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Zahedan
KUWAIT
QASHQA'IS
PERSIAN GULF
BALUCHIS
PAKISTAN
SAUDI ARABIA
QATAR
U.A.E.
GULF OF OMAN

ROOTS OF REVOLUTION

AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF MODERN IRAN

NIKKI R. KEDDIE

WITH A SECTION BY YANN RICHARD

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. . . could thou and I with Fate conspire
To grasp this sorry Scheme of Things entire,
Would not we shatter it to bits—and then
Re-mold it nearer to the Heart's Desire!

An eleventh-century Iranian scientist

TO ERIC ROULEAU

Who bridges the worlds

Religious distress is at the same time the *expression* of real distress and also the *protest* against real distress. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, just as it is the spirit of spiritless conditions. It is . . .

A nineteenth-century European socialist

greater than that of the Sunni ulama. There was now a clear doctrinal basis for appeals to the ulama over the head of a ruler, and for claims by the leading mujtahids to make political decisions, provided they touched on Islamic principles, independently of temporal rulers. These powers were increasingly used from the early nineteenth century on.

Another important mid-eighteenth-century development was Nader Shah's rise to power within Iran and foreign conquests. In part because he conquered Sunni lands to the east and had many Sunnis in his armies Nader tried to deinstitutionalize Shi'ism in Iran, and he confiscated Shi'i vaqfs on a large scale to the economic gain of his regime. He wished to make of Shi'ism a fifth orthodox (Sunni) school of law, but this idea was rejected by both sides and scarcely outlived his death in mid-century. By the mid-nineteenth century Shi'i vaqfs had become as extensive as before.

Although Shi'ism had been spread with much coercion, by the eighteenth century it was deeply and widely embraced by nearly all native Persian speakers in Iran as well as a numerical majority of its ethnic minorities. Within the Safavid and modern borders only ethnic minorities bordering on Sunni conationals abroad—most Kurds in the west, the Turkomans in the north, the Baluchis in the southeast and a minority of the Arabs of the southwest—remained Sunni. In addition there remained more scattered religious minorities: Jews, Armenian and Nestorian Christians, Zoroastrians, and the gnostic Sabeans on the Iraqi border, as well as the semi-Shi'i Ahl-e Haqq ("Ali Ilahis") centered among the Kurds.

The eighteenth century also saw the development of a new, more philosophic school of Shi'ism, the Shaikhi school. As their main political importance appeared in the nineteenth-century Babi movement, discussion will be limited to their role in the formation of that movement, below. In general the eighteenth century, though a period of economic decline, civil war, and decentralization, saw the development of several important politico-religious trends.

In the above summary treatment, only a few highlights of Iranian pre-Islamic and Islamic history could be noted, and stress has been placed on those that tie together religious and social movements in a way that provides some background for recent developments. It should be realized, however, that Iran also has a long history of cultural,

scientific, political, and economic developments having little connection with religion, which occupy the pages of many lengthy histories. In the arts Iran has a continuous history of excellence in both poetry and the visual arts, best known in the West through Persian miniatures and carpets and through a felicitous translation of a second-rank poet and first-rank scientist, Omar Khayyam. Iran was virtually the only area in the first wave of Arab conquests that kept its own language rather than adopting Arabic (although the new Persian was and is written in Arabic script and is full of Arabic vocabulary). With the rise of local dynasties in Iran in the ninth through eleventh centuries, owing only theoretical obedience to the Abbasid caliphate, poetry and prose began to flourish in the new Persian language and feelings of special Iranian identity were often expressed. In addition to literary figures, the trained Persian bureaucracy helped keep alive such a Persian linguistic and cultural identity even when Turkish-speaking tribes ruled Iran. Cultural and governmental forces thus preserved an Iranian identity during the pre-Safavid centuries when there was rarely a single state covering the territory of today's Iran.

The development of Shi'ism in Iran gave some focus to feelings of a separate local identity. Until the twentieth century the Shi'i component of this identity was more important than the Iranian one, although it was often unnecessary to distinguish the two. From 1501 until this century, Iranism and Shi'ism were for many people parts of a single blend.

obtained in 1836 and 1841 treaties that gave them the privileges earlier conceded to the Russians. The British Treaty of 1841 included the famous "Most Favored Nation Clause," and with its subsequent extension to other countries' treaties it meant that all foreign powers were united to extend the treaty privileges of any of them, as new privileges were automatically extended to all.

