of the early canonical texts
to help explain the nature of contact. Using the example of vision, he
says that contact proceeds from "the harmonious occurrence of the three
factors: material form, consciousness, and eye. Feeling proceeds from such
contact."
Note: karika XXVI.5
Dependent upon feeling is craving. When one has sensation, then one
develops likings for certain feelings and aversions for others. This leads
to grasping, which takes the two forms of passionate desire to partake
of pleasant sensations and avoid unpleasant ones. With the development
of grasping, the one who grasps now becomes bound to the cycle of birth-and-death.
Nagarjuna here points out a converse progression. "If [the grasper] were
to be a non-grasper, he would be released, and there would be no further
becoming."
Note: karika XXVI.7
This, Nagarjuna points out, is a weak link in the chain. This is where
the cycle of suffering can be broken and freedom won. One may not have
control over the earlier links of the chain, such as primal ignorance or
past karma, but one assuredly has the ability, here and now, to refrain
from grasping. With detached equanimity, bondage would be broken. If one
does grasp, then the five aggregates constituting the psychophysical personality
will be bound by dispositionally-conditioned karma and will continue to
arise again and again. This will lead to unending rebirths, which in turn
will lead to unending deaths. This is the final link of the chain. "Such
is the occurrence of this entire mass of suffering."
Note: karika XXVI.9
In summary, Nagarjuna reminds the reader that "the ignorant [person]
forms dispositions that constitute the source of the life process," and
hence all suffering. The key is to remove ignorance, which can be done by
cultivating knowledge and wisdom. The wise person will not initiate the
cycle of suffering, "because of his perception of truth."
Note: karika XXVI.10
The truth in question is dependent arising and its concomitant, emptiness.
When all things are seen as being empty, one can form no dispositions about
them and will cause neither passionate attractions nor aversions to come
into play. This will prevent grasping. There is thus a certain circularity
in the chain of dependent arising and the way to break free from the chain.
Nagarjuna said above, in verse seven of this section, that the weak link
is grasping. If one ceases to grasp, then dispositions will wane and endless
rebirths will cease. In another way, however, breaking free from grasping
is the result of the appeasement of dispositions. That is, one must refrain
from grasping to release the dispositions, and one must release the dispositions
to refrain from grasping. There is also a sort of catch-22 evident in the
first two links of the chain: "When ignorance has ceased, there is no
occurrence of dispositions." However, the cessation of that ignorance takes
place only as a result of the release of dispositions.
Note: karika XXVI.11
The two halves of each of these equations, grasping + dispositions
and ignorance + dispositions, arise together. They must also be released
together. This may seem paradoxical, but the Buddhist declares that it
is possible to do. The Eightfold Path is the way to do this. When one structures
one's life on the principle of moderation through right actions, right
thoughts, and right discipline, then ignorance will be undercut. "In this
way, this entire mass of suffering ceases completely."
Note: karika XXVI.12
The chain of dependent arising is not a linear one, but a circular one.
The above catch-22 and the seeming paradox of releasing graspings through
wisdom yet gaining wisdom through releasing grasping is thus clarified.
Ignorance is, it is true, presented as being the first link. This does
not mean, though, that ignorance is in any way a cause of the succeeding
eleven links. The chain can be seen as a series of conditions (pratyayas)
influencing one another in succession, but this is just a way of explaining
it. All links of the chain arise dependently. When there is the first link,
ignorance, then the twelfth link, suffering and death, necessarily will
follow. When there is the twelfth link, death will lead to rebirth, and
the first link will follow. Both the origin and the means of escape from
the entire chain are to be found in this mutually-conditioned and interdependent
arising.
Section twenty-seven — Conclusion: Right and Wrong Views
Nagarjuna has now completed his examination of the Buddha's philosophy.
He has discussed all manner of improper theories and has concluded with
a short but comprehensive recapitulation of the Buddha's central guiding
teaching: the nature of the cycle of arising and suffering and the way
to eliminate this cycle of binding influence through a cultivation of wisdom.
He now closes the treatise with one last warning against unnecessary
theorizing.
Section twenty-seven, "Examination of Views," can be
elucidated by a brief excursus of one element of the Buddha's doctrine.
The first two limbs of the Eightfold Path are Right Thought and Right Understanding.
There are definite and specific ways of thinking which must be cultivated
if one is to escape suffering, and these are the Buddha's teachings. However,
the Buddha also stressed that certain types of speculation
are deleterious, as exemplified by the metaphor of the man shot
with an arrow. These are the metaphysical questions regarding the ultimate
natures of things, which questions he would offer no comment on. They are
referred to as the Avyakrta, the "Unanswerables
," or the "questions which tend not to edification." An episode from an early sutra will best explain these "Unanswerables"
and the Buddha's attitude towards them. The following episode is summarized
and paraphrased.
A certain monk approached the Buddha and spoke as follows:
"Sir, it just occurred to me, as I was in meditation, that you have
left unelucidated, and set aside, and rejected certain theories — - that
the world is eternal, that the world is not eternal, that the world is
finite, that the world is infinite, that the soul and the body are identical,
that the soul is one thing and the body another, that the saint exists
after death, that the saint does not exist after death, or both, or neither.
If you know the answersto these questions, then tell me. If not, then admit
that you do not know. If you do not give me an answer, then I will cease to
be a Buddhist."
"O monk, did I ever say to you, 'Come, lead the religious life under
me, and I will answer these questions?'"
"No."
"In the same way as the man shot with the arrow, O monk, the man who
refuses to live the religious life until I have answered these questions,
that man would die before I have answered them.
The religious life does not depend on the dogma that the world is
eternal… not eternal…
The religious life does not depend on the dogma that the world is
finite… infinite.
The religious life does not depend on the dogma that the soul and
the body are identical… are different.
The religious life does not depend on the dogma that the saint exists
after death… does not… both… neither.
Bear in mind always what it is that I have elucidated, and what it
is that I have not elucidated. I have only taught
those things which have to do with the fundamentals of religion, facilitate
quiescence and cessation of passions, and lead to nirvana."
Note: The complete episode can be found in Warren, 117-122
These "unanswerables," which are found in many places in the early
texts, treat the four basic questions of the temporal duration of the universe,
the spatial extension of it, the future life of the Tathagata, and the relation
between the body and the soul. The questions represent the most basic and
deepest insecurities held by unenlightened persons, and all stem ultimately
from a belief in the self and a fear of its dissolution. They are enumerated
variously as ten or fourteen,
Note: Murti is apparently incorrect in saying that "they are invariably
enumerated as fourteen." Cf. Murti 1960, 36 and Warren, 117-122
but this variance is due to no more than how many "either," "or," "both,"
or "neither" alternatives are given for each of the four. Besides the Buddha's
refusal to provide specific solutions to these problems, as recounted above,
there were also times when, after having been asked such questions, he would
simply not speak.
Discussion of the unanswerablesand the famous
"silence of the Buddha" has been a popular topic in modern scholarship,
and four main theories have been proposed to explain his refusal
to provide answers. These must be presented briefly now, for Nagarjuna's
treatment of the unanswerables does not seem to fit neatly any of the
four.
- First, it has been said that the Buddha was silent because he
was interested only in practical matters. The speculative metaphysics
were, simply, less important than living the proper life, and thus were
set aside.
- A second interpretation is that the Buddha frankly did not
know the answers, and was preeminently an agnostic. This was the initial
suspicion of the monk in the above parable.
- Third, an opposite interpretation of agnosticism is that the
Buddha did know the answers, but was incapable of explaining them. This
interpretation is partially supported by the number of times the Buddha
emphasized the subtlety and abstruseness of the doctrine. Following his
enlightenment he seriously considered not even attempting to teach his new-
found truths, only because he despaired of anyone understanding.
Note: ``[The enlightenment] won by me is deep, difficult to see,
difficult to understand,'' the Buddha thought on the night of his awakening.
``…For human beings this would be a matter difficult to see… If I
were to teach [it] and others were not to understand me, that would be
a weariness to me, that would be a vexation to me.'' (quoted in Kalupahana
1986, 336)
However, to say that the difficulty of teaching motivated the Buddha's
reticence to speak is not to do him justice. Surely such an enlightened
being would be able to wield language to make it do his bidding. Further,
it is stated clearly in the discourses that the Buddha did have the ability
to tailor his use of language to fit his audiences.
- A fourth approach is to say that the problem lies in the mental
processes which give rise to such questions. What is important is, not
an answer or the lack of an answer to these questions, but rather completely
removing oneself from such a sphere of ratiocination by the appeasement
of reifying thoughts.
Note: For a more complete discussion of this, see Gadjin M. Nagao,
"The Silence of the Buddha and its Madhyamic Interpretation," in Nagao
1991, 35-50
These four might or might not be correct, and they might not even
be incompatible, but neither are they Nagarjuna's direct approach. Nagarjuna,
simply, says that the answers to these questions are wrong. There may be
theoretical reasons for rejecting the unanswerable questions, and there
certainly are pragmatic reasons for not becoming entangled in such speculation.
However, Nagarjuna's primary reason for rejecting them in his final section
is none of these.
He simply rejects them because
they do not hold up to logical scrutiny.
Nagarjuna opens with a discussion of
views about eternalism. All views of the survival of the
self are based on the belief that the self existed in the past and/or that
the self will exist in the future. However, it would not be appropriate
to say that the self existed in the past, for this would require that the
self who existed in the past is identical with the self who exists now,
in the present. This has already been refuted in section eleven.
However, the Buddha also said that it is incorrect to say that
the self is not eternal. If the Buddha
had denied continuity of existence, then, as discussed above, morality would
be undercut, for "the fruit of action performed by one will be experienced
by another."
Note: karika XXVII.11
This was discussed in section seventeen. Further, a self that existed
in the present but not in the past would be uncaused, which would be an
erroneous conclusion. Since neither of the above alternatives is appropriate,
it would certainly not be appropriate to combine them and say that one
both existed and did not exist in the past. Further, since there are no
other alternatives besides existence or not existence, and since a middle
ground between the two would be unintelligible, it is not appropriate to
say that one neither existed nor did not exist in the past. V
iews regarding a future existence are to be treated in the same way.
That which leads to the asking of the above unanswerable questions is the
tendency to seek for some "thing," some real entity which can be characterized
in terms of existence or non- existence. But, "if it is thought that there
is nothing eternal, what is it that will be non-eternal, both eternal and
non-eternal, and also what is separated from these two [i.e. 'neither']?"
Note: karika XXVII.20
Nagarjuna next addresses the issue of the
relation between the soul and the body by focusing on grasping,
for it is grasping which causes the belief in self-hood. There is certainly
an appearance of continuous selfhood. This illusion arises from the agglomeration
of the aggregates, but it is only dispositions and grasping that cause
one to see a self in the aggregates. "When it is assumed that there is
no self separated from grasping, grasping itself would be the self. Yet,
this is tantamount to saying that there is no self."
Note: karika XXVII.5
But, he cautions, this does not mean that there is a self different
from grasping. The self, then, "is neither different from grasping nor
identical with it."
Note: karika XXVII.8
What has been refuted here is any natural existential
status of the self, not the self as it has come to be in those who grasp.
"A self does not exist. Yet, it is not the case that a person who does
not grasp does not exist. This much is certain."
Note: karika XXVII.8
That is, when there is grasping, there is a belief
in selfhood, and a self comes to be. Nagarjuna's point is that this self
is not ultimately real.
One may object that perhaps there are forms of "subtle existence" which
do not face the above problems. The Buddha did allow for the possibility
of higher realms of existence, such as realms of Gods or spirits. This
was a natural corollary of the doctrine of rebirth, for one living the
Eightfold Path may improve his or her station but not achieve the final
enlightenment which would obviate further existences. This person would
then have to be reborn, but would be reborn in a better world. However,
these divine spheres of reality, while better, were still not eternal and
ultimately no more satisfactory than the human sphere.
Nagarjuna devotes three verses to clarifying the fact that divine existences
share the same limitations as human existence.
The thoughts of the soul's eternity or lack thereof were negated above,
and now Nagarjuna negates thoughts of the
universe's temporal eternity or lack thereof and its spatial infinity
or lack thereof. The popular
metaphor of candle flames is here used to illustrate the nature of the
universe's existence. If the flame of one candle is used to ignite the
wick of another candle, and then that newly-ignited candle is used to
ignite a third one, then there is the appearance of a flame passing from
one candle on to the next. It cannot be said that there is one identical
flame passing on, for it is burning on different wicks, using different
fuel sources, and in different times. Yet neither can there said to be three
different flames, for there is an obvious continuity from one to the next.
In the same way are the elements of which the universe is composed. The
universe cannot be said to end, because continuity is observed in the series
of dependently-arising elements. Nor can it be said to endure, because each
entity in each moment is composed of different elements. Finally, the spatial
extension of the universe cannot be theorized about in any way. "It is not
possible to assert either the finite or the infinite," Nagarjuna concludes.
Note: karika XXVII.28
Nagarjuna has thus far dealt with three of the four unanswerable subjects:
the duration of the self, the relation of the self and the body, and
the temporal duration and spatial extension of the universe. What was left
out of this section was a discussion of the fourth unanswerable, the posthumous
existence or nonexistence of the Tathagata. It may be noted that each of
the above topics was dealt with in earlier sections. It is not entirely
clear why he brought them up again in the final section, but two options
come to mind. First, while the first three topics appear repeatedly in the
previous twenty-six sections, they were usually mentioned in passing. There
was as yet not a unified treatment of each one on its own. This would also
explain why a discussion of the fourth unanswerable was left out of this
section: Nagarjuna did devote an entire section to the nature of the Tathagata,
and it did not need to be treated again. Second, it is likely that Nagarjuna
felt that the tendency to speculate on these matters was so deeply ingrained
in most people and the speculations so misguided that it was worthwhile to
refute them in summary one last time. This view is supported by the statement
with which Nagarjuna closes the Mulamadhyamakakarika:
"I reverently bow to Gautama [the Buddha] who, out of compassion, has
taught the true doctrine in order to relinquish all views."
Note: karika XXVII.30
According to Nagarjuna, then, the Buddha's teachings were wholly for
the sake of precluding metaphysical speculations and providing guidelines
as to what types of views are appropriate.
Thus ends Nagarjuna's major and most influential work. One may perhaps
wish that it ended on a clearer note: the final two sections and, especially,
the final verse seem to raise far more confusion than they settle. Perhaps,
though, this is not a bad thing. The obscurity
of the karika provides for good thesis topics for those students needing
them.
The Philosophy of Madhyamika
In the previous chapter an attempt was made to present and explain
the main themes of each section of Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamakakarika. It
is hoped that this was accomplished with clarity, and that the reader
now has a cursory grasp of the karika, its themes, and its method of argumentation.
The reasons for and implications of focusing solely on the karika to
present Madhyamika thought should be repeated here. This work represents
the core of the entire school. Though Nagarjuna wrote somewhere between
thirteen and one hundred other texts, and though his commentators were numerous
and disparate, and though the possible interpretations of the meaning and
intent of Madhyamika thought are quite varied, nonetheless one can point
to this work as being both the sole cornerstone of the school's philosophy
and the vital influence which literally provided the school with its very
life-breath. Choosing this work alone may present a limited understanding
of the mind and intent of Nagarjuna (e.g. it will shed no light on the question
of whether Nagarjuna was a Theravadin or a Mahayanist) and it certainly
will not illuminate the subsequent developments of Madhyamika thought in
all its variety. What a focus on this work alone will provide is the purest
and cleanest possible presentation of the fundamentals of the school.
Note: The Buddhist tradition agrees that this is the place of this
treatise, for the work became known as ``The Fundamentals of the Middle
[Way].''
A disclaimer must be forwarded in advance: it must be cautioned that
any exposition of Nagarjuna's thought ultimately must be somewhat tentative.
The terse form of the treatise's verses, their often cryptic quality,
and the subtlety of the thought of both the Buddha and Nagarjuna all conspire
to prevent any final certainties about what exactly Nagarjuna's philosophy
was. Moreover, it is not always clear which of Nagarjuna's verses were
meant to be an opponent's position which he then refuted, and which represented
Nagarjuna's own position. Translators and interpreters of the karika,
ancient and modern, frequently disagree on whether any specific verse
is meant to be the right view being defended or the wrong view being negated.
The above difficulties have not prevented books from being written which
claim to offer definitive interpretations of Nagarjuna and Madhyamika — -on
the contrary, it seems that most commentaries and studies have claimed
to be conclusive. Such allegations of certainty must be suspected even
if only because the studies in question often have arrived at quite diverse
interpretations. This necessary caveat aside, a discussion of the main elements
and significances of Madhyamika thought as expressed in the karika will
now be offered.
The primary themes of Madhyamika thought as detailed in the karika
are three :
- the refutation of self-nature (svabhava),
- the examination of dependent arising
pratitya samutpada),
- and the teaching of emptiness sunyata).
These three are implicitly examined throughout the entire treatise,
but were never isolated and scrutinized on their own. There was, it is true,
a separate section devoted to each of self-nature and dependent arising,
but these sections scarcely exhausted the topics nor even attempted to explain
their full significance. The reason these three were not made explicit
in Nagarjuna's treatise is that they were not simply three subjects among
many which he wanted to investigate. Rather, they
are the very substrata on which Madhyamika is based.