During the reign of Mohammad Shah the strength of foreign powers, and especially Britain, grew, and it was in this period that the first petitions from bazaaris against Western competition were sent to the Shah. Important religious movements and revolts began in these years, possibly connected to dislocations in Iranian life brought on by foreign encroachments. One of these involved Iran's Isma'ili Shi'i community. In Iran there still existed a small group of Sevener or Isma'ili Shi'is, whose leaders were directly descended from the imams of the so-called Assassins, important in eleventh- to thirteenth-century Iran but then suppressed by the Mongol invaders. The Isma'ili community remained largely underground until the Safavids who, even though they belonged to a different Shi'i line, gave them permission to worship openly. The head of this Isma'ili community, who bore the hereditary title of Agha Khan, became involved in a provincial disagreement and, moved in part by personal ambition, launched a revolt in south-central Iran. He was defeated, and as a result he fled, along with many of his followers, to India, where there were many adherents of his branch of Isma'ili Shi'ism. The followers of the hereditary Agha Khans, based from the 1840s until today in India, believe them to be the descendants of the first imams, via the Egypt-centered Fatimid dynasty, followed by the Nizaris (Assassins). Hence they are considered living imams, the imams of the Sevener line never having disappeared like the Twelfth Imam of the Twelvers. Unknown to most, a small and often semisecret community of Seveners has continued to exist in Iran after the 1840s exile.[5]

Far more important for Iran from the mid-nineteenth century on was the messianic movement known as the Babis, an altered offshoot of which later spread both within and outside Iran as Baha'ism. The founder of Babism, Sayyed Ali Mohammad, later called the Bab ("gate" to the Twelfth Imam), was born in 1819 into a family of merchants in the southwestern city of Shiraz. Early choosing a religious vocation, he

went to study with the most learned of the Shi'i ulama in the shrine cities of Najaf and Karbala in Ottoman Iraq. Here he became a follower of a movement within Shi'ism named the Shaikhi movement after its founder Shaikh Ahmad Ahsa'i (1754–1826). Shaikhi ideas included elements both more philosophical and more mystical than those of most orthodox Shi'is, but their most important special feature was a new "fourth pillar," which suggested that there is always a man in the world capable of interpreting the will of the hidden imam (and perhaps of communicating with him). After returning to Shiraz, in 1844 Sayyed Ali Mohammad proclaimed himself this door (Bab) to the hidden imam. Later, as his claims were rejected by most ulama and they began to treat him as a heretic, he sometimes announced he was the imam himself, returning as was predicted to institute perfection on earth. In Shiraz and later in Isfahan he preached against the corruption and venality of the ulama, and when civil authorities turned against him he attacked them also for their sins. The Bab had started with a small but devoted following, and this quickly grew; many at first came from the Shaikhi community, which had expanded in Iran since the late eighteenth century. On the other hand less radical Shaikhis now began, and continued, to insist that the "Bab" spoken of by Shaikh Ahmad Ahsa'i would not manifest himself openly, and that the concept was spiritual, rather than referring to an identifiable man.

It seems probable that the Babi movement, which developed into open socioreligious messianic revolt, can in part be understood as one of several mass religiopolitical messianic movements that appeared under the initial impact of the industrialized West in the third world. This impact tends to make third-world countries subject to new trade fluctuations, to undermine handicrafts, restructure agriculture to the detriment of some, and have other disruptive effects, at the same time as Western examples in law, religion, and custom may suggest new ideas on how to meet new problems. Among such messianic movements occurring after the early impact of the industrialized West are the Taiping Rebellion in China, the Ahmadiya and other groups in India and Pakistan, the Mahdist movement of the Sudan, and a variety of Christian and semi-Christian movements in Africa and Latin America. The new ideological content of most of these, as of the Babi movement, supports the idea that they are not simply "traditional"

messianic revolts, but are in addition linked to new conditions brought by the Western presence.[6]