- Self-nature runs
throughout the karika as the insidious nemesis of Buddhist philosophy.
A refutation of it was the initial inspiration for this treatise, for
all false philosophical positions are based on its often subtle influence.
- Dependent arising
is the chief causal principle and is as well the shaping factor of the
severe use of dialectics for which Madhyamika is so famous. It was a unique
interpretation of dependent arising by Nagarjuna that provided the means
by which to refute self-nature.
- Interpreting causation in such a way as to preclude self- nature
led Nagarjuna to emphasize emptiness
, the concept for which he is most famous. If no entities, events,
or personalities have self-nature, then they are "empty." Emptiness is
the closest that the otherwise apophatic Madhyamika comes to advancing a
doctrinal tenet. It is the only possible description
of the ontological status of the world, and it is as well the sword which
the Madhyamika uses to slash through all false views and counter all opposition.
(Dependent arising is not a cataphatic assertion:
it is a description, an abstract theory.) Now that a broad outline of the
karika and its surface themes has been presented, these three all-pervading
and heretofore largely tacit topics may be examined. Their significance
will be shown to be profound and subtle and their ramifications vast.
Chapter 5
The Philosophy of Madhyamika
In the previous chapter an attempt was made to present and explain
the main themes of each section of Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamakakarika. It
is hoped that this was accomplished with clarity, and that the reader now
has a cursory grasp of the karika, its themes, and its method of argumentation.
The reasons for and implications of focusing solely on the karika to present
Madhyamika thought should be repeated here. This work represents the core
of the entire school. Though Nagarjuna wrote somewhere between thirteen
and one hundred other texts, and though his commentators were numerous
and disparate, and though the possible interpretations of the meaning and
intent of Madhyamika thought are quite varied, nonetheless one can point
to this work as being both the sole cornerstone of the school's philosophy
and the vital influence which literally provided the school with its very
life-breath. Choosing this work alone may present a limited understanding
of the mind and intent of Nagarjuna (e.g. it will shed no light on the question
of whether Nagarjuna was a Theravadin or a Mahayanist) and it certainly
will not illuminate the subsequent developments of Madhyamika thought in
all its variety. What a focus on this work alone will provide is the purest
and cleanest possible presentation of the fundamentals of the school.
Note: The Buddhist tradition agrees that this is the place of this
treatise, for the work became known as ``The Fundamentals
of the Middle [Way].''
A disclaimer must be forwarded in advance: it must be cautioned that
any exposition of Nagarjuna's thought ultimately must be somewhat tentative.
The terse form of the treatise's verses, their often cryptic quality, and
the subtlety of the thought of both the Buddha and Nagarjuna all conspire
to prevent any final certainties about what exactly Nagarjuna's philosophy
was. Moreover, it is not always clear which of Nagarjuna's verses were meant
to be an opponent's position which he then refuted, and which represented
Nagarjuna's own position. Translators and interpreters of the karika, ancient
and modern, frequently disagree on whether any specific verse is meant to
be the right view being defended or the wrong view being negated. The above
difficulties have not prevented books from being written which claim to
offer definitive interpretations of Nagarjuna and Madhyamika — -on the contrary,
it seems that most commentaries and studies have claimed to be conclusive.
Such allegations of certainty must be suspected even if only because the
studies in question often have arrived at quite diverse interpretations.
This necessary caveat aside, a discussion of the main elements and significances
of Madhyamika thought as expressed in the karika will now be offered.
The primary themes of Madhyamika thought
as detailed in the karika are three:
- the refutation of self-nature
(svabhava),
- the examination of dependent
arising pratitya samutpada),
- and the teaching of emptiness
sunyata).
These three are implicitly examined throughout the entire treatise,
but were never isolated and scrutinized on their own. There was, it is
true, a separate section devoted to each of self-nature and dependent arising,
but these sections scarcely exhausted the topics nor even attempted to explain
their full significance. The reason these three were not made explicit in
Nagarjuna's treatise is that they were not simply three subjects among many
which he wanted to investigate. Rather,
they are the very substrata on which Madhyamika is based.
- Self-nature runs throughout
the karika as the insidious nemesis of Buddhist philosophy. A refutation
of it was the initial inspiration for this treatise, for all false philosophical
positions are based on its often subtle influence.
- Dependent arising
is the chief causal principle and is as well the shaping factor of the
severe use of dialectics for which Madhyamika is so famous. It was a unique
interpretation of dependent arising by Nagarjuna that provided the means
by which to refute self-nature.
- Interpreting causation in such a way as to preclude self- nature
led Nagarjuna to emphasize emptiness
, the concept for which he is most famous. If no entities, events,
or personalities have self-nature, then they are "empty." Emptiness is
the closest that the otherwise apophatic Madhyamika comes to advancing
a doctrinal tenet. It is the only possible description
of the ontological status of the world, and it is as well the sword which
the Madhyamika uses to slash through all false views and counter all opposition.
(Dependent arising is not a cataphatic assertion: it is a description,
an abstract theory.) Now that a broad outline of the karika and its surface
themes has been presented, these three all-pervading and heretofore largely
tacit topics may be examined. Their significance will be shown to be profound
and subtle and their ramifications vast.
Nagarjuna's Motivation and Mission
The Dedicatory Verses
Nagarjuna appears to have been motivated
by two factors.
- First, certain interpretations
of the Buddha's teachings had been proposed with which he disagreed. A careful reading of the karika points to
the notion of self-nature as being his primary focus. This
was not simply a metaphysical doctrine which Nagarjuna disagreed with. The
notion of self-nature with all its ramifications would have far-reaching
repercussions on the Buddha's philosophy, calling into question the applicability
of the Eightfold Path, the veracity of the four Noble Truths, and the
attainability of nirvana.
- The second motivation both caused and explains
the first — - Nagarjuna was a devout Buddhist. It was paramount to him to defend the Buddha's teaching
against all misinterpretations, to clarify the teachings for his fellow
Buddhists, and to spread the teaching to those outside the community.
Note: The rather antinomian character of much of later Buddhism
tends to disguise these two aspects of early Buddhism which many Buddhists
today, especially in America, would find unappealing:
- One, the Buddha's teaching was basically fundamentalist
in requiring "right views" before anything else. The only right view is
the Saddharma, the Buddha's "True Law." Granted, the right view is a "moderate"
view, but this does not negate its dogmatism.
- Two, Buddhism was one of the most missionary- and
conversion-oriented religions in world history, second only to Christianity.
(On the latter, cf. Kulke and Rothermund, 64-67) Nagarjuna's devotional
attitude and his dedicatory verses of the karika will be discussed first,
and a detailed treatment of self-nature will follow.
It cannot be stressed too much that Nagarjuna was, first and foremost,
a Buddhist. This devotional attitude does not necessarily shed light on
the philosophy of Madhyamika, but it was the dominant reason for Nagarjuna
to write the treatise. The karika opens with a two-verse dedication to the
Buddha, it contains almost twenty direct invocations of the Buddha variously
extolled as the Supreme Ascetic, the Victorious One, the Perfectly Enlightened
One, and the Blessed One, and it closes with Nagarjuna saying "I reverently
bow to Gautama who, out of compassion, has taught the true doctrine."
Note: karika XXVII.30
This aspect of Nagarjuna seems to be overlooked curiously often by
modern scholars. His work tends to be treated as a philosophical system
based on ratiocination and expounded solely for the purpose of clearing
up misunderstandings. This is true, but it is not the whole picture. Nagarjuna's
frequent homages to the Buddha display his devotional attitude, and the
volume of hymns and devotional literature attributed to him demonstrate
that the Buddhist tradition did not see him in such a purely philosophical
light. He was also seen as an apologist motivated by faith and greatly concerned
with the dissemination of the Buddha's word.
Nagarjuna's religious piety and his trenchant philosophy are in no
way contradictory. This harmony between his faith and his intellect is
expressed by the
two dedicatory verses with which he opens
the karika:
"I salute him, the
fully-enlightened, the best of speakers,
who preached the non-ceasing
and the non-arising,
the non- annihilation and
the non-permanence,
the non-identity and the
non- difference,
the non-appearance and the
non-disappearance,
the dependent arising,
the appeasement of obsessions
and the auspicious."
Note: karika, introductory verses
This introduction demonstrates, not only that
Nagarjuna's faith and intellect are not contradictory, but that they
are complementary. The soteriological path of the Buddha both
explains and engenders the rational dialectical philosophy of Nagarjuna.
These laconic verses may at first sight seem to express little
more than a simple rejection of extremes. In actuality, their significance
is great, for they summarize,
in a mere eighteen words (in Sanskrit), the entirety of the Madhyamika
philosophical approach. All of the philosophical
aspects contained in these verses have been or will be discussed at length
elsewhere in this thesis. Notwithstanding, since Nagarjuna saw fit to
state them in a preview to his work, so shall they be briefly explained
here.
- First, the Buddha is extolled
as the fully enlightened (sambuddhah). This, obviously, immediately
tells the reader what religious system is going to be explained in the
following treatise, but it also encapsulates the soteriological goal, "full
enlightenment."
- The Buddha is then credited with preaching
the "non- ceasing" and the "non-arising" and, later, "dependent arising."
These three terms state a sort of table of contents, but their
significance is far greater. They
detail, in a mere three words, the full Madhyamika interpretation of dependent
arising.
- Early Buddhist schools saw
dependent arising as the mutual conditioning of interrelated elements
and events. These elements and events were seen as being mutually conditioned
but still real in themselves.
- The Madhyamika school
gave a wholly new twist to dependent arising, stating that,
if mutually conditioned, elements and events can not be real. Things
are thus not explained by ceasing and arising, but are characterized as
non-ceasing and non-arising. Seen this way, one
could almost call Nagarjuna's theory "non-dependent non-arising." The fact
that the normal casual order is reversed in this pair further foreshadows
the subversionary method so peculiar to Madhyamika.
- Two more pairs flesh out Nagarjuna's interpretation of dependent
arising: "non- annihilation and non-permanence"
and "non-appearance and non- disappearance."
- As things arise dependently, they
cannot have any real temporal location.
- They cannot be annihilated,
for they were never really originated.
- Nor can they be permanent,
for this would require that they
have self-nature, an assertion that does not withstand logical analysis.
- The perceiving and conceptual reifying faculties of the individual
are illuminated by the non-appearance and non-disappearance of things.
This pair shows that the existence
of things is illusory, and hence any perceptions of them are
evanescent and imputations of existence to them are false.
- Any conceptions that are held must be based on thoughts of identity
and difference. E.g., "I" am different from this "desk" which is front
of me; only thus can there be a subject relating to it as a different object.
Further, I know that there is a "me," for I have identity — the me who
existed last night is identical to the me who exists today.
Since the Buddha taught "non-identity and non-difference,"
all such thoughts are wrong.
- Finally, these introductory verses point out
the means of salvation, which are
"the appeasement of obsessions and the auspicious." By abandoning
clinging to obsessions, that is, one finds the auspicious, the good (siva).
One finds enlightenment. The fact that Nagarjuna did not state his dedication
to the Buddha and then follow it separately with the above summary of Madhyamika
thought shows that his devotional attitude and his philosophical agenda
are wholly intertwined.
Self-Nature Theories
The concept of self-nature, svabhava
, has been repeatedly discussed in passing in the above three chapters.
It has not yet been examined in isolation because Nagarjuna did not present
a single, comprehensive presentation of it in the karika. He did devote
section fifteen to an "Examination of Self-nature," but this presentation
of it was not exhaustive.
In it he only discussed three aspects
of self- nature theories:
- the character of svabhava as necessarily
non-made and independent (karika XV.1-3),
- the fact that svabhava cannot be related
to thoughts of existence or non-existence (XV.4-5, 8-11),
- and the incompatibility of svabhava with
the Buddha's teachings (XV.6-7).
The full significance of self-nature is hinted
at by the fact that the karika can be seen as being structured around a
discussion of self-nature.
The first fourteen sections of the treatise dealt mostly with refutations
of certain Realist interpretations of the elements and factors comprising
objective, external reality. For example, examinations in the first half
of the work were of causes and conditions pratyayas), elements, action,
and the conglomerating relations and forces. The placement of this important
section near the middle of the treatise, instead of at the beginning, hints
that a clarification and refutation of self- nature concludes this examination
of the elements and factors of reality.
The sections of the treatise following this seem to deal more with
an examination of the individual and his or her internal subjective reality.
For example, examinations following it are of bondage and release, self
and time, enlightenment and hindrances thereto, and right and wrong views.
It was necessary for Nagarjuna to have refuted notions of self- nature before
he could examine these latter issues.
Non-Buddhist Notions of Self-nature and the Soul
The three aspects of self-nature theories discussed in section fifteen
seemingly were chosen because they were of the most direct relevance in
the theories Nagarjuna was refuting and the teachings he was upholding in
the treatise. What he did not discuss, then, and for obvious reasons, was
a more sympathetic account of self- nature, i.e. the reasons it
was formulated as a concept in the first place, what the theory meant, and
what problems it solved.
The concept had a long history of usage and a variety of meanings throughout
that history.
There were definite reasons for some schools of thought, Buddhist and
otherwise, to posit self-nature.
Further, there are more significances of the concept which Nagarjuna
did not as explicitly touch upon; these significances were only implicit
in his refutation of the concept.
A brief discussion of the history of
the concept, reasons for its assertion, and its significance needs to be
taken up now. This is not an irrelevant aside, but is
important for two reasons.
- First, a fuller understanding of self- nature theories
will shed greater light on Nagarjuna's enterprise.
- Second, it will demonstrate the ground for his
philosophy. The two most important concepts
of Nagarjuna's philosophy, dependent arising and emptiness, will only make
sense against the backdrop of the theories he was criticizing.
One cannot point to a conclusive beginning of self-nature theories.
Surely, they were first posited whenever individuals reflected on the fact
that there is a causal regularity between events and an apparent continuity
of identity in individuals and things.
By the time of the early classical period in India,
two distinct camps of self-nature theories had
become clear:
- a) those of orthodox
Hinduism (1),
- b) and those of the three
heterodoxical systems of
- Materialism (2),
- Jainism (3),
- and Buddhism (4).
The central fact agreed upon by
almost all of Hinduism (1) is
the reality of an eternal, immutable, immanent soul, the atman. This led Hinduism to assert the reality
of self-nature in one form or another.
For example, Aghamarsana, one of the earliest Hindu philosophers, considered
"warmth" to be the first
creative principle. From this primal warmth originated, respectively,
law, truth, darkness, water, time, and finally the physical universe.
The Sankhya-Yoga system later postulated
a general material principle (prakrti) which was the
primal cause of the universe and from which all else evolved.
- Theistic interpretations of the above posited
a primum mobilum which initiated the causal process,
- and nontheistic interpretations declared that the primal matter
contained an inherent energy
which obviated the need for a primum mobilum.
Note: ibid., 7
Either way, though, it was clear that the omnipresence
and the eternality of the soul declared that nothing really new could
come into existence; all change was, in some form or another, based on
self-nature.
Note: The Nyaya-Vaisesika theory of asatkaryvada is not an exception
to this, for the effect, while empirically a new creation, is nonetheless
potential in and hence inherent in the cause. Cf. Hiriyanna, 239
The "Materialist" philosophies
of the early classical period (2) were even more
clear about the reality and function of self-nature, for they denied the
existence both of controlling, inner soul and of a transcendent primum mobilum.
"Without doubt," says Kalupahana, "it was the Materialists
who first put forward a systematic theory of inherent nature svabhava)."
Note: Kalupahana 1975, 28 <
Since the regularity of causation
could be attributed neither to a God nor to an inner soul,
only inherent self- nature could be invoked to account for it. This
self-nature became elevated to the status of
fixed, universal law: self-nature is the only determinant of
and force behind causation. Since self-nature
took the place of both the soul and God for the Materialists, they were
often grouped under the broad heading of Svabhava-vada, the "School of Self-
nature."
Note: cf. Hiriyanna, 103- 106<
Generally speaking, they held that
only matter is real. Any forms of life or consciousness are byproducts of material forces,
the theory of hylozoism. These material elements have an inherent nature
which manifests itself in a fixed pattern of causation. Since sentience
is epiphenomenal and self-nature invariable,
free will is necessarily an illusion.
The main difference between Hindu svabhava
and Materialist svabhava boils down to morality.
- First, the Hindu was more transcendental. The eternal
all-pervasiveness of atman required that nothing really new come into
existence — -causal change was always ultimately superficial. The Hindu
tradition emphasized the spiritual quality of ultimate reality, a corollary
of which was that morality is real. One's action determined one's fate,
and so it was paramount to make causality and self-nature two halves of
the same coin. The Bhagavad- Gita summarizes
well the connections between self- nature and morality in Hinduism. Its
final chapter states clearly that each person has a self-nature which determines
his or her duties in life. Each of the four castes
is said to have its own intrinsic nature, svabhava, which prescribes
specific duties incumbent upon each person. One can only obtain freedom
by properly living out and manifesting one's svabhava.
Note: Cf. Bhagavad-Gita, XVIII.40-48
- The Materialist
recognizes no such transcendent self-nature, for
self- nature is a blind physical force found in the material elements
only.
Religion then boils down only to morality, and morality in turn reduces
to simple hedonism. One text defines heaven
as nothing more than "eating delicious food, keeping company of young women,
using fine clothes," etc.
Note: Sarvasiddhantasamgraha
9, in Radhakrishnan and Moore, 235
Certain Materialists did at least elevate morality to include cultural
cultivation, discipline, and education, but this was for no other reason
but to develop a greater capacity to enjoy the world's delights.
Note: Satischandra Chatterjee
and Dhirendramohan Datta, An Introduction to Indian Philosophy (Calcutta:
University of Calcutta, 1960), 69
Morality is
further obviated by the complete absence of free will in certain
of these Materialist systems. The text quoted above declares that
even one's potential for pleasure is determined by the lifeless self-nature:
"A person is happy or miserable through [the
laws of] nature: there is no other cause."
Jainism (3)
, whose founder was a contemporary of the Buddha,
adopted a middle ground between the above two opposing theories. The Hindus held a modalistic philosophy; they saw the universe as
nothing but modes of the living atman. The Materialists saw the universe
as nothing but manifestations of non-living matter.
The Jains attempted to reconcile the two by
postulating a living being with a soul acting in a universe comprised of
non-living matter, space and fate (karma).
Both permanence (spirit) and change (matter) are equally real. This led
to what seems to be the rather confusing
doctrine that "things are partly
determined and partly undetermined," that both determinism and free will
are real and operative.
Note: Kalupahana 1975, 50<
As might be expected from this, they attempted
to both accept and deny self-nature. This was accomplished by asserting
that, on one hand, individual human exertion was capable of effecting change.
On the other hand, past extrinsic karma caused the individual to become
associated with a deterministic type of self-nature.
The Buddha's Theory of Soullessness
The Buddhist theory of
self-nature (4), both in its original formulation
and its later developments, is unlike any of the above three. There are
few references to self- nature to be found in the
early Buddhist writings. This is not because the Buddha
was unaware of or was ignoring the issue, but because
he saw self- nature as included in the larger issue of selfhood (atman)
as a whole. About this, he had very clear teachings.
Any ideas of self are false and imaginary beliefs which have no objective
ground. Further, the illusory beliefs in self-hood are the direct cause of
selfishness, craving, and greed. "In short," says Buddhist scholar Walpola
Rahula, "to this false view can be traced all the evil in the world."
Note: Rahula, 51
However, and this is crucial,
the Buddha also taught that one must not conceive of the self as non-existent.
He clearly stated that there is no self, but he did not intend for
this to be interpreted as a negation of something that once existed.
An anecdote will explain this
apparent ambivalence between denying and asserting the soul.
The Buddha was once asked by his disciple Vacchagottagotta whether
or not there was a self. The Buddha declined to answer, and the disciple
left. He later explained his refusal to respond:
"If I had answered 'There is a self,' [that would not have been] in
accordance with my knowledge that all things are without self… If I had
answered 'There is no self,' then that would have been a greater confusion
to the already confused Vacchagottagotta. For he would have thought: 'Formerly
indeed I had a self, but now I haven't got one.'"
Note: quoted in ibid.,
62-3.
The Buddha's dilemma is the same as that presented by the famous,
albeit distasteful, joke from Western philosophy: ``Have you stopped beating
your wife yet?'' As soon as one attempts to answer the question, one is
forced to give misleading information. The only escape is to refrain from
answering.
- The Buddha was thus careful not to be too adamant about either
answer. Saying that there is a self would
lead people to interpret him as being eternalist
, i.e. asserting the eternal atman of Hinduism.
The moral result of eternalism is selfishness
and, ultimately, excessive desires.
- Saying that there is no self would lead
people to interpret him as being annihilationist,
i.e. denying any sort of self-hood in the same way that the Materialists
denied it.
The moral result of annihilationism is
a state of distress over losing that which one believes one now has and,
further, annihilationism would undermine moral accountability.
- Neither could the Buddha say that there
both is and is not a soul, for that would echo
the Jaina theory.
Morally, he probably saw the Jaina fatalistic
determinism as another threat to accountability; if one's nature and actions
are determined as inexorably by previous karma as the Jains held, then
the efficacy of individual initiative is greatly lessened.
A few hundred years after the Buddha's
death some schools undertook the task of systematizing
his ontology in the face of his teaching of anatman, soullessness. The
result was the Abhidharma
, a classificatory analysis of human experience into physical elements,
sense- faculties, and the aggregates comprising the individual.
In this process of analysis,
two old pre-Buddhist theories crept back in:
- self-nature (svabhava
) and
- other-nature (
parabhava ).
It was in response to these
insidious heresies that Nagarjuna formulated his refutation of the two.
- 4.1 Theories of self-nature
found their host in the Realist (
Sarvastivada ) school.
- 4.2 Theories of other- nature
found a host in the "Sutra School" (
Sautrantika), so called because they saw themselves
as being the most faithful to the original writings, the sutras.
The Realists (4.1)
reduced all phenomena to ultimate atomistic
entities.
The systematization of these atoms and the relations between them was
complete enough to account for all phenomenal things, events, and individuals
without any recourse to theories of a transcendent self, such as atman.
However, since these atoms were irreducible and discrete, both temporally
and spatially,
- there remained a difficulty of accounting
for the influencing effect of one momentary atom on another.
- Further, the perceived continuity of existence was not fully
explained.
- To resolve these difficulties, the
Realists asserted that each atom has its own self- nature.
- However, since these atoms are the ultimate building blocks
of reality, and since each has self- nature, they
cannot be associated with arising and ceasing. As such, they must
exist in all three phases of time, past, present, and future. It is not
clear how exactly the atoms can be momentary but their self-nature eternal.
It seems that the phenomenal manifestation of an atom is but momentary,
while the potential existence of an atom and its eternal character, its self-nature,
are trans-temporal.
Such a self-nature may not have been explicitly contrary to the Buddha's
teachings, but it seemed to other schools of Buddhism to come dangerously
close to the Hindu atman-theories which the Buddha was assuredly and clearly
negating.
Note: Kalupahana 1986, 32
In response to these theories which seemed to border on heresy, a group
of monks split off of the Realists around 150 C.E.
Note: Kohn, 189
This, the "Sutra School,"
(4.2) intended to reject the heresies of the Realists
and return to the original Buddhism as found in the earliest scriptures.
They denied
the eternal self-nature of the otherwise momentary atoms by going to
the other extreme of denying the atoms any temporal duration. They did
not merely confine the atom to existence in the present alone, but literally
reduced its duration to zero. A result of this nontemporal instantaneity
was that the atoms could have no spatial extension, either.
The atoms were seen as arising
and perishing in the same instant. Since the atoms partook of neither
time nor space, their causal efficiency was negated. Causation was not
denied, for regular continuity of phenomena was observed to exist. However,
the all-but-nonexistent atoms had no such power to influence or cause. There
was thus seen to be a difference between cause and effect, and
the Sutra School was forced to recognize other-nature, parabhava.
Note: Kalupahana 1986, 23 <
The "other" in their other-nature
was the series of atoms of which any one atom was a part. The atoms succeed
one another in a contiguous, uninterrupted sequence. While no atom on
its own lasts long enough to have causal efficacy, the series of atoms
does last long enough to influence other atomic series.
It is the self-nature
of one series, which series is "other" than each atom within it, that interacts
with and conditions pratyayas) other series.
Note: The Sautrantika philosophy of instantaneity led to another,
even more heretical doctrine, which, being unrelated to the topic at hand,
was not mentioned above. Briefly, the Sautrantikas were another school of
Personalists. If an atom is infinitesimally short-lived, then it cannot
be perceived directly. The act of perception would have to be once-removed
from the object of perception. Yet perception exists. To account for this,
consciousness was seen as underlying and supporting all phenomena. This consciousness
creates from succession the illusion of continuity. This illusion is self-conscious,
and a subtle self comes to be.
Nagarjuna's Response
(A. IT WOULD BE CONTRARY TO
BUDDHA'S TEACHING — IT IS A MISTAKE)
Nagarjuna's position seems to be that
the above two schools were led to posit a form of self-nature because they
took the Abhidharma agenda of analysis too far. By so enthusiastically
making lists of all the elements and factors by which the Buddha explained
reality and drawing correspondences and relations between these factors
they failed to realize that, though the Buddha explained his philosophy using
such conceptions as psychophysical aggregates, material elements, and sense
perceptions, he was not reifying these factors. Such
elements and factors provided for a complete description of reality, but
they were not intended to be taken as real. They are all dependently-arisen,
not autonomous. Further, the doctrine of momentariness, as explained above,
led the Realists to posit the existence of self-nature in all three phases
of time and led the Sutra School to deny any temporal duration to the elements.
But this notion of momentariness is not to be found in the Buddha's teachings,
either. Nagarjuna's position is that, had
these schools understood dependent arising in the right way, they would not
have been led to hold such beliefs.
Nagarjuna's attitude towards
self-nature is wholly explained by one fact: the theory of dependent arising
necessarily upholds the Buddha's doctrine of soullessness (anatman), which
soullessness can never be compatible with self-nature theories.
(B. IT CONDUCT TO CONTRADICTION)
The self-nature of a thing is
its "identity," that which makes it unique, autonomous,
and differentiable from any and every other thing.
The meaning of identity can be illuminated by examples from the English
language. If someone points to me and asks "Who is that?" and they are told
"That is Jonah Siegel,"
then I have been "identified." I have been distinguished solely on the basis
of my "identity."
Further, this identity requires temporal
identical-ness. For the person who is now reading this to have
an identity, that person must at this moment be identical to the person
who got out of bed this morning, and both must be identical to that person
who was born one year or fifty years earlier.
Identity theories therefore require that
there be an enduring and unchanging substance residing within the entity,
event, or individual being identified. If
a substance either changed or did not endure, then it would not be identical
from one moment to the next, and thus would not have identity, and thus
could not be self-nature.
Nagarjuna saw that self-nature,
by necessity, must have two qualities:
- it must be unchanging
(i)
- and it must be enduring
(ii).
- The Buddha's theory of dependent arising, however, is incompatible
with such identity on both accounts.
- First, as explained above, self-nature must be
unchanging (i) and identical from one moment
to the next.
However, it would then never be associated with change, and cause-and-effect
would be meaningless.
"Because of the perception of change,
the absence of self- nature is [recognized]," says Nagarjuna.
FOOTNOTE:
karika XIII.3
The example he used previously to deny change of identity
was that a person cannot be said to age. Who
is it that ages, the young person? No, for youthfulness and agedness cannot
exist in the same identity. Is it the old person who ages? No, for an old
person is already aged, and thus cannot again partake of the process of
aging.
Note: Cf. karika XIII.4
Is the person distinct from the discrete
process of aging, which process is a mere temporal attribute of the enduring
subject? No, for then subject and attribute would be separate and individually
autonomous. Aging would exist as an abstraction apart from any thing that
ages, and the subject would exist but have no association with either youthfulness
nor agedness, and would thus be equally abstract. Thus, if a thing has self-nature
as a sort of substance, then that thing can never participate in change
or, by extension, causality. A tempting alternative would be to posit a
distinction between a thing's identity and its substantial self-nature.
This is wrong for two reasons. One, such a distinction is meaningless.
Self-nature is identity, and vice-versa. Two, if a thing's identity and its
self- nature were distinguished, then it would have to be said to have "other-nature."
This is metaphysical nonsense, and Nagarjuna repeatedly makes it clear
that, without self- nature, there can be no such thing as other-nature.
- The second quality of self-nature is that it must be
eternally enduring (ii), for its autonomy would
require that it not be causally conditioned. "The
occurrence of self- nature through causes and conditions (pratyayas) is not
proper," declared Nagarjuna.
Note: karika XV.1
If self-nature arose due to a cause or through the influence of
conditions (pratyayas), then it would be artificial, it would be made.
But "how could self-nature be made?"
Note: karika XV.2
If made, it would be at least partially
dependent and self-nature, by definition, is independent. If made,
its identity would be potentially or explicitly in its cause, its maker.
One may object that it is still theoretically possible to declare self-nature
to be eternal and unmade, and thus a real and autonomous identity. A Buddhist
would say that there are two philosophical problems with such eternalism.
(There is a moral one, too: see below.) One, no such unmade identity is
evident. The Buddha saw that the nature of all conditioned things is transitory
and he announced this transitoriness. Asserting eternalism contradicts
the Buddha's enlightened observation. Two, such an eternal identity would
be pure metaphysical speculation. If eternal, it would be uncaused and
unconditioned, and wholly autonomous. As such, it could have absolutely
no influencing effects on the rest of the universe, and so it could never
be known. The theoretical denial of self-nature is further upheld by an
empirical fact: self-nature is never observed to exist, and so its assertion
must be pure metaphysical speculation. The very third verse in the treatise
states "the self-nature of existents is not evident."
(C. IT IS
NOT SEEN BY BUDDHAS AND BODHISATTVAS)
Note: karika I.3 The
Buddha, with all of his perspicacity and philosophical acuity,
who was "adept in existence as well as in non-existence,"
said that he found there to be no substantial identity in things.
Even Nagarjuna, who did not
claim to have the same enlightened wisdom as the Buddha, observed the empirical
evidence that self- nature is simply not found to exist. It is na vidyate,
"not seen."
Those who do claim to perceive immutable
and eternal identity are simply myopic, filtering their perceptions through
defilements, grasping, and dispositions.
"Those who perceive self-nature as well
as other-nature, existence as well as non- existence, they do not perceive
the truth embodied in the Buddha's message."
Note: karika XV.6
As mentioned, a supranatural transcendent identity could be posited theoretically
but, as explained above, this theory could never leave the realm of pure
speculation, and so is pointless.
(D.
IT WOULD LEAD TO IMMORALITY)
The final reason that Nagarjuna refuted
self-nature theories is the moral one.
- The potential of things to change and to
be changed is prerequisite for personal growth, change, and escaping from
suffering.
- If one's substantial identity were immutable,
then change would obviously be simply superficial.
- For one to escape suffering by changing
and appeasing the defilements, self- nature must necessarily be mutable.
Note: The common Vedantic solution to this is that,
since one's substantial nature (atman) is immutable and eternal, the defilements
are but adventitious and temporal.
Change is not change of substance, but change of the accidentals; bondage
is removable because it is extrinsic. A Madhyamika response to this likely
would be that, if truly extrinsic, the adventitious elements could never
really affect or bind the substance. More drastic, a person is only confined
to the cycle of birth-and-death if he or she has dispositions like passionate
attraction and aversion and if he or she grasps onto these passions or
grasps onto existence itself. If things had self-nature, then these dispositions
and graspings would themselves have self-nature. Since self- nature is
unchanging, then the dispositions and grasping themselves would be permanent,
unappeasable, and eternally binding. One could never break free from them,
and enlightenment could never be found.
(E.
IT WOULD BE IMCOMPATIBLE WITH CAUSATION, AND THE PATH)
Note: Cf. karika XXII.9 <
Finally, self-nature would be incompatible with causation
, an individual's ability to effect real change would be impossible, all
moral action would be nullified, and the Buddha's path would
become meaningless. "If you perceive the existence of the existents
in terms of self-nature, then you will… contradict [the notions of] effect,
cause, agent, performance of action, activity, arising, ceasing, as well
as fruit [i.e. the results of moral action]," Nagarjuna concludes.
Dependent Arising, the Foundation of Madhyamika
Dependent Arising as a Central Notion in Buddhism
The Buddha's theory of dependent arising
has an immediately obvious significance — -
it is the only positive ontological theory expounded by the Buddha.
The formulations of the four Noble Truths
and the Eightfold Path are of course positive teachings, but
they are not really philosophical dogmas. They are descriptions
of the condition of humankind, the ultimate goal of humankind, and teachings
about how to achieve that goal.
Only dependent arising describes
- the ontic status of the universe (dependence),
- its mode of creation (dispositions conditioned
by ignorance),
- its future fate (the appeasement of dispositions
which reverses the cycle of arising),
- the ontic nature of the individual (impersonal
aggregates conditioned by ignorance),
- and the future fate of the individual
(extinction through enlightenment).
Scholar Gunapala Malalasekera has expressed the status of these various
formulations well in saying that
- "Just as the Four Noble Truths… form
the
heart of the Buddha's teaching,
- so does the doctrine of dependent arising
constitute its backbone."
Note: Gunapala Piyasena Malalasekera, "Aspects of
Reality taught by Theravada Buddhism," in Moore, 78
Dependent arising was likewise of supreme importance for Nagarjuna. As
explained above, Nagarjuna opened his treatise with a dedication that placed
dependent arising at the center of his appreciation of the Buddha and as
central for Madhyamika thought. Indeed, renowned scholar of Buddhism Gadjin
Nagao has gone so far as to say that Nagarjuna
"regarded Sakyamuni as the great master precisely because of his elucidation
of dependent arising."