Once he lost hope of becoming the leader of a reformed Islam, the Bab not only denounced both secular and religious authorities, but announced a new scripture, the *Bayan,* which contained laws superseding many in the Quran. In his scripture and preachings the Bab spoke out for greater social justice, and his partially modern, perhaps "bourgeois," content is seen in such points as a high valuation of productive work, a denunciation of begging (not blameworthy in Islam, especially as it provides an occasion to give alms), a call for mild and humanitarian treatment of children and others, and the end to the prohibition of taking interest. He also called, if not exactly in modern economic terms, for guarantees for personal property, freedom of trade and profits, and the reduction of arbitrary taxes. He called notably for a higher position for women, who were to be educated and not to be beaten, and for limits on polygamy. The already educated but formerly secluded Babi poet and preacher, Qorrat al-Ain, was reported to have preached unveiled; most Babi women did not dare go that far at this early time.

Whether he claimed to be the gate to the Twelfth Imam or whether, as he sometimes later said, he was both a prophet and the imam himself returned to institute a reign of perfect justice throughout the world, the Bab aroused messianic sentiments among his followers. The differences of his scripture from the Quran he explained by a theory containing a progressive evolutionism rare in premodern thought. Muslims believe that there were prophets before Mohammad but that each brought an essentially identical revelation, from which some followers deviated and needed to be brought back to the true path by a new prophet. Mohammad, however, was the last of the prophets (even though Shi'is often seem to revere Ali and Hosain more, their messages are not considered to differ from Mohammad's). The Bab, however, said that each prophet brings a new message in accord with the growing maturity of humanity, and that each new message supersedes the last one. Hence the *Bayan* does not just interpret, but supersedes the Quran, while including the essence of its message. Past prophets are respected and their laws were needed during their own prophetic cycle, but those laws that are superseded are no longer valid. This doctrine was regarded with horror by pious Muslims and was seen as a dangerous heretical breakoff from Islam.

Political events now impinged on the Babi movement. Mohammad Shah died in 1848 and British and Russian protection served to assure the throne to the crown prince, the teen-aged Naser ad-Din, who was to reign for forty-eight years (1848–96). In Muslim countries interregna are often periods for disorder and revolt, as when there is no new king ruling from the capital many consider that no legal ruler exists. As crown princes took some weeks to travel from Tabriz to Tehran, interregna could be dangerous times for rulers and propitious ones for their opponents. The Babis tried to take advantage of this period to begin revolts, and they succeeded in establishing enclaves, first in a village in the Caspian province of Mazanderan and later in some cities. The Babi revolts were not well coordinated nationally, however, owing in part to lack of modern transportation and communication, and the government was able between 1848 and 1851 to suppress them cruelly, massacring many who had been offered safe conduct in return for surrender. The Bab himself was arrested even before the revolts began, and his civil and ulama opponents evidently decided that messianic feelings about him, considered a main factor in the revolts, could be dampened by his execution. Hence, he was taken to Tabriz, interrogated by the ulama about his religious beliefs, and sentenced to death by firing squad, in 1850. The first round of bullets sent up a cloud of smoke, which remarkably cleared to reveal no body, though the Bab was then found and executed, the first volley having merely cut his ropes.

After the suppression of the Babi revolts, during which one Babi conclave adopted a semicommunist doctrine, and the repression that followed, a small and desperate group of Babis tried to kill the shah in 1852. After this there were terrible tortures and executions of Babis, including the woman preacher-poet Qorrat al-Ain. The Babis who survived now had either to keep their beliefs hidden or to emigrate, concentrating first in Ottoman Baghdad. The successor as leader of the Babis, apparently chosen by the Bab, was called Sobh-e Azal. He was soon challenged by his more dynamic half-brother, Baha'ollah, who succeeded in attracting the great majority of the community. As part of the Bab's progressive theory of prophets, he had predicted that the

to 1889, and concentrated his reform activities on promoting a modified Persian script and on writing reformist essays with very limited circulation.

In 1889 Naser ad-Din Shah took his third trip to Europe, which was heavily promoted by the British minister in Iran, Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, who hoped to further British financial interest in Iran, and largely succeeded. Among the concessions signed by the shah was one for a lottery in Iran promoted in part by Malkom Khan. After returning to Iran, the shah faced strong opposition to the lottery concession, coming partly from the religious element who noted that gambling was forbidden by the Quran. The shah canceled the concession and so informed Malkom Khan, who hastened to sell what he controlled of the concession for a good price before its cancellation became known. This and other actions resulted in Malkom's dismissal from his posts and the removal of all his titles. The somewhat tarnished but influential reformer now decided to undermine, or perhaps to blackmail, Iran's rulers by producing an oppositional and reformist newspaper, *Qanun* (Law), printed in London and smuggled into Iran. Preaching the virtues of a fixed legal system and the evils of arbitrary and corrupt government, *Qanun* concentrated its attacks on Amin as-Soltan. It was widely read among Iran's elite during its existence, until the death of Naser ad-Din Shah.[1] The only other free newspaper at this time, the older *Akhtar* put out by Iranians in Istanbul, was milder in its reformism, and hence less often forbidden entry into Iran. Within Iran there were only official journals. (The one freer paper launched with the encouragement of Mirza Hosain Khan in 1876, the bilingual *La Patrie,* lasted for only one issue, in which its French editor called for open and fearless criticism.)

Before 1890 most educated Westernizing reformists had been rather hostile to the ulama—as were reformist officials like Amir Kabir, Mirza Hosain Khan, Amin ad-Dauleh, and the Babi and Baha'i reformers. On the other hand, some ulama increasingly emerged as effective opponents of the alarming trend toward the sale of Iran's resources to foreigners. Moreover, the ulama's virtual inviolability and their ties to the guilds could make even secular reformers recognize them as useful allies in a struggle against foreign control. From 1890 through 1912 there was some reconciliation between secularists and ulama opposed to the regime's policies.

One architect of this historically unusual alliance between religious and radical elements was the internationally traveled Muslim reformer and pan-Islamist, Sayyed Jamal ad-Din "al-Afghani" (1839–97). Although he claimed Afghan birth and upbringing, probably in order to have more influence in the Sunni world than he could have had as an Iranian of Shi'i birth and education, Afghani was in fact born in Iran and had a Shi'i education in Iran and in the Shi'i shrine cities of Iraq. Educated in the rationalist philosophical tradition of Avicenna and later Iranian philosophers, who were far more taught in Iran than in the Sunni Near East, Afghani was also influenced by the philosophically oriented Shaikhi school of Shi'ism. In about 1857–58 he traveled to India, where he seems to have developed a lifelong hatred of British imperialism. After activities in Afghanistan and Istanbul and an influential stay in Egypt from 1871 to 1879, he continued his modernist and antiimperialist writing, first in India and then in Paris, where he edited the anti-British and pan-Islamic Arabic newspaper. *al-'Urwa al-Wuthqa.*[2]

After activities in London, Afghani returned to the south Persian port city of Bushehr, whence he had left decades before for India. He apparently intended only to pick up books sent to him there from Egypt and to go to Russia to continue anti-British activities. The Iranian minister of press, E'temad as-Saltaneh, who had read *al-'Urwa al-Wuthqa,* talked the shah into inviting Afghani to Tehran. There he soon offended the shah, probably by violent anti-British proposals, but gathered a group of Iranian disciples. He apparently spoke to them of the need for uniting religious and nonreligious opposition to foreign encroachments. Forced by the shah to leave Iran in 1887, he spent two years in Russia and then rejoined the shah during the latter's third trip to Europe and received an invitation back to Iran. He first went to Russia, believing he had a mission from Amin as-Soltan to calm Russian hostility over concessions to the British, but in Iran Amin as-Soltan denied such a mission and refused to see him. In the summer of 1890 Afghani heard that the shah was planning to exile him and forestalled this by taking sanctuary in a shrine south of Tehran. He continued to gather disciples, to whom he explained such means of organized opposition as the secret society and the secretly posted and distributed leaflet. His contacts in Iran included his Tehran host, Amin az-Zarb, the wealthiest Persian merchant and master of the mint;