Note: Gadjin M. Nagao, The Foundational Standpoint
of Madhyamika Philosophy (New York: State University of New York Press,
1989), 5 (italics mine)
As with the above discussion of self- nature, a prefatory presentation
of the doctrine and its development is necessary.
Dependent arising is not a theory that
the Buddha developed, but one that he saw.
As he sat under the Bodhi tree on the night of his full awakening he
discovered the fact of the mutual contingency of all existent things.
This awareness led him to the "threefold knowledge"
that marked his station as one who had achieved full enlightenment
sambuddhah).
- First, he saw, through his new- found knowledge
of dependent arising, the origin of suffering in ignorance
and the end of suffering in wisdom.
- Second, fixing "his mind upon
the chain of causation, in direct and reverse order,"
Note: Mahavagga, quoted in Radhakrishnan 1929, 410
he obtained the knowledge of all of his previous existences. This
provided him with the recollection of his previous actions and their karmic
consequences, enabling him to see that he had lived out all of his accrued
karma and that this would be his last existence.
- Third, having so clearly perceived the origin of the cycle,
he knew with certainty that he had fully erased the binding ignorance,
and would surely never return
to existence. He knew himself to be "Thus Gone;" he was a Tathagata.
A key to the Buddha's teaching is that
he was not the only one privileged to see dependent arising.
Anyone who follows the path he recommended
can realize its nature and workings. More than this, individual
freedom requires that one verify these truths for him- or herself. The
importance of and possibility of perceiving dependent arising is exemplified
by the story of the conversion of Sariputta and Moggallana related in chapter
one, above: all that was needed for each of them to realize nirvana was
to be told " all things that arise will cease."
The duty of the Buddhist
monk who is aware of the Buddha's formulation of dependent arising is
to examine each of the links for him- or herself, discover how they are
conditioned, how they arose, and how they can be ceased.
Note: Warder, 133
This is the key to the Buddhist path. The import of this duty is far
greater than merely verifying one aspect of the Buddha's teachings. Rather,
one who follows this will understand the entirety of the Buddha's teachings,
his "dharma," and, more, one who follows this is guaranteed to see the Buddha
himself. He once said "those who see dependent arising will see the dharma;
those who see the dharma will see dependent arising," and another time
he said "those who see the dharma will see me; those who see me will see
the dharma."
Note: Majjhima-nikaya and Samyutta- nikaya, respectively, quoted
in Nagao, 1991, 104
The Meaning of Dependent arising
There are two main formulations
of dependent arising,
- one general (i)
- and the other specific
(ii).
- In its most
abstract form (i), the theory
holds that
"That being, this
comes to be;
from the arising of
that, this arises;
that being absent,
this is not;
from the cessation
of that, this ceases."
Note: Samyutta-nikaya, quoted in Harvey, 54
- The more specific
formulation (ii) details the process by which links
in the chain arise, one after the other, and which links directly influence
which others. The most common of these specific formulations is the twelve-link
one described in chapter two, but there are minor variations on this.
(SHORT RESUME : NO EXTERNAL LAW, NO SELF-NATURE)
- The crux of all formulations of the theory
is the mutual interdependence of all things.
- Every element is both conditioned and
is a conditioner, so every element is both an effect and a cause.
- There is no transcendent law of cause-and-effect
ruling the process, for there is only a relative "before" and "after,"
only a relative causal sequence.
- On the one hand no element is individually
autonomous, and on the other hand neither is there a higher force ruling
the process.
- Since no thing exists on its own, no thing
is real in itself.
- A thing is dependent on another, then,
not just for its identification, as "tallness" is dependent on "shortness,"
but for its very existence, as the piece of clothing is dependent upon the
threads which constitute it.
(DON'T GET FOOLED BY ITS SUPERFICIAL LOOK)
Thus far, the doctrine of dependent arising may seem clear and obvious.
If so, it is only because one does not yet understand it in all of its implications.
The Buddha's attendant, ananda, once said to his master, "It is surprising,
sir, it is wonderful, sir, how profound this dependent arising is and how
profound is its illumination. Yet it seems to me as if very simple." "Say
not so, ananda, say not so," admonished the Buddha in reply.
Note: Mahanidana Sutra, quoted in Warder, 108
The theory is abstruse and its ramifications vast.
In the eyes of Buddhism, the doctrine
of dependent arising solves all metaphysical philosophical problems.
- Etiology is solved because there is,
not an absolute beginning, but an temporally indeterminate welling
up of mutually-conditioned factors. Since no factor is temporally
prior, as such, the discussions of genesis manage to avoid positing an
absolute beginning without recourse either to a metaphysical entity like
a transcendent God or to causal priority ad infinitum.
- Eschatology is solved because, since
the ultimate end of existence is merely the appeasement of arising
through appeasement of ignorant dispositions, there is no need
to predict apocalypses or nihilistic destruction of existence. Things arose,
but there was no ultimate cause, and things will cease, but there is no
ultimate fate.
- Soteriology is likewise solved; one need not face
either a final Judgment Day nor mere annihilation,
but rather one will just face the self-caused abandonment of equally
self-caused afflicted existence. When ignorance ceases, birth ceases,
and death ceases.
- Karma, metempsychosis, and the nature of the soul
are also all solved without recourse to abstract soul-theories.
- Karma is neither an adventitious elemental defilement,
like it is for the Jains, nor a subtle and transcendental deterministic
fate, like for certain schools of Hinduism. Karma is simply the correlation
between cause and effect. Karma is determined by one's actions and dispositions,
and when one appeases one's dispositions then, when eventually the lingering
effects of prior causes have come to fruition, existence will be no more.
The simple conditioning of one link by another link enables the Buddhist
karma to be determined without being deterministic, and subtle without being
transcendental.
- Reincarnation is similarly solved with no recourse
to atman-theories. Death is conditioned by birth, which is in turn conditioned
by ignorance.
- This contiguous contingency obviates the need to posit a substantial
and transcendently-enduring soul. The perceived existence
and continuity of the individual is likewise explained without recourse
to atman: since the aggregates of the individual arise together, and these
aggregates account for the entire nature of the individual, there is no
need to posit an extraneous metaphysical entity like the self.
- The debate of free will versus determinism is also
solved. There can be no "free" will, for no element of existence is independent.
All things are dependent upon other things, and so is the will. This does
not mean that the universe is bound by inexorable determinism: the Buddha
declared himself to be an upholder of "free action,"
Note: Malalasekera in Moore, 80
for it is one's will in
the form of volitional dispositions which both caused existence in the
first place and will ultimately bring about appeasement and freedom.
Note: That both free will and determinism
are operative in Buddhism's dependent arising is not to be
confused with the compatibility of the two in Jainism. In the former,
neither is ultimately real, but in the latter, both are real.
Two more theories
repugnant to the Buddha, the extremes of eternalism and annihilationism,
are obviated by dependent arising. Nothing is eternal, for,
when a thing's conditioning factors cease, then it will cease. Neither
is anything destined to face destruction in non-existence for, as contingent
upon other things, it was never independently real in the first place.
- Finally, dependent arising solves ontology.
Things are empirically real, for they were arisen. However, they are
not ultimately real, for there is no substance on which they are founded.
There is Becoming, but no Being. Since things are not ultimately real,
the affliction of suffering can be vanquished; if suffering were ultimately
real, then it could never be abolished.
(2 INTERPRETATIONS)
The Abhidharma schools
(1) were the first to offer an interpretation of the doctrine
of dependent arising, but interpretation probably was not their intent.
They understood the doctrine to mean the temporal succession of momentary
and discrete elements (dharmas) which were in themselves real.
They did not see dependent
arising to mean that the elements were only relatively real, but rather
they saw it as describing the interactions between already-existing elements.
The point of the
doctrine dependent arising, they felt, was solely to negate soul-theories,
not to negate the elements themselves.
The Perfection of Wisdom
(Prajnaparamita) (2) writings criticized the Abhidharma
theory of relations as being, not an explanation of dependent arising, but
an interpretation of it, and an interpretation with which they disagreed.
The systematic hierarchy of relations was seen as being no less metaphysical
than the speculative theories of causality which the Buddha was trying to
avoid.
Note: Cf. Kalupahana 1975, 154-155
A further problem
was that, while it was not explicitly wrong to describe the universe as
made up of discrete elements, it was misleading. To isolate an element temporally
was to take a first step towards conceptually reifying that element.
The approach adopted by the Perfection of Wisdom school was to elevate
the theory of dependent arising from the empirical to the conceptual by
formulating a two- truth theory
, a theory later embraced by Nagarjuna.
- i) This approach declared that
the Abhidharma schools saw reality from the standpoint
of lower, conventional truth, and so they saw all as being composed of
real elements which are mutually dependent in terms of causal efficacy.
- ii) The Perfection
of Wisdom, on the other hand, believed themselves to have
access to perfect prajna, "wisdom" (hence the name of this school, Prajnaparamita).
From the standpoint of higher, ultimate truth afforded by such wisdom,
elements were seen as being, not just causally conditioned, but even ontologically
conditioned. That is, the elements did not merely constitute conglomerate
things which, as an assemblage, had no inherent identity and real existence;
moreover, rather, the elements themselves had no inherent identity or
real existence.
The result of this interpretation
of dependent arising is that
- the elements are "empty;" as
dependent arisen,
they are not real and are without
self-nature.- Furthermore,
concepts, too, are unreal.
Note: Santina, 12
All concepts
are based on dualities as "tallness" is dependent on "shortness." The ultimate
implication of this interpretation is a shift from emphasis on logical reasoning,
as evidenced in the Abhidharma, to non-dual intuition, or prajna. This non-dual intuition prefigured Nagarjuna's use of comprehensive
four-fold negations and the later mysticism of Zen.
Note: On the latter, cf. Shunryu Suzuki, "No Dualism,"
in Zen Mind, Beginner's Mind (New York: Weatherhill, 1983), 41-43
In the writings of both the Perfection of Wisdom school and Nagarjuna,
all propositions regarding a subject are negated (e.g. something is, is
not, both is and is not, neither is nor is not), but no alternative proposition
is offered. The only way to
grasp the subject is through non-dual, non-conceptual intuition.
Madhyamika Interpretations and Re-interpretations
The Perfection of Wisdom school of
thought was to have so great an influence on Nagarjuna
that he was even credited with having founded the school.
Note: Cf. chapter three
Indeed, his interpretation of dependent arising is identical with that
of the Perfection of Wisdom. However, while in the former this interpretation
of dependent arising was pervasive but implicit,
Nagarjuna fleshed it out and gave systematization to its implications. In doing so, the notion of dependent arising became radically different
and more profound than it had been in its earlier incarnations. It has been
argued that Nagarjuna instigated
a "Copernican revolution" in both Buddhism and Indian philosophy as a whole
by expanding the meaning of dependent arising from being mere elemental relations
to defining a full dialectical method.
Note: Cf. Murti, 1960, 123-4 and 274.
This may or may not be the case — -it is in no way clear that Nagarjuna
was revolutionizing the philosophy of the Buddha as the Buddha meant it — -but
it is certainly true that Nagarjuna's interpretation of dependent arising
was wholly unlike that of the Buddhism which preceded him.
Briefly, Nagarjuna's interpretation
of dependent arising of elements focused on the nature of each element
on its own.
He found that nothing can
be conceptualized in isolation,
but neither can it be conceptualized
in association.
Two things, if dependently
arisen, can be neither identical nor different.
Yet, the concept of relation
requires that they be both identical and different.
Note: ibid., 138
They must be identified as separate, for, if not separate,
one cannot speak of their relating. A thing cannot interact with itself;
plurality is required. Conversely, they must be identified as not
being different, for, to relate, they must have a connection. If
truly separated, then they can never interact. Water, for example, cannot
interact with burning, and fire cannot interact with freezing. "In identity,"
Nagarjuna points out, "there is no co- existence. That which is associated
does not arise together." That is, if identical, the "co-" of "co-existence"
is meaningless.
Dependent arising requires two distinct elements for there to be relation
and hence arising. Yet, on the other hand, "in discreteness, how can there
be co- existence?"
Note: karika VI.4
That is, if separate, the "co-" doesn't
apply, either, and the relation that is required for arising is again
precluded. The only conclusion is that "whatever arises depending on whatever,
that is not identical nor different from it."
Note: karika XVIII.10
One cannot avoid the above difficulty by positing a type of causality
that is other than dependent arising, such as eternalism or simple
phenomenalism. Things cannot be eternally existing and hence unarisen
for, if they had an eternal identity, then they would be devoid of change,
devoid of action, devoid of all phenomenality, and hence meaningless in
their metaphysicality. Neither can there be a type of causality in which
things are temporally new phenomenal creations for, if the effect is discrete
from its cause, then ultimately it is not connected to the cause and hence
is uncaused. Dependent arising, which explains causation
without recourse either to eternalism or to simple phenomenalism, is the
only coherent theory. As Nagarjuna says in relation to agent and action,
a cause proceeds depending upon its effect and the effect proceeds depending
on the cause. "We do not perceive any other way of establishing [them],"
he says.
The main complication
in thinking of things as independent is self- nature, svabhava.
Any thing that is dependently
arisen, Nagarjuna said, must be without self-nature, incapable of being
isolated and, ultimately, not even real.
Maria Ruth Hibbets, a recent thesis student of Madhyamika, has clarified
the incompatibility of self- nature and
relativity with a most apt analogy.
Seeking to discover the essential meaning of a word, i.e. its one true
and unique meaning, one looks up the word in a dictionary. Here one finds
a series of relations, e.g. X is like Y, unlike Z, etc. Still wanting to
pinpoint the word's identity, one looks up the secondary relational words
Y and Z, where entirely new sets of relations are given. One could continue
ad nauseam and never find the word's essence, its svabhava. It is only defined
in relation to other words, all of which are likewise without self- nature.
Note: Maria Ruth Hibbets, "An Investigation into
the Negative Dialectics of Nagarjuna and Candrakirti" (Bachelor's thesis,
Reed College, 1991), 20
The constituents of existence are both brought into manifestation and
defined in the same way — -they have neither essential nor empirical independence,
but can only arise and be defined in relation to other constituents.
Had the earlier Buddhists not analyzed reality into discrete momentary
elements, Nagarjuna likely would not have responded by so drastically
disproving the reality of elements in themselves. It was in the light
of these self-nature theories that he responded with this teaching of
relativity. If all things are dependently arisen, then they
are not arisen independently, on their own. If not arisen on their own,
then they cannot be said to exist on their own. This is identical to the
Buddha's formulation of dependent arising as explained above: their conceptual
distinction is relative as "tallness" depends on "shortness," and, further,
their very ontological existence depends on relative arising, as fire cannot
exist without fuel and fuel cannot exist without fire. The only reason for
Nagarjuna to repeat the Buddha's doctrine, then, was to negate the misconception
of self-nature that had arisen since the Buddha's time.
The shift in emphasis
from mere elemental relativity to both ontological and conceptual relativity
is exemplified by the exegesis of the term pratitya-samutpada, dependent
arising, by two Buddhist philosophers. The Abhidharma
notion of momentary elements required that the universe at each moment
be quantitatively and qualitatively a new creation. With this
understanding, a proponent of the Realist school, Srilabha
, interpreted the term with the following etymology:
"Pratitya denotes the sense of momentary destruction and it qualifies
the term samutpada as a derivative adjective. 'Prati + iti + yat,' which
means 'fit to disappear in every succeeding moment.' [sic] The suffix yat
connotes 'fitness,' iti means 'perishing,' 'destruction,' 'annihilation,'
'cessation.' The prefix prati is used, according to [the Abhidharmas], in
the sense of repetition. They mean by 'pratitya-samutpada,' 'origination
by repetitive destruction.'"
Note: Ramendranath Ghose, The Dialectics of Nagarjuna (Allahabad,
India: Vohra Publishers and Distributors, 1987), 183, quoted in ibid., 34
The insight afforded by this exegesis
is that the Abhidharma saw dependent arising as just the interplay of
relations between real elements, which elements enjoy ephemeral but real
manifestation. Candrakirti, a later commentator on Nagarjuna,
disagrees with the interpretation of those "who hold that the term means
the arising of things which vanish in the moment. This is bad etymology,"
he says.
Note: Prasannapada in Sprung, 34.
A note may be added here.
It may not be clear why the Abhidharma theory of elements requires that
an element be destroyed after its momentary "flash" of existence. The reason
is two-fold. First, they held that a
cause must cease utterly before its effect could manifest, or cause and
effect would overlap. This would allow there to be at least one moment in
which an element is still being caused while its effect has already materialized.
Two, a change in time must be a change in identity; if a thing lasted two
moments with the same identity, then it would endure, and, by extension,
could be eternal.
To counter this "bad etymology," Candrakirti offers his own:
"The root i means motion; the preposition prati means the arrival or attainment.
But the addition of a preposition alters the meaning of the root… So,
in this case, the word pratitya, as gerund, means 'attained' in the sense
of dependent or relative. Again, the verbal root pad [to go] preceded by
the preposition samut [out of] means to arise or to become manifest. The
full meaning of the term pratitya-samutpada is therefore the arising, or
becoming manifest of things in relation to or dependent on causal conditions
pratyayas)."