Islam. The inclusion of some (though not most) vaqf land in land reform was also of some importance. The imprisonment of revered religious leaders, and their foreign or internal exile in the cases of Ayatollahs Khomaini and Taleqani, further aroused their colleagues and followers. It was also felt that the shah's downgrading of Islam was accompanied by his favoring of both foreigners and non-Muslim Iranians. In the case of the Baha'is, considered apostates from Islam by pious Muslims, this was a point that sometimes took on exaggerated proportions, while the words of some ulama occasionally went from anti-Zionism to anti-Semitism. A minority of Baha'is, Christians, and Jews had well-paying jobs and/or ties to foreigners or to the court; the importance of this was often exaggerated and so, like similar minorities elsewhere, these non-Muslims were sometimes resented. Officially the ulama and their partisans spoke and speak of protecting the recognized minorities. Resentment was also felt against reputed Freemasonic connections of some in the government and at court, as many considered Freemasonry anti-Islamic and pro-British.

The ending of Iraq-Iran cold and hot hostilities by treaty in 1975 resulted in a resumption of Iranian pilgrimages to Iraq in 1976, and an increasing number of tapes and writings reached Iran from Ayatollah Khomaini in Iraq. His uncompromising line gave courage to oppositional ulama within Iran, and much mosque preaching became increasingly hostile to the shah. Some within Iran, like Ayatollah Kazem Shariatmadari, took a more moderate line, but nonetheless eventually began to call for the full restoration of the 1906–07 constitution (meaning free elections, a government responsible to the majles, a weak shah, and a committee of mujtahids to veto bills not deemed in accord with Muslim law). The death of Khomaini's son Mostafa in Iraq in October 1977, assumed to be the work of SAVAK, added to the opposition.

In January 1978, the regime demonstrated the degree to which it miscalculated the strength of the religious opposition in taking one of its fatal missteps. Reportedly at the instigation of the shah, an article was published in the leading, semiofficial newspaper, *Ettela'at*, violently attacking and slandering Khomaini. The article emanated from Information Minister Daryush Homayun (one of several former oppositionist students abroad who rose high in the shah's regime). The

two-column article was entitled "Iran and Red and Black Colonization" and signed with a pseudonym. After generalities on the White Revolution and "black reaction" (of the ulama), the article attacked a religious leader chosen to direct the movement: "an adventurer, without faith, and tied to the centers of colonialism . . . a man with a dubious past, tied to the more superficial and reactionary colonialists." This man was Ruhollah Khomaini, better known as "the Indian Sayyed." Although his ties to India had never been brought to light, it was clear that he had contacts with the British. In his youth he wrote love poems signed *Hindi* (the Indian). The article ended by saying that Khomaini was opposed to the shah's reforms, and suggested that he received large sums from the English (via an Arab) to continue his fight against the shah.

The promotion of such calumnies showed the concern of the regime to discredit Khomaini, but events proved it to be a bad miscalculation. The following day theological students in Qom staged a massive protest and sit-in, which was broken up by security forces. This brought on a violent confrontation, at least seventy were killed in two days, making this the bloodiest incident since 1963.

The newspaper attack on Khomaini and the Qom incident may be seen as a key point—January 1978—in which much of the initiative in the protest movement swung from the secular forces, with their letters, petitions, organizations, and political poetry readings, to the religiously led opposition. Even if the authorities had had the sense not to calumniate Khomaini, the religiously led movement would probably have developed as the leading oppositional force. The religious opposition, especially if one adds those who admired Shariati and the Mojahedin, appealed to far larger numbers than did the secular liberals, and in any mass protest it is virtually certain that these people would ultimately have been decisive and would have turned to the leaders they trusted most. The government had been largely successful over many years in suppressing secular protests and had left a clearer field for the less manageable religious opposition.