The above two exegeses may not seem contradictory and, indeed, the
only obvious difference is that Srilabha's etymology mentions both arising
and ceasing, while Candrakirti's focuses only on arising. The important
differences are those between the underlying assumptions, which assumptions
can be gleaned from the quotes. The Abhidharma
interpretation of dependent arising is little more than the interaction
of distinct parts to form new wholes.
The Madhyamika interpretation, as hinted at by Candrakirti, is more radical.
It is not just that composite
things which are made up of momentary parts are arisen depending on the
parts and have new identities in each time- moment. More, the parts
themselves have no real existence outside of the mutual interaction which
causes them to become manifest. The momentariness of the Realist conception
requires that each element arise, endure for a moment, and then cease.
This is not possible, says Nagarjuna's Madhyamika. "When the triad consisting
of arising, [enduring, and ceasing] are discrete, they are
not adequate to function as characteristics of the conditioned."
These three characteristics
cannot be real, explains Nagarjuna in the following verses, for then each
one would itself have to partake of arising, enduring, and ceasing. That
is, if "arising" is a hypostatized process, then "arising" itself will
have to arise, endure, and cease before the next hypostatized process,
"enduring," can come to be manifest, and so forth. Nagarjuna will not
accept this, for the result is infinite regress. On the other hand,
these three processes must be characteristics of existent things. If not,
it would be possible for a thing to arise but not endure or cease, for a
thing to endure but not arise or cease, or for a thing to cease but not arise
or endure.
There is another problem regarding the arising,
enduring, or ceasing of existent things.
What is it that arises, the existent thing?
No, for an existent thing already exists, and
cannot arise again.
Does the non-existent thing arise?
No, for, if non-existent, it is not a "thing,"
and there is no possible nominal subject of the verbal predicate. "
As such," Nagarjuna
concludes, "neither the arising of
an existent nor the arising of a non-existent is proper." Likewise the both
existent and non-existent and the neither existent nor non-existent are
improper.
Note: karika VII.20
In the same way, mutatis
mutandis, Nagarjuna refuses to accept the enduring or the ceasing of
existent or non-existent things.
He has no choice but
to conclude that dependent arising has
no function, no reality.
"With the non- establishment
of arising, duration, and destruction, the conditioned does not exist.
With the non-establishment
of the conditioned, how could there be the unconditioned?"
Dependent arising can
have no relation either to existence or to non-existence.
Arising, duration,
and cessation are "an illusion, a dream."
Note: karika VII.33-34
Following such
a radical and comprehensive denial of dependent arising and its three characteristics,
arising, enduring and ceasing, it would seem that Nagarjuna has completely
annihilated the Buddha's central doctrine.
However, there is one
verse which demonstrates that this is not the proper explanation of Nagarjuna's
agenda: "Whatever that comes to be dependently,
that is inherently peaceful. Therefore, that which is presently arising
as well as arising itself are peaceful."
Note: karika VII.16
The only way to reconcile this cataphatic
statement with Nagarjuna's relentless denial of dependent arising presented
above is to question the subject of the dilemma, namely conceptions of existence
itself.
What he is
denying, then, are the very notions of existence or non- existence .
Note: David Snellgrove, Indo-Tibetan Buddhism (Boston: Shambhala,
1987), 82-83
Reality must be devoid of
conceptual dichotomies. Nagarjuna made this clear in demonstrating that
fire and fuel or lust and the lustful one cannot be thought of as independently
real, and now declares that even existence
and non-existence are but illusory conceptions with no empirical basis. "A thing that is existent or non-existent is not produced." Further,
if existence is unreal, then so is non-existence, for "existence and non-existence
are, indeed, dependent upon one another."
Note: karika I.7 and XXV.12, respectively
All that can be
said to be real is the "inherently peaceful."
This was, in fact, enunciated by Nagarjuna in the opening dedicatory
verses, where dependent arising was linked with "the appeasement of obsessions
and the auspicious." This is in fact nothing
less than nirvana itself, the "blown-out,"
the appeasement of defiling dispositions and graspings through the appeasement
of passionate desires. The conceptual reality left when dispositions and
conceptions are "blown out" corresponds exactly with the Buddha's original
message: there is no soul in the individual and no self-hood of
the universe but those conceived in ignorance. If one is to ask "Of whom
is there old age and dying, and of what is there dependent arising," both
the Buddha and Nagarjuna would answer that the question is wrongly formulated.
Note: Warder, 119
Nagarjuna's interpretation
of dependent arising, then, holds that all that can be said to have any
reality is the process, not the fluctuating elements comprising the process.
Wrong views arise when one, through ignorance, believes there to be absolute
objects, absolute temporality, absolute spatiality. "Those who posit the
substantiality of the self as well as of discrete existents — -these I do
not consider to be experts in the meaning of the [Buddha's] message."
A key to understanding Nagarjuna's distinction
between reifying the elements versus seeing only the process is the
two truths.
- From the standpoint of conventional
truth, arising, enduring, and ceasing
are seen.
Where existents
are observed, one has no choice but to say
that they are dependently-arisen through these three characteristics.
- It is only from the standpoint of
ultimate truth that dependent arising is peaceful.
From this standpoint, when the notions
of permanent being and identity are "blown out,"
all that is perceived is the flow of becoming.
This flow is inherently
without static objects such as elements or the individual self.
This is fully compatible with and, indeed, explains the philosophical
core of Buddhism: impermanency and soullessness.
Emptiness, the Ultimate Cosmology
Pre-Madhyamika Use of the Concept
(FROM THE FIRST IDEA OF EMPTINESS)
The Buddha perceived
that all things are transitory, that nothing endures. This was the logical
basis for his declaration that nothing has an essence, that all is anatman.
- The Theravada tradition
interpreted this to mean that no persons have a self
beyond that constructed by the five fluctuating aggregates, but that the
individual elements constituting existence did have an essence; this is
what made the elements individual and irreducible.
- Mahayana offered
a broader definition of soullessness and declared that, not only are
persons devoid of a self, but that all of the elements comprising existence
are also without essence. They are empty, sunya, of self-nature.
Note: An analogy from the history of Western physics (Western)
will clarify these two conflicting notions of emptiness. Classical Newtonian
physics saw everything as comprised of irreducible atoms with a determinable
location and momentum. Belief in the determinism made possible by such a
reified existence led French mathematician Pierre de Laplace to declare that,
could he theoretically know the location and momentum of every monad in
the universe, he could predict the exact future history of the entire cosmos.
Quantum physics revolutionized this view by describing the qualities of
the monadic elements of existence as being inherently unknowable.<
Further, the utter smallness of the particles and the sheer distances
between them shows matter to be little more than empty space and existence
ultimately nothing more than interactions of abstract energy fields. That
the truest cosmological quality of things is emptiness, sunyata, came
to be regarded as the central notion of Buddhism.
The base formulation of emptiness comes from Nagarjuna
, and it is the concept for which he is most famous, so much so that
the Madhyamika school was often referred to as the Sunyata-vada, the "School
of Emptiness."
(TO SOME RESTRICTION IN ITS USE — AND THEN FALLING ON OLD HABITS)
Notwithstanding, the concept was not original
with him.
The term "sunyata" appears a few places
in the Pali Canon, but only
a few.
Here it tends to have the simple meaning of a lack of something.
In the "Lesser Discourse on Emptiness," the Buddha says that, in a
hall where there are monks gathered but in which there are no elephants
or cows, one can say that the hall is "empty" of elephants and cows. Likewise,
when a monk is meditating in a solitary forest, the forest is "empty" of
villages and villagers. "When something does not exist there, the latter
[the place] is empty with regard to the former," the Buddha defines.
Note: Culasunnata-sutta, quoted in Nagao 1991,
52
This meaning of a lack is extended to also mean
a lack of disturbances for the meditating mind. Emptiness is both
an object for contemplation and a method of quietism; one can "practice
emptiness" both by meditating on the emptiness of the self and by freeing
oneself from disturbances.
The philosophical formulation of emptiness
in the Theravada tradition is usually taken
to be that expressed by the Abhidharma writings.
The Realist school
of the Abhidharma held that the
elements of existence must not be empty, or else they would not be able
to interact. It was just compounded objects, like the individual, that are
empty, in that they have no enduring soul.
(TO SOME CORRECTION OF THIS MISTAKE — AND GENERALIZATION)
The Perfection of Wisdom (Prajnaparamita) school
disagreed,
pointing out that the elements, like
the things they compound, must also be seen as empty. By applying
emptiness to all things, this school used the concept much more systematically
and frequently and expanded its meaning. The Abhidharma quest to define the
true nature of things was replaced by a stress on non-dual, intuitive
apprehensions of reality through wisdom, prajna. The highest achievement
of wisdom, this school held, was the realization that all things, not
just compound ones, are empty of an essence.
(BUT NOT TOO FAR)
Taken far enough, the mystical Perfection of Wisdom insight into emptiness
produced
a paradox.
Not only are things empty, the school
declared, but emptiness is a thing (rupa = sunyata).
This meaning of this equation was not made entirely clear until Nagarjuna
offered an interpretation of it. The equation is not to be taken too literally,
but it seems just to express the notion that emptiness
should not be seen merely as a negation. This was hinted at in the
"Lesser Discourse on Emptiness," where the Buddha said that, "through abiding
in emptiness, [I] am now abiding in the fullness thereof." Further, the
text continued, it is comprehended that, when a place is empty of something
like cows or a village, there is "something [which] remains there that does
exist as a real existent."
Note: Culasunnata-sutta, quoted in Nagao 1991,
52 (italics mine)
On
the one hand, early Buddhism saw emptiness as a lack of being but, on the
other, something remains which cannot be negated. These statements
will not make sense in Buddhist terms unless reconciled with the Buddha's
absolute rejection of an ultimate ground of reality.
The meaning of the paradox, according to the Perfection of Wisdom writings,
is that emptiness is both and neither being and non-being, both and neither
negation and affirmation. Emptiness is not really a thing any more than a thing is really empty,
for reality cannot be pinned down in concepts.
Note: Harvey, 99
This paradoxical, non-conceptual use of
the notion of emptiness is reflected in the fact that certain of the Perfection
of Wisdom writings used the notion without ever mentioning the term. The
Diamond Sutra, for example, taught that the
notion of emptiness was to be used like a hard diamond to "cut away all
unnecessary conceptualization,"
Note: Vajracchedika, quoted in Kohn, 57
including the idea of emptiness itself. The discourse accomplished this
by presenting a series of paradoxes that demonstrated emptiness without
using the word. For example, the Buddha is made to say:
"As many beings as there are in the universe of beings, …all these
I must lead to nirvana, into that realm of nirvana which leaves nothing
behind. And yet, although innumerable beings have thus been led to nirvana,
no being at all has been led to nirvana."
Note: Vajracchedika 3, Edward Conze, trans., in Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh,
The Diamond Sutra (Poona, India: Ma Yoga Laxmi Rajneesh Foundation, 1979),
3.
(The similarity of such paradoxes with Zen teachings may be noted.
The Vajracchedika is, indeed, the locus classicus of Zen. Cf. "Silent Meditation
and Ch'an," in Kalupahana 1992, 228- 236)
A paradox like this will only make
sense if the elements of it are not taken either as real or nonreal, but
as, in terms of Perfect Wisdom, "empty."
(DANGER WITH THE EMPTINESS CONCEPT)
The actual use of the term "emptiness" (sunyata) was likely avoided
in the Diamond Sutra because, even though the paradoxes were half affirmative
and half negatory,
- the potential for misunderstanding and
seeing only the negative side of the equation was great.
- Equally dangerous was the possibility
of clinging to the notion of emptiness as yet another, albeit apophatic,
theory.
- These were dangers the Buddha was quite aware of. He said that,
following his death, "the monks will no longer wish to hear and learn
[my teachings], deep, deep in meaning, …dealing with the void (sunyata),
but will only lend their ear to profane [teachings], made by poets, poetical,
adorned with beautiful words and syllables."
Note: Samyutta- nikaya, quoted in Santina, 7
(JUST A SKILFUL MEANS)
What was crucial, the Buddha taught, was to
use the teaching of emptiness as a provisional tool, a way to cut through
illusion and achieve insight. His teachings were to be
seen as a raft which gets one across a stream but which,
upon reaching the other side, should be discarded. The Perfection of Wisdom
school used the method of teaching with nonsensical paradoxes to show the
final nature of things as empty and then to prevent one from grasping onto
the concept of emptiness itself.
Nagarjuna adopted the Perfection
of Wisdom teaching that the highest form of intuitive wisdom is insight
into the emptiness of all things.
His innovation was to clarify this
insight and apply it to all philosophical concepts in a more systematic
way than had his predecessors. The result of this was that
the notion of emptiness, though not new to Buddhist thought, suddenly
became seen as a revolutionary concept. It is common for mystical
expression to speak negatively of the Absolute, noumenal sphere; the mystical
side of every religion in history has witnessed this apophaticism in some
degree. Nagarjuna's innovation was
- to apply the via negativa to the
phenomenal sphere,
- as well, and thereby to deny the
essential reality of even relative dualities.
Emptiness as a Via Negativa, a Way of Negation
(IMPORTANCE — AND REJECTION OF NIHILLISM)
It may be helpful to precede a presentation of Nagarjuna's philosophy
of emptiness with a discussion of his school's peculiar use of negation.
As a philosophy of emptiness, the functions
of refutation and negation are central to Madhyamika, and
if the function of negation in the school is not understood, radical
misinterpretations are likely. Even as reputable a scholar as Austin Waddell
dismissed Madhyamika as "essentially a sophistic nihilism" which advocated
the "extinction of Life."
Note: L. Austin Waddell, Tibetan Buddhism (New York: Dover Publications,
Inc., 1972), 11<
The Madhyamika philosophy of emptiness is much more than just a method
of negation or a declaration of negativity. However, since this is how
both the West and Nagarjuna's fellow Orientals have often viewed it, that
must be addressed first. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, who pertinaciously misunderstood
Nagarjuna as an absolutist,
Note: "The whole show of Nagarjuna's logic is a screen for his
heart, which believed in an absolute reality." (Radhakrishnan 1929, 656)<
Based on other, likely spurious, writings attributed to Nagarjuna, one
could perhaps make such a claim. However, in the works which modern scholarship
believes to be authentically Nagarjuna's, there is found no justification
for Radhakrishnan's claim. expressed well the standard rationalist opinion
of negation: "All negation depends on a hidden affirmation. Absolute negation
is impossible. Total skepticism is a figment, since such skepticism implies
the validity of the skeptic's judgment."
Classical Hindu thinkers, too, dismissed Nagarjuna's extreme use of
the via negativa as self-condemned. The negation of everything is inconceivable
without implying a positive ground thereby, they held, and so the ultimate
truth cannot be negative; nothing can be proved false if nothing is taken
as true.
The act of negation itself proves the existence of the negator, one could
say.
(ORDINARY WAYS OF NEGATING — TAKING SIDE IN THE DUALITY)
Shin-ichi Hisamatsu has delineated five
general uses of negation which are to be distinguished from Nagarjuna's. These are:
- 1) the negation of the existence of a particular, e.g. "there
is no desk," or "there is no such thing as self-nature;"
- 2) a negative predicate, e.g. "pleasure is not pain," or "self-nature
is not an existent;"
- 3) the abstract concept of "nothingness," as the opposite of
being or of a general existent "somethingness;"
- 4) a blank of consciousness which would be equal to a state
of dreamless sleep or, by conjecture, death, e.g. the Upanisadic analogy
that "when one is in deep sleep, composed, serene, dreamless — -that is the
Self;"
Note: Chandogya Upanisad, quoted in Ainslee T. Embree, ed., Sources
of Indian Tradition, volume one (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988),
35
- 5) a hypothetical
negation whereby something which is usually considered to exist is denied,
e.g. "self-nature is an illusion which does not really exist."
Note: adapted from Shin-ichi Hisamatsu,
"The Characteristics of Oriental Nothingness," in Streng, 162
It was claimed above (see Introduction) that all religious philosophies
save Madhyamika are, to some degree, Absolutisms which posit a really
existing substratum in the cosmos.
This substantialism is reflected both in the dismissal of the Madhyamika
negative method by many Western scholars and classical Hindu thinkers, as
well as in the above five uses of the concept of negation, for all directly
assume the quality of essential existence or, by positing non-existence,
indirectly assume the quality of existence. All non-Madhyamika
uses of negation, in Murti's words, affirm a real thing "existing in some
form or in some place other than what and where it was mistaken for."
For example, to say "A is not B" is usually tantamount to saying "A
is C."
(AN ALTERNATIVE TO ELIMINATION OR TO TAKING SIDE : TRANSCENDENCE)
In contrast with such substantialist-oriented
uses of negation is Nagarjuna's concept of emptiness, sunyata.
Emptiness is the description of things as having no self- nature. Nagarjuna's
emptiness was arrived at through a use of dialectics such as those exemplified
in the above five, but its meaning was different.
Emptiness is neither the denial of an existing thing or quality nor
merely the negation of a concept. It is a call to shift one's perceptions
to reconceive the nature of reality.