The ulama and bazaar leadership, sensing their new power and the grievances of their constituency, helped in 1978 to organize massive memorial demonstrations for those killed in previous incidents, taking place at traditional forty-day religious intervals. Here was a brilliant

century: "many of them [mujtahids] maintain that it is not at all true that the Succession of Imams was lost, and that there is nobody today who has at least part of the charge; and that it is even impossible that this occur, but one must believe on the contrary that the succession of Imams continues always and that there is always someone who has the charge of Lieutenant of God on earth. . . . They teach that the *Imam* should be sought particularly among the . . . *Mujtahid*(s)" (*Voyages*, 2: 337). And "The People of the church . . . and all those who profess the strict observation of religion, hold that in the absence of the Imam, the royal place should be filled by a Mujtahid . . . 'How is it possible,' say the people of the Church, 'that these impious . . . Kings, drinkers of wine, consumed by passion, be the vicars of God, and that they have communication with heaven? . . . Our kings being iniquitous and unjust men, their domination is a tyranny, to which God has subjected us to punish us, after having taken from the world the legitimate successor of his Prophet. The supreme throne of the universe belongs only to a mujtahid, or man who possesses sanctity and science above most people. It is true that since the mujtahid is holy, and consequently a man of peace, there must be a king who carries a sword for the exercise of justice, but he must be only like his minister and dependent on him." (Chardin, *Voyages*, 2: 207–08.) Playing down the ulama's premodern political claims are J. Eliash, "Misconceptions Regarding the Juridical Status of the Iranian 'Ulama,' " *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 10 no. 1 (1979): 9–25; and S. A. Arjomand, "Political Action and Legitimate Domination in Shi'ite Iran: Fourteenth to Eighteenth Centuries A.D.," *Archives Européennes de Sociologie*, vol. 20 no. 1 (1979): 59–109.

11. The Twelver Creed by al-Allama al-Hilli, *al-Babu'l-Hadi 'Ashar*, trans. W. M. Miller (London, 1928), praises the Mu'tazilites, stresses the rationality and comprehensible justice of God, and says that men have free will and that certain things are incumbent on God. See also W. Madelung, "Imamism and Mu'tazilite Theology," in *Le Shi'isme Imamite*. Thanks to N. Keddie's 1979–80 graduate seminar, especially to J. Cole and T. Shimamoto, for aiding in this analysis.

12. See Comte de Gobineau, *Religions et philosophies dans l' Asie Centrale* (Paris, 1957), pp. 35–39.

Chapter 2

1. On the contrasting centralizing role of cannons and decentralizing role of good handguns see H. Inalcik, "The Socio-Political Effects of the Diffusion of Fire-arms in the Middle East," in V. Parry and M. Yapp, eds., *War, Technology, and Society in the Middle East* (London and New York, 1975). The point on the importance of rifles to the resurgence of tribes in eighteenth-century Iran was suggested to me on the basis of research in progress by Robert McDaniel. Among the works showing significant eighteenth-century socioeconomic change are T. Naff and R. Owen, eds., *Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History* (Carbondale, Ill. 1977); N. Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal, 1964); and A. Hourani, "The Changing Face of the Fertile Crescent in the Eighteenth Century," *Studia Islamica*, 8 (1957): 89–122.

2. The estimates are by C. Issawi, ed., *The Economic History of Iran: 1800–1914* (Chicago, 1971), p. 20. A detailed study of a shorter period is G. G. Gilbar, "Demographic Developments in Late Qajar Persia, 1810–1906," *Asian and African Studies* vol. 11, no. 2 (1976): 125–56.

3. More detailed analyses of the role of tribes in Iran and the Middle East are found in articles by N. R. Keddie, "Is There a Middle East?" *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 4, no. 3 (1973): 255–71; "Socio-Economic Change in the Middle East since 1800: A Comparative Analysis," in A. Udovitch, ed., *The Islamic Middle East, 700–1900: Studies in Social and Economic History* (Princeton, Darwin Press, 1981); and "Pre-Capitalist Structures in the Middle East," in N. R. Keddie, *The Middle East and Beyond* (London, 1981). There is a large recent literature on Iranian tribes by authors including G. R. Garthwaite and J. P. Digard on the Bakhtiaris; L. G. Beck and P. Oberling on the Qashqa'i; W. Irons on the Turkomans; P. Saltzman and B. Spooner on the Baluchis; R. and N. Tapper on the Shahsevan; G. Chaliand, ed. *People Without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan* (London, 1980), and M. Van Bruinessen on the Kurds, and D. Bradburd and L. Helfgott on theoretical questions.