The fifth option given above,
negation as the cancellation of an illusion, is the closest
to Nagarjuna's use, save one difference. The cancellation of an illusion
is usually taken to mean that one is piercing phenomenal reality to perceive
true ontological reality. An oft- repeated analogy is that
of a person walking on a path at twilight who is startled to see
a snake lying curled up in the middle of the path; on closer examination,
the snake is seen to be nothing more than an abandoned piece of rope. The
illusion that has been dispelled was never real. The snake never existed,
and so the negation of it amounts to nothing more than a clearer perception
of what always was.
For Nagarjuna's Madhyamika, in contrast,
the snake, or self-nature, is not such a simple illusion. Things do exist,
even if only as dependently-arisen phenomena. That they have self- nature
is not so much an illusion as it is the result of a misguided or improperly-trained
faculty of conceptualization. One holds to a theory of self-nature not
because of primal ignorance, like Advaita Vedanta's avidya, nor because of
a clouded perception, like that of the rope, but because one cognizes falsely.
"When the sphere of thought has ceased, that which is to be designated also
has ceased," says Nagarjuna, and when one ceases to adhere to a metaphysical
theory like self-nature, it disappears. Emptiness is not so much the means
to dispel an illusion as it is the correction of an error.
(USING EMPTINESS AS A MEAN TO TRANSCEND ANY DUALITY — LEAVING NONE
OF THE PROBLEMS OF EITHER SIDE)
Nagarjuna's method of negation is by means
of a logical use of the concept of emptiness.
This is hinted at by the first appearance of the term in the karika
which is in section four. Nagarjuna has just spent the first seven verses
of this section discussing the relation of the five psychophysical aggregates
to their causes, concluding that cause and effect
are neither identical nor different and that there is no self- nature in
any of the aggregates. He concludes the examination by saying
that:
"when an analysis is made in terms of emptiness, whosoever were to address
a refutation, all that is left unrefuted by him will be equal to what is
yet to be proved.
"When an explanation in terms of emptiness is given, whosoever were
to address a censure, all that is left uncensured by him will be equal
to what is yet to be proved."
Note: karika IV.8-9
(The crypticness of these verses is not the fault of the translation,
for other translations are equally or more unclear.)
What Nagarjuna seems to be saying here is that the concept of emptiness,
when used as a method of negation, is exhaustive. When an analysis is made
in terms of emptiness, all bases have been covered and no loopholes remain.
Nagarjuna's negation of self-nature is thorough, and the burden of
proof for further analysis lies with the opponent. When an explanation in
terms of emptiness is given, there is no room for criticism by the opponent.
The Madhyamika description of all things as empty is also exhaustive,
and anyone offering a positive counter theory must provide an equally-exhaustive
metaphysic.
(NOT REJECTING OR ELIMINATING ANY SIDE — ALL IS EQUAL)
This far-ranging value of the concept of emptiness is expressed succinctly
in a later section. "Everything is pertinent for
whom emptiness (sunyata) is proper," Nagarjuna says. Conversely,
"everything is not pertinent for whom the empty (sunyam) is not proper."
This verse can be explained in terms of the two truths. Conventional
truth deals with, not theories, but with the interaction of individual existents.
These things, by virtue of having arisen dependently, are "the empty."
In conventional truth, emptiness is used as an adjective to describe the
arisen existents, "the empty." Only if these things are seen as "empty"
can everything be "pertinent," that is, can one formulate coherent and
valid thoughts about reality.
Note: There may be confusion about this verse due to the fact that
the primary translation of the Mulamadhyamakakarika prior to Kalupahana's,
i.e. Streng's, contains an error here. The third and fourth padas of this
verse are translated by Streng as "If emptiness does not 'work,' then
all existence does not 'work'" (italics in original). The error is the
term "emptiness" instead of "the empty" here. That the original word is
"the empty" is proven by the fact that only "sunyam" fits the meter. The
term " sunyata" would make this line seventeen, not sixteen, beats long.<
Ultimate truth relates more to abstractions that go beyond everyday particulars.
From this broader vantage point, the fact that all arisen things as well
as the process of arising are empty is encompassed by
the abstract theory of "emptiness." This theory is comprehensive,
encompassing any and all other concepts by virtue of showing how any description
of reality must ultimately itself be negated and thus be empty. Only if
one includes the notion of "emptiness" in one's worldview can one's theory
be "pertinent." As a method of negation, then, emptiness is, like the diamond,
an incisive and effective tool. It does not merely refute false concepts,
but it refutes them so comprehensively that the ball is in the opponent's
court, so to speak. "All that is left unrefuted by him will be equal to
what is yet to be proved."
Another aspect of using emptiness as a method of logical refutation
is that, as a somewhat mystical concept based on intuitive wisdom (prajna),
it does not merely negate. Emptiness also affirms.
Substantialist methods of negation implicitly assert the opposite of
what is negated, as in the above example where saying "A is not B" means
"A is C." Madhyamika negation, to continue this example, would say that
"A is not B, nor is A not not B." It is true that the Buddha leads innumerable
beings to nirvana, but it is also true that no being at all has been led
to nirvana. Such paradoxes are not meant to imply that ultimate reality
transcends conceptual thinking, such that the relation of A to B cannot
be conceived. Rather, since A and B are both empty of self-nature, and since
both the beings led to nirvana and nirvana itself are empty of self- nature,
equations are neither valid nor invalid. A cannot
be B nor not B, for there is no essence of A which can either be identical
with or different from the essence of B.
That the negatory aspect of emptiness
is usually emphasized does not mean that emptiness is negative; rather,
since Nagarjuna felt there to be more affirmative ontologies in need of
refutation than annihilationist ones, he responded with negation more often
than affirmation. However, both the Buddha and Nagarjuna make
it quite clear that one should not stress negativity any more than one should
affirm positivism. As Edward Conze puts it, "The Buddhist
sage… should never really commit himself to either 'yes' or 'no' on anything."
Since the Buddhist path is a middle one which renounces all extremes, if
the sage "once says 'yes,' he must also say 'no.' And when he says 'no,'
he must also say 'yes.'"
(EMPTINESS OF EMPTINESS)
Emptiness is a middle view which, by denying essences and identities,
stands between the extremes of being and non-being, between negation and
affirmation. Since negation is no more real than affirmation, even the
concept of emptiness must in the end be denied reality. After emptiness
has shown the falsity of wrong views like self-nature, its job is done,
and negation itself must be negated.
Note: As if to answer this very question and tie it in with theory
of two truths, Neils Bohr said ``There are trivial truths
and there are great truths. The opposite of a trivial truth is plainly false.
The opposite of a great truth is also true.'' (quoted in Malaclypse the
Younger, p. 9)
Emptiness is Perceived, not Invented
Emptiness is not a theory which Nagarjuna invented, nor even one which
he clarified — it is not a theory as such. Emptiness
is just the description of the way things are, i.e. impermanent and without
essences or self-natures. It is only the opposites of emptiness that
are concepts. That is, metaphysical theories like self-nature, permanency,
the soul, or God are concepts that require definition and defending by those
who hold them. Emptiness requires no defending. When obscurities are cleared
away, one sees, through intuitive wisdom, the nature of things as they
always have been. This nature, before the addition of defiling concepts,
is, the Buddha described, like the clean water of a clear pool, "self-luminous
through and through."
Note: (source not noted) quoted in Conze 1975, 162
The Diamond Sutra expressed this by having the Buddha say that nothing
has ever been taught by him. "If a man should say that the Law [Dharma]
has been taught by the Tathatagata, he would say what is not true."
Note: Vajracchedika, quoted in Zimmer, 522
Nagarjuna echoed this in saying that "the Buddha did not teach… some
thing to some one at some place."
Note: karika XV.24
What the Buddha and Nagarjuna
did was to show that concepts are false and distort the true nature of
reality. They did not offer thoughts of their own to replace false ones,
but taught that all ideas, including even the philosophy of Buddhism, must
be appeased, or not grasped on to. When notions like self-nature, the soul,
or permanency are "blown out" (nir - vana), the true nature of reality,
emptiness, is seen.
Note: Kohn, 245
The Visuddhimagga, the most important post-canonical work of the Older
School, delineated seven stages of purification and the development of
insight. Each stage is one of greater perception of the soullessness of
reality culminating in, in the seventh and final stage, perception of the
"signless," the "wishless," and "emptiness,"
which are three qualitative descriptions of the unconditioned
nature of reality. This insight is the Perfect Wisdom of pre-Madhyamika
Buddhism, which insight Nagarjuna found to be the supreme expression of
Buddhist knowledge. The heart of this
Perfect Wisdom is nothing more than a perception of emptiness.
- Both the Perfection of Wisdom school and Nagarjuna agree that
a proper understanding of the Buddha's philosophy as reported by the original
discourses inevitably leads to seeing all things as empty.
- This was in contrast to the Abhidharma
attitude that a study of the scriptures can allow one to formulate a neat
set of concepts to define and describe the nature of reality.
- It must be admitted, though, that Nagarjuna's
idea that emptiness is seen, not invented, is only implicit in the karika,
for he never expressly describes the nature or the importance of this insight.
What he does make clear is that emptiness is
empirically evident. That emptiness is perceptible is only a manner of
speaking, for it is explained that emptiness is not a "thing" which can
be defined and perceived. Rather, it is a lack, as, for example, one can
speak of the concept of darkness even though it is nothing more than a lack
of light. The term Nagarjuna uses most frequently is pasyati, "perceives."
Note: Kalupahana 1986, 82
What is perceived
is the non- existence of self-nature in things, and an awareness of
this non-existence is referred to as the perception of emptiness.
One may ask, if the original nature of all things is unconditioned
emptiness, then why was it ever hidden in the first place? On one level,
this question can be answered by pointing to the first link of the chain
of dependent arising, ignorance.
On the basis of ignorance,
concepts and
consciousness arise.
Concepts by their very nature
and function create artificial divisions in the otherwise undivided, seamless
reality, and thus obscure its true nature. Existence and essence, though
seemingly ultimate concepts, are nonetheless themselves artificial divisions
which thus distort the "self-luminous pool of clear water." The Madhyamika
stress on emptiness is one way to demonstrate the unreality and falseness
of concepts.
Note: Williams, 62
On another level, the question cannot be answered. If one further
inquires, "and what created ignorance?" the Buddhist can only point out
that, in the twelve-link circular chain of dependent arising, ignorance
is causally conditioned by previous karma and death. More cogent, though,
one should not even ask such a question; since ignorance is a "lack" and
not a "thing," it is not proper to ask how it was created.
Beyond these replies, further speculation is not fruitful.
Some schools of Buddhism, especially Zen, would offer the above explanation
and then stop. The mind cannot possess anything, a modern Zen teacher
says, and if one continues questioning, the teacher has nothing to say
but "in Japan in the spring we eat cucumbers."
Note: Shunryu Suzuki, 138
Nagarjuna's philosophy supports the same conclusions, but arrives at
them by a quite different way.
One way to
counteract the conceptualizing tendency is by offering alternative concepts.
Notions of self-nature and the soul are root causes of suffering. As a means
of "fighting fire with fire," Nagarjuna offers a systematic philosophy of
emptiness as a conceptual antidote to these notions.
Dependent Arising + Emptiness = tattva (The Union of Both Truths)
The Perfection of Wisdom school taught that emptiness is a fact of
reality that is indirectly perceived by virtue of non-empty things not
being perceived. Nagarjuna's innovation was to expand the meaning of emptiness
by applying the notion to the conceptual sphere as well as the experiential
one. That is, whereas earlier Buddhism saw all composite things as empty
of soul, Nagarjuna declared them to be empty of existence, as well.
The crux of the Madhyamika philosophy of emptiness is
a reinterpretation of dependent arising
by a distinction between conventional and ultimate truths.
- The Theravada definition of dependent
arising was the interdependency of irreducible atoms which,
through mutual contingency, create a world of phenomenal things. Things
are empty of self- nature in that they are not self- subsisting, but were
brought into being only through the action of dependent arising.
Nagarjuna said that, from the point of view of conventional truth, this
theory is applicable.
- Perfect wisdom, though,
allows one the insight that even the causal process
itself is empty, for there is no self-nature to be found anywhere, in
any thing. A greater understanding of dependent arising shows things
to be more than just causally interdependent; they are interdependent for
their very definition and essential self-nature, too. "In the absence of
self-nature, there is no other-nature," Nagarjuna declares numerous times,
Note: karika I.3, XV.3, XXII.2,
XXII.4, XXII.9
the meaning of which is that, without dependency, things cannot
even have an individual identity and essence.
Note: This idea that things are relative
for, not just their arising, but their very identity has
led some interpreters of Madhyamika to translate sunyata as, not "emptiness,"
but "relativity" or "non-exclusiveness." (Cf. Stcherbatsky, 242, and Ramana,
42, respectively)
There are thus no things, but only the process by which things
came to be, and this process, too, is empty. The main reason for declaring
things to be without essence is empirical, as explained above.
Self-nature simply is not observed. More than this, though,
logic leads to the same conclusion. If the identity of dependent arising with emptiness were just
an expression of mystic intuition, the function of Madhyamika as a philosophy
would be precluded.
The logical
argument that leads to the theory of emptiness is this:
The nature of reality is dependently
arisen; that is attested to by the Buddha,
by observation, and by logic.
"A thing that is not dependently arisen is not evident," Nagarjuna declares.
If things are dependently arisen,
then they are phenomenal, not real, entities. Self-nature must, by definition,
be a really-existent and permanent essence. A permanent essence never
changes nor acts, so self-nature will never interact, hence things that
interact or are the product of interaction have no essence. "A non-empty
effect will not arise; a non-empty effect will not cease."
Dependently arisen things have
no self-nature. Both their arising and their very essential definition
are the result of causal interdependence. They are thus empty of existence,
of self-nature, and of any other type of hypothetical essence. "A thing that
is non-empty is indeed not evident," he concludes, but he does not stop there.
If things are empty of
essence, then the whole process of dependent arising is also called into
question. If things are empty, then what even is the point of saying that
they arise and cease? "If something is empty, it follows that it is non-ceased
and non- arisen."
There is no "it" which can
partake of arising or ceasing. Both arisen things and the process of dependent
arising itself are but "an illusion, a dream, a [mythical city]."
This relentless negation is the revolutionary aspect of Nagarjuna's
Madhyamika. He is not content just to refute the self-nature of composite
things, nor even of the individual elements comprising things, but goes
so far as to refute the reality of the entire process of interaction itself.
With the negation of
any kind of self-nature, anywhere, all sense of real and unreal, of cause
and effect, of identity and difference is lost. The only way left to speak
of things is in terms of emptiness. The bold
consistency with which this via negativa "has been carried through every
phase of thought and feeling, to the very limit," says Heinrich Zimmer,
"keeps a wonderful, really sublime wind of detachment blowing through" the
entire philosophy.
(NOT A SIMPLE NEGATION)
(BOTH NEED TO BE UNDERSTOOD : EMPTINESS AND CAUSE & EFFECT /
COMPASSION)
However, this negative method must not overshadow
positive affirmation, or the Madhyamika would surrender to its opponent's
accusations that the philosophy of emptiness is mere nihilism.
Note: Much of the misunderstanding of Nagarjuna's philosophy as
nihilism especially by Westerners, could have been avoided if the etymology
of sunya had been kept in mind. The word likely comes from a root which
means "to swell," the interpretation of which is probably that something
which appears swollen is hollow, empty, on the inside. Sunyata would then
be not a mere nothingness, but a certain potentiality, an internal openness
within apparently full entities. Cf. Conze 1975, 130f.<
Instead of saying simply that dependent arising is empty or that only
empty things dependently arise, Madhyamika declares that
the formula dependent arising = emptiness is an affirmative equation. The Perfection of Wisdom formula that matter is emptiness and emptiness
is (matter rupa = sunyata) had a similar purpose, but its meaning was slightly
different. There, the equation was made to demonstrate
the paradoxical non-dual nature of intuitive wisdom. For Nagarjuna,
the formula dependent arising
= emptiness was meant to be taken literally.
One must not lean to either side of the equation; over-emphasizing dependent
arising or being would lead to a sort of positivism, and too much stress
on emptiness or non-being could engender nihilism.
This equation must be carefully
explained. If the declaration that dependent arising is identical with
emptiness or that being is identical with non-being is not properly understood,
then it would seem to be, in Nagao's words, "the raving of a madman."
(BEYOND BEING AND NON-BEING)
(emptiness of the duality dependent-arising-and-emptiness)
If things were not empty, then they could
in no way arise, dependently or otherwise. Conversely, if things arise,
they could in no way have a self- nature. Both being and non-being
are real in one sense; there is being, for things do arise, even if but
phenomenally. That the chain of arising has, not one, or two, but twelve
links of existential causality demonstrates the at-least-partial reality
of being. However, as these things are not absolutely real but have not
always existed and will one day cease to exist, they are non-being. This
idea of non-being is not a nothingness, for it does not deny that things
do, in some way, exist. Rather, non-being is the denial of an essential
self-nature in things. From another angle, being and non-being are unreal
concepts which can only exist dependently. They are thus empty, devoid of
any independent definition.