4. On the Qajar bureaucracy see the article by A. R. Sheikholeslami in A. Banani, ed., *State and Society in Iran* (special issue of *Iranian Studies*, 1978); and S. Bakhash, *Iran: Monarchy, Bureaucracy, and Reform under the Qajars, 1858–1896* (London, 1978). In the literature important men are known either by their given names, often preceded by the honorific "Mirza" and followed by the honorific "Khan," or by titles, which may change, or as here by the name followed by the title. In the latter case we italicize the title to distinguish it from the name. Most titles were abolished under Reza Shah, who also introduced family names. (The word "Mirza" *before* a name means an educated man; *after* a name it keeps its original meaning of a royal prince.)

5. On the disruptive economic impact of opium see the important article by Roger Olson in M. Bonine and N. Keddie, eds., *Modern Iran: The Dialectics of Continuity and Change* (paperback, *Continuity and Change in Modern Iran*) (Albany, 1981). Overviews of nineteenth- and twentieth-century agricultural changes are in N. R. Keddie, "Stratification, Social Control, and Capitalism in Iranian Villages, before and after Land Reform," *Rural Politics and Social Change in the Middle East*, ed. R. Antoun and I. Harik (Bloomington, Ind., 1972), reprinted in N. R. Keddie, *Iran: Religion, Politics and Society* (London, 1980), and A. K. S. Lambton, *Landlord and Peasant in Persia* (London, 1953, reprinted 1969).

6. This is suggested to us by the studies of leading families in Maragheh by M. J. Good and in Shiraz by Wm. Royce in M. Bonine and N. Keddie, eds., *Modern Iran*, which suggest considerable long-term continuity until at least the Reza Shah period, as does the ongoing study of mobility in various social strata in Shiraz being done by Ahmad Ashraf and Ali Banuazizi. This contrasts to the high mobility in Tehran elite families, most of whom came from elsewhere, revealed by the ongoing work of Constance Cronin on Tehran.

7. There has yet to be a book-length study of women's religious lives or women mollas, although Judith Goldstein and other women have done fieldwork in this area and several Western women including myself have witnessed women's ceremonies.

Research in Iran was largely inspired by the first Western work to deal extensively with Shi'i women's religious ceremonies and mollas, E. W. Fernea's enthralling account of life in a Iraqi village, *Guests of the Sheik* (Garden City, N.Y., 1965).

8. On the harem as a center of useful work and management see A. L. Marsot, "The Revolutionary Gentlewomen in Egypt," in L. Beck and N. Keddie, eds., *Women in the Muslim World* (Cambridge, Mass., 1978).

9. J. Atkinson, trans., *Customs and Manners of the Women of Persia* (New York, 1971; reprint of 1832 ed.); A. Chodzko, "Code de la femme chez les persans," unidentified offprint at the Institut Nationale des Langues Orientales Vivantes in Paris.

Chapter 3

1. G. Curzon, *Persia and the Persian Question,* 2 (London, 1892), 470–71, "Formerly the Crown only claimed one-tenth; but this proportion was doubled by Fath Ali Shah. In practice it is found that the assessment frequently amounts to thirty percent, and twenty-five percent may perhaps be taken as a fair average. The system, however, varies absolutely in different parts of the country, and even in different parts of the same province."

2. See N. R. Keddie, "Stratification, Social Control, and Capitalism in Iranian Villages, before and after Land Reform," *Rural Politics and Social Change in the Middle East,* ed. R. Antoun and I. Harik (Bloomington, Ind., 1972), reprinted in N. R. Keddie, *Iran: Religion, Politics and Society* (London, 1980).

3. Mid-nineteenth-century appeals by merchants to the government to limit or prohibit European imports are noted in various sources, among them one reported by a British consul in 1844, cited in C. Issawi, ed., *The Economic History of Iran: 1800–1914* (Chicago, 1971), p. 76. By the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries merchants and nationalists were forming companies to boycott Western goods and promote Iranian ones. Even merchants who profited from foreign trade often saw opportunities for greater profit if European privileges were ended.

4. See the account in H. Algar, *Religion and State in Iran 1785–1906* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1969), pp. 94–99, which challenges standard Western accounts.