Note: Thus is the foundation and explanation of the wonderful outlook
of Zen, which manages to teach the utter purposelessness and futility of
all things and yet at the same time to find in that meaninglessness of life
the very motivation for joy, humor, love, and compassion. Cf., for example,
Alan Watts, "The Secret of Zen," in The Spirit of Zen (New York: Grove
Press, Inc., 1960), 46-64
This equal status of each half of the dependent arising/emptiness equation
is reflected in the status of the two truths. Ultimate truth is no more
real than conventional truth, but is just a different way of looking at
the same thing. They are each truth, even though their verdicts conflict,
and neither level of truth could exist alone. Without relying upon conventional
truth, ultimate truth is not taught, Nagarjuna said, and without the existence
of a higher truth, there could be no such thing as Perfect Wisdom and knowledge
of emptiness. Conventional truth is that things arise, endure, and cease,
and are thus real. Ultimate truth is that, as transitory phenomena, things
are empty of self-nature, and are thus unreal. Each one of these statements
is true, and neither should be asserted to the exclusion of the other,
else either positivism or nihilism would result.
A final reason that the formula dependent arising = emptiness must be
clearly understood is that it may seem, prima facie, to evidence a contradiction
in Madhyamika philosophy. The relation between things has been demonstrated
to be neither one of identity nor one of difference. A is not B, nor is
A not not B. Yet, Nagarjuna here appears to be declaring an identity relation. The resolution of this discrepancy is
that the equation is not one of simple identity. Neither dependent arising
nor emptiness has a nature which can relate to something else; neither
has any form of real existence. Thus, their relation, as well as their
own nature, is empty and indefinable. They are equal only in the fact that
neither has self- nature. The formula is a practical guide, not a dictum
of logic.
(WE SHOULD LOOK AT THEM AS ONE IMPLYING THE OTHER (as with any duality)
:
DEPENDENT ARISING <==> EMPTINESS)
Though dependent arising and emptiness, cataphaticism and apophaticism,
are said to be equally valid and important, Nagarjuna understood that there
is still a tendency for spiritually insecure, unenlightened individuals
to reify emptiness and become distressed thereby. In a further attempt to
prevent this, he offered yet another
reason why dependent arising must be seen as empty.
An opponent, misunderstanding the meaning and use of emptiness, may
object that the concept undercuts the entire Buddhist philosophy and path.
If all is empty, the opponent objects, there exists no dependent arising,
and the four Noble Truths, the teaching of the Buddha, the community of
monks, and the Buddha himself are invalidated. "Speaking in this manner
about emptiness, you contradict the three jewels [Buddha, his Law, and
his community], as well as the reality of the fruits, both good and bad,
and all worldy conventions," charges the opponent.
Note: karika XXIV.6
On the contrary, responds Nagarjuna, it is the opponent's theory of
self- nature that contradicts all of these things. It is the philosophy
of emptiness that makes possible causality, the Buddha's teaching and
the Buddhist path, all change and growth, and nirvana itself. It is only
the fact that things do not have an immutable essence and identity that
makes them able to change, interact, and condition new events. Further,
it is only the fact that the defilements and suffering are empty of self-nature
that makes them susceptible to eradication. If there were self- nature
in things, then defilements would be eternal and suffering inescapable.
Emptiness is thus not only the description of dependently arisen things
nor only the nature of the process of dependent arising itself. Rather,
emptiness is the very thing which makes dependent arising and hence the
entire phenomenal world possible. Thus, whatever one's attitude towards
the world, emptiness is a positive theory. If one dislikes the world, it
is emptiness which makes it possible to change the world or escape from
it. If one likes the world, it is emptiness which allowed it to come into
being. Later Mahayana philosophy used emptiness as a springboard for its
very positive doctrines of Love and Compassion, declaring that, only after
the world is negated and selflessness is seen, can one truly empathize with
the plight of one's fellow humans and desire earnestly to help them.
Note: Nagao 1991, 49. Cf. also 33-34
Emptiness is a Theory of No-Theory
One of the more disturbing results of the doctrine of emptiness is
that it would seem to deny the possibility of enlightenment. It is relatively
easy to accept the position that all existent, mundane, and hence unpleasant
things are empty, for one can still hope for a pleasant enlightenment or,
in certain types of Buddhism, afterlife. If, as Nagarjuna claims, all things,
both worldly as well as transcendent, are empty, then how can one retain
hope and aspire to the ultimate goal of freedom, nirvana? In response to one
who expresses such concerns, Nagarjuna says that
"you do not comprehend
the purpose of emptiness.
As such, you
are tormented by emptiness and the meaning of emptiness."
There are two significances
implied by this statement of Nagarjuna.
- One, there is a meaning of
emptiness besides the obvious one of lack of self- nature.
- Two, the concept has a
pragmatic value as well as a logical one.
- The former, the fact that
emptiness has a greater meaning, was already discussed. This
meaning is that, besides referring merely to the lack of essential reality
in things, emptiness also betokens
the potential of things to interact and change, to arise and cease. Reality
is not "nothingness," but an indefinable mix of being and nonbeing and both
and neither.
Note: The reader's patience is requested in this improper and perhaps
misleading continual use of the term "reality." No alternatives were found.
- The latter, the pragmatic
value of emptiness, is that it prescribes
a method by which unpleasantries can be appeased.
- Suffering is caused by dispositions, desires, expectations, and
graspings, all of which in turn are caused by an improper understanding
of the world and the way things are.
- If one comprehends emptiness, one ceases to cling to desires,
for the things one would desire are shown to be empty and thus not desirable;
- one would cease to grasp and cling, for the pleasant things
which one would want to hold on to are seen as unreal;
- one would cease to form false theories and concepts about reality,
for the theory of emptiness precludes the tendency to theorize;
- one would not entertain false hopes for a concrete afterlife
and a real Savior-figure, for the Buddha and his teachings are both seen
as provisional;
- and, finally, one would have an incentive to appease suffering,
for, being empty, suffering is susceptible to change and, hence, can be
vanquished.
The pragmatic function of emptiness is intimately tied to its non-theoretical
nature. Part of the nature of nirvana is the appeasement
of the tendency to theorize excessively and grasp onto theories.
It is thus crucial to make as clear as possible, before examining nirvana,
the anti-theoretical character
of emptiness.
- From the standpoint of conventional truth, emptiness is
the declaration that dependently arisen things have no independent identity.
They are "the empty."
- From the standpoint of ultimate truth, emptiness is the
description of all things, events, processes, and life-forms as having
no real existence. All is "emptiness." Both "the empty"
and "emptiness" are descriptions, not attributes. A thing or event
does not partake of emptiness, but rather, since it assuredly does not
partake of self-nature, it is described as empty. "'Empty,' 'non-empty,'
'both,' or 'neither' — -these should not be declared," Nagarjuna explains.
They "are expressed only for the purpose of communication."
Note: karika XXII.11
The
true reality, the "suchness" (tathata) of the cosmos, must be seamless.
Conceptualizing
it imposes artificial divisions and distinctions on that which is undivided. Notions like existence or nonexistence,
self-nature or other- nature, emptiness or fullness, are wholly improper.
There are times, however, when one would wish to refer to this "suchness."
No manner of speaking or means of cognizing is proper, but, in light of
the inveterate tendency of humans to seek and grasp onto supposed positive
notions like "soul" and "existence," the most proper designation is a negative
one.
Nagarjuna therefore uses such a notion as a means of communication
only. This is referred to, in the Buddhist tradition, as
"skillful means" (upaya), the ability of a teacher
to tailor his or her speech and philosophical system to the ears and understanding
of his or her audience.
Note: Williams, 143
The
teacher communicates thoughts and formulates theories only insofar as they
would be helpful to the student. This was Nagarjuna's intent in expounding
the idea of emptiness; it is a useful way of speaking, for it is less misleading
than ideas like "God" or "permanency," but it still has no ultimate applicability.
Nagarjuna's
use of emptiness as a "skillful means" has a specific function and purpose.
One of the chief causes of bondage
is, not so much the faculty of conceptualization, but rather
the propensity to grasp onto the products of that faculty. The
rational nature, like the dispositions Nagarjuna discussed in section seven
of the karika, has a value. Concepts are an important and necessary tool
to be used in ordering one's world and acting within it.
The problem is that rational creatures, be they humans or Gods, tend
to ascribe excessive validity to these concepts.
This is done for two reasons.
- One is ignorance: the rational
creature does not know or ignores the fact that his or her mental nature
is only a tool and has limited applicability.
- The other, and perhaps foundational,
reason that sentient creatures cling to the mental processes is
desire. Desiring pleasure, the mind reifies the apparently
pleasurable things in the hope of thereby possessing them and preventing
them from ceasing. Fearing death, the individual reifies the apparent existence
of life itself and thereby acts with excessive and unjustified selfishness.
Note: The Buddha did uphold the importance of
self-preservation, not because the self is real, but
only out of compassion — -compassion for oneself as well as compassion for
others. Self-preservation
must be tempered by "other-preservation."
The Buddha taught that these two tendencies,
desire and the faith in the results of mentation, are, indirectly, the
cause of bondage.
"Desire, know I thy root," he is reported to have said.
"From conception thou springest;
No more shall I indulge in conception;
I will have no desire any more."
Note: quoted in Candrakirti's Prasannapada, quoted in Murti 1960,
223 (samkalpa translated as "conception." Cf. Monier- Williams, 1126)
There are, as explained,
two significances of the notion of emptiness.
- One is simply that,
when one is enlightened, one sees things as empty. It is not a concept,
but an observation.
- The other significance is the
pragmaticone.
As a "skillful
means," emptiness is an antidote to an excessive emphasis on mentation.
Having demonstrated that all things
are empty, Nagarjuna explains that it is pointless to hypostatize anything.
"When all things are empty, why [speculate on] the finite, the infinite,
both…, and neither…? Why [speculate on] the identical, the different,
the eternal, the non-eternal, both, or neither?" Note: karika XXV.22-23
Emptiness, as a concept,
acts as an antidote to this misuse of the rational faculty in two ways.
- One, if all things are empty,
then no speculation is worthwhile. Excessive belief in concepts
is misguided and, ultimately, debilitating, for it distracts one from the
proper path, which is tranquillity and appeasement of desires.
- The other use of the concept of emptiness is a
positive one. The neophyte who has not developed the Perfect Wisdom which
allows him or her to see all things as empty may need to use concepts as
a temporary guide. The mind, by its very nature, needs to think.
The trained mind can dwell in peaceful wisdom (prajna), but the untrained
one needs a system to direct its thoughts properly.
The theory of emptiness can act as an object for contemplation, an
abstraction on which meditation can be focused. Once the mind in
training achieves perfect wisdom, then even the notion of emptiness itself
must be abandoned. In this context, the notion has pragmatic value only;
it is like, in Streng's words, "a phantom destroying another phantom."
Note: Streng, 92 Once the phantom of real existence has been appeased,
then the phantom of empty existence must also be released.
That Nagarjuna's philosophy
is a middle path must be kept in mind to understand properly
the function of emptiness as a concept. Madhyamika is, obviously, not a
philosophy that declares there to be a real structure in the universe which
can be defined in rational formulas, so emptiness is clearly not a positive
theory. Neither is Madhyamika a nihilism, so
- Nagarjuna is not advocating
the destruction of concepts or the stifling of ratiocination.
- The middle path
rather advocates the appeasement of conceptualization.
- Thoughts have a certain
function — -they are useful and necessary in relation to the mundane world — -but
they must not be applied to ultimate truth; they must be appeased.
- The point of the idea
of emptiness, Nagarjuna says, is "the relinquishing of all views."
Note: karika XIII.8
This pragmatic function of emptiness for Nagarjuna is indicated by
the fact that he did not devote a section of his karika to it;
if emptiness were a description of Ultimate Reality, or if it were
an absolute concept, then he certainly would have explained it more fully.
What he does devote a section to (section XXIV, "On Truth") is an explanation
that emptiness is, not a nihilism or an Ultimate Reality,
but only the principle of relativity and the best description of conditioned
things.
Note: Sprung, in translating the Prasannapada, wrote that
the term sunyata should be read as "the absence of both being and non-being
in things." Sprung, 13 (italics mine)
Nagarjuna's philosophy of emptiness, no matter how clear and precise,
still could never prevent all misunderstanding. C. W. Huntington points
out
the dangers of misconceiving it with the following
example: Buddhist teachers often remind their students that while mistaken
beliefs concerning the mundane are relatively easy to correct, like dousing
a fire with water, if one reifies the notion of emptiness, then it
is as if the water intended to extinguish the blaze has itself caught fire.
Note: Huntington, 22
To reify the concept of emptiness
is a blatant error, for it is an idea whose function is to prevent reification
of concepts. "Those who are possessed of the view of emptiness [as a theory]
are said to be incorrigible," Nagarjuna wrote. Note: karika
XIII.8
To hypostatize emptiness would
be both ridiculous and an insult to the Buddha's doctrine. It
would be ridiculous because emptiness is not a thought but the absence of
thoughts, not a theory but a criticism of theorizing. Candrakirti demonstrates
the absurdity of reifying emptiness by saying that it would be like one person
saying to another "I have no wares to sell you," and the other person responding
"give me what you call those 'no wares.'"
Note: Prasannapada, in Sprung,
150
Since emptiness is not a thing, it cannot be thought of in positive
terms.
It is nothing more than a lack of theories, not a theory itself.
Note: In the Vigrahavyavartani, verse 29, Nagarjuna writes: "If
I were to advance any proposition whatsoever, from that I would incur error.
On the contrary, I advance no proposition. Therefore, I incur no error.
" (pratijna translated as "proposition." Cf. Monier-Williams 664)
Emptiness Is Freedom Itself
The relationship between the anti-theoretical
function of emptiness and freedom, nirvana, is quite close.
- Thoughts are useful, but
the results of these thoughts, namely concepts , are
not ultimately real.
- Similarly, desires and dispositions
have a specific function, for they assist the individual in acting
in and interacting with his or her world,
- but, if too much emphasis is placed
on any of these, i.e. thoughts, desires, or dispositions, then one will
hold a false view of the world.
- This will lead to desiring and grasping
onto things which do not exist,
- which, finally, will bind one to the phenomenal cycle of birth-and-death.
- Enlightenment is achieved
when the true nature of things as transitory and as having no real self-nature
is seen, understood, and accepted.
- Nirvana is nothing more
than the "blowing out" of false thoughts and their concomitant desires.
This may seem to be a surprisingly
simplistic account of the way to achieve enlightenment. Nagarjuna
would say that, yes, it may seem simplistic. And it is.
There is no transcendent realm that must be discovered, no ultimate knowledge
that must be obtained, no psychic or spiritual powers that must be won.
To become free, one need do no more than release, or appease, the things
onto which one is grasping and see reality as it truly is, as it always
has been.
Nagarjuna discussed four
stages in explaining the cause of bondage and the way to release
:
- 1) "Those who are of little intelligence,
who perceive the existence as well as the non-existence of [things …],
do not perceive the appeasement of the object, the auspicious."
Note: karika V.8
Nagarjuna has here referred to appeasing "things" because this quote
is the conclusion to section five, the examination of the material elements.
The formula is identical, though, with the appeasement of dispositions
and thoughts, of things as well as sentient creatures. As long as one obstinately
clings to thoughts of existence and non- existence, one will never see
the way things truly are, which does not fall into either category. Until
one sees things and individuals as empty, one can never release the binding
forces.
- 2) "From the appeasement of the modes of
self and self-hood, one abstains from creating the notions of 'mine' and
'I'.'"
Note: karika XVIII.2
One of the words for ego is ahamkara, which means, literally, "I-making."
(The word ``ego'' in Greek means nothing more than ``I.'') Self-hood is
not a really-existing thing, for the nature of reality does not allow for
permanency and individuality. An individual is "in-dividual:" it is the
monad which cannot be further reduced into constituent elements. Such a
monad must, by definition, have self- nature, or it would be neither definable
in independence nor be enduring. Since such a monad could not exist, there
can be no such thing as an in-dividual.
- 3) "When views pertaining to 'mine' and
'I' …have waned, then grasping comes to cease. With the waning of [grasping],
there is waning of birth."
Note: karika XVIII.4
It is the false belief in a real ego that underlies and creates all
problems. The self does exist in a conventional way, for the five aggregates
have come together to form a temporary composite. However, to believe that
this self is ultimately real or will endure will cause one to grasp onto
pleasant things and avoid unpleasant ones, both of which will bind one
to the cycle of repeated deaths. To escape rebirth, one need only appease
the views pertaining to "mine" and "I."
- 4) "On the waning of defilements of action,
there is release. Defilements of action belong to one who discriminates,
and these in turn result from obsession. Obsession, in its turn, ceases
within the context of emptiness."
Note: karika XVIII.5
When one ceases to desire for and grasp onto things and concepts, nirvana
follows. Why the five aggregates came together to produce the illusion
of self-hood in the first place is not entirely clear, and a comprehensive
answer to that question can never be known. What is clear is that, having
come together, the notion of self-hood arises. This self is real, in a limited
way. Without the benefit of wisdom, however, this self-hood reflects on
its existence and believes itself to be real and permanent, and it begins
to seek pleasure and avoid pain. One of the primary ways it continues to
fool itself is through the use of concepts. It reifies notions like mine,
existence, and possession. The teaching of emptiness allows it to see the
impossibility of real possession, the lack of an essential nature within
itself, and the empty relativity of all dependently arisen things. The notion
of emptiness allows it to extinguish its false notions. The self is not
completely extinguished, for the limited existence that it does have is
true. What is extinguished is defiling passion, any expectation of permanency,
and excessive "selfishness."
To summarize, the four stages are as follows
:
- 1) ignorance causes one to reify things and the self;
- 2) appeasing the thought of self-hood puts an end to the process
of "I-making;"
- 3) when the ego is appeased, grasping is released, and rebirth
ends;
- 4) with the waning of grasping and dispositions and the cessation
of transmigration, freedom is won.
These four steps delineate both
how belief in the self comes to be, i.e. through ignorant perceptions
of existence and non-existence, and how freedom can
be realized, i.e. through a proper perception of emptiness. It would
be a mistake to see this process as a linear one. In the form Nagarjuna
presents it, ignorance causes bondage and wisdom releases one from it.
This is only one way to understand the process, for wisdom does not necessarily
follow the release of dispositions; looked at from the other direction,
it is wisdom which allows one to release the dispositions in the first
place. The whole process must be seen as one whose elements dependently
arise.
Perfect wisdom, the insight of emptiness,
provides one with a certain sort of power — -not power to make, but power
to refrain from making.
Note: Streng, 159
It is ignorance that causes one to construct dispositions
and passionate desires, and so, indirectly, it is ignorance which has the
power of bringing the entire phenomenal world into manifest existence.
Wisdom provides one with the power to appease
this process and release the world. Lest this sound like an inversion of
good and evil, it must be pointed out that the power of ignorance is not
a real power, for the world it brings into existence is but a phantom. Similarly,
the function of wisdom as extinguishing the world is not a negative one,
for wisdom merely causes the phenomenal world to revert to its truest state.
(NIRVANA)
The function of the conceptualizing faculty has a broader impact
than merely creating false views about self-hood. The faculty of
thought is that which applies distinctions to the perceived cosmos, which
differentiates between subject and object, noun and verb, past and future,
motion and rest, and any such dualities. Nagarjuna says that
"when the sphere of thought has ceased, that which is to be designated
also has ceased."
Note: karika XVIII.7
It is thus the sphere of thought which,
in a way similar to the Idealism of Berkeley or Bradley, creates the
observed world and, in a way similar to the Sapir-Whorf linguistic
hypothesis,
defines the elements of that world. Nagarjuna says that the truest description of
reality, i.e. the world as it is without the hypostatized notions of the
ignorant mind, is "independently realized, peaceful, unobsessed by obsessions,
without discriminations and a variety of meanings."
Note: karika XVIII.9
The character of reality is not differentiated
; all divisions are artificial and imposed by
the mind. Without the passionate clinging of the unenlightened mind,
the best possible description of this reality is that
it is at peace and restful. There is process
and flux, for elements continue to arise and cease dependently. Without the
imposition of the insecure mind, though, this process is undisturbed by
obsessions. Moreover, were the insecure mind not to attribute essences to
the process and its products, there would not even be a need to refer to
them as "empty."
When one's dispositions and obsessions
are extinguished, one sees this nature of reality as it is, i.e. empty,
undifferentiated, and undisturbed. Since self-hood is no longer reified,
the tranquillity of the world becomes the tranquillity of the individual,
and nirvana can be described in very positive terms indeed. An early scripture
says that the individual who has appeased ideas, false views, and passions
"enters the glorious city of Nirvana, stainless and undefiled, secure and
calm and happy, and his mind is emancipated as a perfected being."
Note: Milindapanha, quoted in
Embree, 114
Nirvana is not happy etc. by its nature; since it is not a thing, no
adjectives can be applied to it. Rather, since the status of the unenlightened
person is suffering, the release of suffering is, subjectively, pleasant.
Similarly, nirvana is not calm by its nature; since the flux of elements
is a non-real and empty one, it can be described as peaceful. Though nirvana
is said to be empty, this apparently negative term is actually the foundation
for the most positive of descriptions.
No matter how much one may stress that nirvana is not a thing but
is a lack of thing- ness, there is much likelihood that unenlightened
people would think of it as a concrete goal or a tangible heaven. Seeing nirvana in this way would be yet another
false concept and form of grasping, and would erect yet another obstacle
to freedom. To preclude this possibility, Nagarjuna enunciated what
could perhaps be the most controversial verse in the karika:
"The life-process (samsara) has no thing that distinguishes it from
freedom (nirvana). Freedom has no thing that distinguishes it from the
life- process."
Note: karika XXV.19
The term used to refer to the life- process, samsara, can be translated
as "wandering" or "transmigration." It is a term for the cycle of birth-and-death
in its imprisoning, pre-enlightenment aspect. To say that the world of
suffering is identical with the highest and most honored of goals of Buddhism
would seem to be flagrant blasphemy.
There are two main significances
of Nagarjuna's equating the life-process with freedom,
- one theoretical and one practical.
- First, it is only blasphemy from the standpoint
of essentialism. If there is a self- nature in either, then the two would
assuredly be different. Bondage, as a real thing, would have to be broken
free from, and enlightenment, as a true state, would have to be achieved.
However, the refutation of self-nature applies to these notions as well;
both are empty. Nirvana and the phenomenal world do not exist, as such.
They only are separate due to their being differentiated and named by the
hypostatizing mind.
Note: Streng, 45
The tendency to
see them as concrete things actually would deny a person the possibility
of ever releasing one and obtaining the other. If the life-process
had a self- nature, and if one were bound within that life-process, then
one could never leave. Similarly, if nirvana were a real attribute of which
the unenlightened individual were not yet partaking, and if it had an essence,
then it could never be achieved. It is only because both nirvana and the
life-process are empty that they can be said to be identical. Again, Nagarjuna's
attitude towards identity and difference must be kept in mind to prevent a
misunderstanding of this equation. In saying that they are identical, he is
not saying that they have an identity-relation, for neither has an essence
which can relate. Rather, as empty, they can each be said to lack self-nature,
and are identical in that neither is real. This relation is made clear in
the discussion of the nature of the Buddha in section twenty-two. "Whatever
is the self-nature of the Tathagata, that is also the self- nature of the
universe," Nagarjuna says. The two are equal because and only because "the
Tathagata is devoid of self-nature. This universe is also devoid of self-nature."
- The pragmatic value of equating nirvana and the cycle of
birth-and-death is that it demonstrates
the attainability of enlightenment. Freedom and bondage are not
identifiable things with separate and distinct spheres of influence. To
borrow a simplistic view of theism, if the world comprised one plane and
freedom another, transcendent one, then the feasibility of escaping one
and attaining the other would be highly suspect.
Nagarjuna's declaration that freedom is the world and the world is
freedom demonstrates that enlightenment is readily at hand.
One need do no more than shift one's perceptions
to find it.
- The unpleasant world is one constructed through ignorance and
grasping dispositions.
- The pleasant (or not-unpleasant) world is found simply by understanding
the meaning of emptiness and ceasing to reify the phenomenal one.
- Seen from the conventional or unenlightened vantage point, the
cosmos is a cycle of birth-and-death characterized by suffering.
- Seen from the vantage point of wisdom or of ultimate truth,
the cosmos is an ever-flowing, ever-changing empty process.
Note: Cf. Nagao 1991, 177-179
The notion of emptiness may,
at first, seem negative and limiting. It seems to deny the cosmos the option
of having existence, of being real. When comprehended properly, though,
the paradox of emptiness is seen as the most liberating of all possible
teachings. In teaching that the self is empty and that the universe is empty,
it demonstrates that both are one and the same, and that their distinction
was based on nothing more than obscured understanding. The limitations caused
by the notion of self-hood are destroyed. The true nature of the enlightened
one is seen to be the true nature of the universe, for both are empty. In
enlightenment, one becomes the universe.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
As with any subject, much more could be said about Madhyamika, and often
has been. Candrakirti's commentary, for example, runs to many hundreds of
pages. This thesis, too, far exceeds the normal length of bachelor's theses.
In light of Nagarjuna's teaching that excessive theorizing is one of the
main causes of suffering and bondage, it may seem that lengthy commentary
is self- negating. This objection would be quite valid, were the intent
of these research projects to express truth and the nature of reality. However,
as exemplified in the Introduction, were that the intent of these works,
they likely would have said no more than "this flax weighs three pounds."
(SHOWING THE LIMITS OF CONCEPTS)
The purpose of the philosophy of Madhyamika,
with its stress on emptiness, is not to discard all theorizing. Rather, the
point is to demonstrate that theories are not ultimately valid. Ascribing
excessive validity to the products of thought will cause one to grasp onto
them and lose sight of the true nature of things, which is empty. The truest
conceptual expression of reality will always be a paradox. "A saint (bodhisattva)
is a saint because there is no saint," says the Perfection of Wisdom school,
"and that is why there is a saint!"
Note: quoted in Nagao 1989, vii
- Concepts are applicable in the conventional
sphere only. This is the place of commentary and research: such projects
can clarify the nature of the phenomenal world and discuss the relative
validity of various theories within that plane. Neither the Buddha nor Nagarjuna
would have said that the rational faculty has no function, for, though no
theory is absolutely true, some theories are certainly better than others.
- When one wishes to speak of the ultimate
sphere, thoughts can point the way towards a proper understanding
of it and teach one how to achieve the Perfect Wisdom which can perceive
it, but theories themselves cannot express
its nature.
(A CONCEPT / A DUALITY / A SKILFUL MEAN)
As a conventional truth, the Madhyamika
philosophy propounds a system of ordering one's thought,
and then it shows where such thought must end. This system includes
- the theory of dependent arising,
- the four Noble Truths,
- the constitution of the psychophysical personality,
- and the Noble Eightfold Path;
- the theory of emptiness points out the limit
of the mental faculty.
Nagarjuna demonstrates that all of his ideas are pragmatic only in one
of the most famous verses of his treatise:
"We state that whatever is
dependent arising, that is emptiness.
That is dependent upon convention.
That itself is the middle path."
Note: karika XXIV.18
This verse succinctly ties together his entire philosophy, shows where
it comes to an end, and defines the point of it all.
Nagarjuna's thought can be summed up in
the first two terms of the verse: dependent
arising and emptiness.
From these all other elements of his philosophy are derived.
- Dependent arising explains
all aspects of the relative world, for it details
the process of causation and, hence, the ontology of the world.
- Emptiness is the only
possible description of ultimate truth, for it demonstrates
relativity and provides a sort of anti-theory on which the
rational faculty can focus.
- Neither of these, though, should be relied
on as valid in themselves, for they are
both "dependent upon convention."
Note: The original of this latter phrase,
sa prajnaptir upadaya, is a famously difficult one to translate.
For example, Nagao renders it "a designation based upon (some material),"
Ramana as "derived name," and Sprung as "a guiding, not a cognitive,
notion, presupposing the everyday." Kalupahana's translation was used here
because, while not necessarily more accurate than any others, it is clearer
and more succinct.
- Any theory, even one as all-encompassing as emptiness, is still
a theory based on convention.
- Were there no dependently arisen things, there would be no theory
of dependent arising.
- Further, even though these things are empty, they are at least
phenomenally real; if they were not, there would be no theory of emptiness,
for there would be nothing on which to base it.
- The whole of Nagarjuna's philosophy is dependent upon convention,
for it all presupposes the perception of everyday things and their phenomenal
reality. It is vital that one following his philosophy understand that
it, every bit as much as the things
it describes, is relative.
- Dependent arising and emptiness are relative to each other, and
both are relative to the perceived world. They thus constitute a middle
path.
- One must remember that dependent arising would be no more proper
a description of ultimate truth than emptiness, and vice-versa, else
either materialism or nihilism would result.
- Likewise, one must find a middle ground between theorizing and
refraining from doing so.
- The philosophy of Madhyamika is of vital importance, for it explains
reality and points the way to an escape from it. Were one to accept no
philosophy, the mental faculties would be ungrounded and directionless.
On the other hand, one must remember the proper place of philosophies as
based on convention only; they have no final validity. This, Nagarjuna
says, is the middle path of the Buddha.
(INDESCRIPTIBLE)
Perhaps the most important thing demonstrated by the equation Nagarjuna
presents in the above verse is that the Madhyamika philosophy is, in its
essence, very simple. "Independently realized, peaceful,
unobsessed by obsessions, without discriminations and a variety of meaning:
such is the characteristic of truth," he says. [Note:
karika XVIII.9 ] The one clear perception underlying Madhyamika is
the interconnectedness and complete dependence of all things.
Becoming and being, past and future, reality and emptiness, subject and
object, arising and ceasing are all real things, but only in relation to
each other. None exist absolutely. Unfortunately, this insight, while utterly
simple and clear, is not so easily explained. The function of language and
concepts is to make distinctions and impose artificial boundaries. The very
word "define" has in its roots the connotation of creating boundaries (de
+ finis). The Buddha and Nagarjuna had no choice but to explain their insight
into the nature of reality in philosophical terms, formulas, and theories.
Nagarjuna's brilliance lay in his ability to explain it so clearly, and
then to build such effective safeguards against excessive philosophizing
into his system.
Ultimately, the one thing that is of importance is the Buddha's
three-faceted teaching of transitoriness, soullessness, and suffering,
the goal of which teaching being freedom. Only in light of this can Buddhism
and Nagarjuna's enterprise be understood correctly. Rejecting all conceptual
extremes and advocating a middle path is not an exercise in philosophy,
but an aid to help people escape suffering and become free. The Visuddhimagga
expresses poetically but succinctly the reality that remains when the Buddha's
teachings are truly understood:
"Misery only doth exist, none
miserable,
No doer is there; naught save the deed is
found.
Nirvana is, but not the man who seeks it.
The Path exists, but not the traveler on
it."
Note: Visuddhimagga, quoted in Warren, 146
Epilogue
This research project was not merely an academic exercise. I would like
to address briefly what I consider to be the
importance of Madhyamika to our modern world, Occidental or otherwise. To my knowledge, there has never been in recorded history a philosophical
system so exhaustively apophatic as Nagarjuna's that was not also a nihilism.
Even Zen, the champion of paradox, is not really either apophatic or a system.
I have defended the value of Madhyamika within the Buddhist tradition as
being a defense of and an explanation of the twin doctrines of soullessness
and transitoriness, the purpose of which being an aid to escape suffering.
Outside the Buddhist tradition the importance of Madhyamika is slightly
different, for it is not likely that the Western undercurrents of essentialism
could easily be unseated — -nor would I want to.
- One value of this philosophy for the West
lies in its potential to undercut the habits of "I-making" and grasping,
both grasping onto the things of the world and grasping onto the products
of rationality.
- Another value is the contribution Madhyamika could make to Western
philosophy and theology.
Many of the structures of the modern world are based, in some way or
other, on distrust of individual authority. For example, that which has become American democracy is rooted in a
party system. The hope is that, if two or more parties
compete for election and for legislation, then compromises will
emerge in the long run, and no individual will have too much power. The method
on which science is based is founded on a similar
safeguard. One can never prove, but only disprove. Third, the quest
for objectivity underlying all academia certainly betrays this distrust.
There is a strong emphasis on removing all personal reference from research
and attempting to make it uninfluenced by any personal emotions or prejudices.
These safeguards are necessary components of the structures we have. However,
it is not certain that these structures are the only option.
The Buddha's teachings demonstrate that, in a way, emphasis
on the self is the root of all evil. It is an excessive "self-ishness"
that causes one to desire passionately, to assert forcefully one's opinions
and thoughts, to want to be right, to desire to possess. "Self-ishness"
is that which, in whatever situation, causes one to seek one's own well-being
and ignore the thoughts and needs of others. The Buddha's path, especially
as enunciated so radically by Nagarjuna, subverts this "I-making."
I do not know what the result would be if the doctrine of soullessness
were introduced into our systems of politics, science, and academia, but
my suspicion is that the results would be beneficial.
The other importance of Nagarjuna's agenda for me is
the impact it could have on our rational structures of philosophy and theology.
There are many discerning thinkers in these fields whose philosophies are
in no way simplistic, but there are far too few.
A study of Madhyamika philosophy has not forced me to abandon my belief
in concepts like God, the soul, and the afterlife. What it has done
is shown me, if I am to retain those beliefs, of what they may and may not
consist. Nagarjuna's teaching of emptiness can vastly deepen and enrich
one's religious and philosophical notions. Further, his teachings can demonstrate
to what extent those notions are self-created and, thus, which notions may
be true, which false, and which merely helpful guides that must ultimately
be abandoned.
The philosophies of the Buddha and Nagarjuna offer trenchant
explanations of the constitution of reality, the function of the human
mind, and the purpose to which an individual's life and, in some cases,
academic career should be devoted. A study of Madhyamika, if approached
with a receptive attitude, will complement any philosophy, no matter how
antithetical.
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