5. See H. Algar, "The Revolt of Agha Khan Mahallati and the Transference of the Isma'ili Imamate to India," *Studia Islamica,* 29 (1969): 55–81. A recent scholar has studied the small Isma'ili community in contemporary Iran.

6. See N. R. Keddie, "Religion and Irreligion in Early Iranian Nationalism," *Comparative Studies in Society and History,* vol. 4, no. 3 (1962): 265–95, and the sources cited therein (reprinted in N. R. Keddie, *Iran: Religion, Politics and Society* (London, 1980). On Shaikhism and Babism see M. Bayat-Philipp, "Mysticism and Dissent in Socio-religious Thought in Qajar Iran," forthcoming.

7. See Roger Olson, "Persian Gulf Trade and the Agricultural Economy of Southern Iran," in M. Bonine and N. Keddie, eds., *Modern Iran: The Dialectics of Continuity and Change* (Albany, 1981). G. Gilbar, "Persian Agriculture in the Late Qajar Period, 1860–1906," *Asian and African Studies,* vol, 12, no. 3 (1978): 363, while noting price rises in basic foodstuffs, speaks of a more diversified peasant diet, but cites only sugar, tea, opium, and tobacco. His article is, however, factually informative. Nineteenth-century economic decline is argued in H. Katouzian, *The Political Economy of Modern Iran* (London, 1981), chap. 3.

8. A partial translation of this work is found in W. M. Floor's mimeographed Ph.D. thesis, "The Guilds in Qajar Persia," (Leiden, 1971).

9. There is now controversy over the helpful or harmful impact of Western trade on Iranian nineteenth-century living standards. The primarily optimistic views represented by hitherto unpublished papers presented by Gad Gilbar and Guity Nashat at a 1978 congress in Babolsar, Iran, and Gilbar, "Persian Agriculture," appear to be based too heavily on assumptions found in pro-British documentation, whereas V. Nowshirvani's paper at Babolsar was more balanced. W. Floor spoke at a 1980 congress at Harvard of general nineteenth-century immiserization, a view supported by H. Katouzian, *Political Economy.* Olson, "Persian Gulf Trade," indicates that the commercialization of agriculture concentrated wealth in the hands of a few while leaving the majority more vulnerable. When one looks at similar long controversies about pre-revolutionary France or postindustrial-revolution England it seems clear that not even the unearthing of better statistics and more sophisticated arguments is likely to solve this question to everyone's satisfaction.

10. Curzon, *Persia,* 1: 480.

11. On Mirza Hosain Khan see A. Karny, "Mirza Hosein Khan Moshir od-Dowle and His Attempts at Reform in Iran, 1871–1873" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, UCLA, Los Angeles, 1973), and G. Nashat, *The Beginning of Modern Reform in Iran* (Urbana, Ill., 1981).

12. See F. Kazemzadeh, *Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864–1914* (New Haven, 1968), chaps. 2-3: L. E. Frechtling, "The Reuter Concession in Persia," *Asiatic Review,* 34 (1938); E. Taimuri, *Asr-e bikhabari ya tarikh-e emtiyazat dar Iran* (Tehran, Eqbal, 1953–54).

13. Kazemzadeh, *Russia and Britain,* and Denis Wright, *The English amongst the Persians* (London, 1977).

Chapter 4

1. On Malkom Khan see H. Algar, *Mirza Malkum Khan: A Study in the History of Iranian Modernism* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1973), the newspaper *Qanun*, and M. Tabataba'i, *Majmu'eh-ye asar-e Mirza Malkam Khan* (Tehran, 1948–49). *Qanun* has been reprinted as a book in Iran.

2. On Afghani see N. R. Keddie, *Sayyid Jamal ad-Din "al-Afghani": A Political Biography* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1972); *An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamal ad-Din "al-Afghani"* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1968); and H. Pakdaman, *Djamal-ed-Din Assad Abadi dit Afghani* (Paris, 1969), and the Persian and Arabic works referred to therein.

3. N. R. Keddie, *Religion and Rebellion in Iran: The Tobacco Protest of 1891–1892* (London, 1966), and the sources in several languages referred to therein.